Authority To Appoint Includes Power To Dismiss; Visitor Can Terminate 'First Registrar' Under Transitional Provisions: Supreme Court

"Section 46(b) and Statute No.28(1) must, therefore, be read in the light of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides that where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to make appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having power to make appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person so appointed," Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated May 21, 2026, held that the Visitor of a University, as the appointing authority for the 'First Registrar' under transitional provisions, possesses the inherent power to terminate their services.

A bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe observed that the authority having the power to make an appointment also necessarily possesses the power to suspend or dismiss the person so appointed. The Court clarified that while the Executive Council is the general appointing authority for regular staff, the "First Registrar" occupies a distinct legal position under the University's founding Act.

The dispute arose when the services of the First Registrar of the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University (RGNAU) were terminated during his probation period in 2020. After a series of litigations, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court eventually quashed the termination in 2024, holding that the Visitor and the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MOCA) had no jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings against University employees. The University and the Union of India challenged this finding before the Supreme Court, arguing that the First Registrar's appointment was governed by special transitional provisions.

The primary question before the Court was whether the Visitor of the University has the jurisdiction to terminate the services of the 'First Registrar' appointed under Section 46 of the RGNAU Act. The Court was also called upon to determine if the general disciplinary procedures involving the Executive Council apply to appointments made under the transitional provisions of the Act.

Distinction Between First Registrar And Regular Employees

The Supreme Court began its analysis by emphasizing the distinction between the "First Registrar" and a "Regular Registrar" under the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013. The Court noted that while Section 14 of the Act generally requires the Registrar to be appointed by the Executive Council, the appointment of the "First Registrar" is specifically governed by the transitional provisions contained in Section 46.

The bench observed that under Section 46(b), the First Registrar is appointed by the Visitor on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor. This special provision is designed to facilitate the initial establishment of the University before its permanent bodies are fully operational. The Court held that the High Court erred in treating the First Registrar as a standard employee subject only to the jurisdiction of the Executive Council.

"The power under Section 46(b) of the Act, exhausts itself when it is exercised by making an appointment."

Application Of The General Clauses Act, 1897

Crucially, the Court invoked Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to interpret the scope of the Visitor’s authority. This section stipulates that the power to make an appointment includes the power to suspend or dismiss, unless a different intention appears in the specific statute. The bench found no such contrary intention in the RGNAU Act that would strip the Visitor of disciplinary control over his own appointee.

The Court reasoned that since the Visitor is the statutory appointing authority for the First Registrar under Section 46, he must also be recognized as the authority competent to terminate those services. The bench clarified that the "appointing authority" referred to in the University Statutes for the purpose of removal must be read as the Visitor in the specific context of transitional appointments.

"The appointing authority necessarily possesses the power to terminate the services of the employee appointed by it."

Validity Of Disciplinary Action Taken By The Visitor

The bench rejected the High Court’s conclusion that the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Visitor were "interlopers" in the disciplinary process. It noted that until the first Executive Council is fully formed, the Steering Committee of the Ministry functions as the interim Executive Council under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, the involvement of the Ministry and the subsequent approval by the Visitor were in accordance with the legal framework of the University.

The Court pointed out that the First Registrar had been served a Memorandum of Charges and an Enquiry Committee had held the charges of indiscipline and gross insubordination to be proved. The Visitor granted approval for termination only after following these due processes. The bench held that this exercise of power was "just and proper" and was in consonance with Statute No. 28(1) of the University Statutes.

"We are, therefore, unable to concur with the finding recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court... that the Visitor had no role in the disciplinary proceedings against the First Registrar."

Non-Interference With Operative Directions Due To Peculiar Facts

Despite finding in favor of the University on the legal question of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court chose not to disturb the operative directions of the High Court. The bench took note of the "peculiar facts and circumstances" of the case, including the fact that the original three-year term of the First Registrar had already expired.

The Court observed that the parties had undergone repeated rounds of litigation and that the First Registrar’s tenure under Section 46(b) was meant to last only from 2019 to 2022. Consequently, while correcting the legal error regarding the Visitor's powers, the Court declined to reverse the actual reinstatement or back-wage orders as they had become largely academic due to the passage of time.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Visitor possesses the legal jurisdiction to terminate the First Registrar, as the power to appoint carries an inherent power to dismiss under the General Clauses Act. While the Court overruled the High Court's legal reasoning on jurisdiction, it disposed of the appeals without interfering with the final outcome due to the expiry of the respondent's term of office.

Date of Decision: May 21, 2026