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by Admin
27 April 2026 9:42 AM
"In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint. Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny," Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling, held that a long period of incarceration alone cannot override the statutory embargo on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, especially in cases involving national security and the recovery of explosives.
A division bench comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Madhu Jain observed that while Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects individual liberty, it must be balanced against the State’s obligation to protect the security of the community. The court emphasized that the right to a speedy trial does not act as a "mathematical formula" for universal application to release accused persons linked to banned terrorist organizations.
The appellants, Mohd. Saquib Ansari and Waqar Azhar, were arrested in March 2014 following disclosures by a Pakistani national regarding the "Rajasthan Module" of the banned outfit Indian Mujahideen (IM). They were allegedly involved in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist attacks in Delhi and were found in possession of substantial quantities of explosives, IED materials, and detonators. The appellants approached the High Court after the Trial Court rejected their bail applications in 2025, despite them having spent nearly 12 years in custody.
The primary question before the court was whether the prolonged incarceration of the appellants for 12 years entitled them to bail under Article 21 of the Constitution of India despite the restrictive provisions of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. The court was also called upon to determine if the appellants could claim parity with a co-accused who was granted bail and whether their prior conviction by a Jaipur court in a related explosives case established a prima facie true accusation.
Jail is the Rule and Bail the Exception Under UAPA
The High Court observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence—that bail is the rule and jail is the exception—does not apply to the UAPA. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, the bench noted that the language of Section 43D(5) is severely restrictive. The court held that the legislature intended to make bail the exception in terror-related cases, requiring a "prima facie" standard of satisfaction that the accusations are true based on the case diary and the charge sheet.
Conviction in Related FIR Satisfies Section 43D(5) Threshold
The bench placed heavy reliance on the fact that both appellants had already been convicted by a Trial Court in Jaipur for possessing explosives and being members of the Indian Mujahideen. The court noted that this conviction, which included a sentence of life imprisonment under Section 121 of the IPC, was sufficient to satisfy the "prima facie true" test. The judges remarked that the findings of the Jaipur court proved the appellants were "wholly entrenched" in the activities of a banned outfit and had imparted training in bomb-making.
"The mere fact that the sentence of the Appellants has been suspended, does not mean that the conviction is doubted at this stage."
No Parity Between Possession of Digital Devices and Explosives
The court rejected the appellants' plea for parity with a co-accused, Mohd. Maroof, who was previously granted bail. The bench clarified that parity cannot be applied blindly and depends on the specific role and material recovered from each accused. While Maroof was only found with digital devices, the appellants were caught with chemicals, detonators, and IED materials capable of causing massive destruction.
Court Distinguishes Quality of Evidence for Parity
The bench emphasized that "position in crime" is the clincher for parity claims. In this case, the appellants were identified as key members of the Rajasthan Module who had conducted reconnaissance of potential targets. The court held that the nature of recovery from the appellants was materially distinct from that of Maroof, making the latter's bail order inapplicable to their circumstances.
Delay Does Not Automatically Mandate Release in Terror Cases
Addressing the issue of the 12-year incarceration, the High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s recent findings in Gulfisha Fatima v. State. The bench held that while prolonged detention is a matter of constitutional concern, it is not the "sole determinant" for bail under UAPA. The court observed that delay acts as a trigger for "heightened judicial scrutiny" rather than a "trump card" that displaces statutory restraints in cases involving the sovereignty and security of India.
"Najeeb must be understood as a principled safeguard against unconscionable detention... not as a mathematical formula of universal application."
National Security Interests Outweigh Claims of Prolonged Detention
The court concluded that the release of the appellants posed a significant threat to national safety. The bench noted that Article 21 also reflects the State's obligation to protect the life and security of the community. Given the appellants' links to IM leadership in Pakistan and their expertise in bomb-making, the court found that the "competing interest" of societal security outweighed the individual claim to liberty at this stage.
The High Court dismissed the appeals and confirmed the Trial Court's orders denying bail. The bench held that the gravity of the offences, the established role of the appellants in a terrorist module, and the prima facie strength of the case established by their prior conviction necessitated their continued detention. The court ruled that the statutory bar under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA remained firmly attracted.
Date of Decision: 24 April 2026