-
by Admin
17 December 2025 10:13 AM
"Private grievances cannot be converted into public interest through clever pleading" — Andhra Pradesh High Court delivered a decisive judgment reiterating the foundational principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked for resolving private disputes. A Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Sujoy Paul and Justice Renuka Yara observed that the writ appeal was an attempt to settle private scores under the guise of public law, and thus deserved outright dismissal.
The appellant, a former trustee, sought various reliefs against private trusts and individuals, including removal of existing trustees, appointment of an administrator, and relief against wrongful termination. The single judge had earlier dismissed the writ petition, concluding that no public law element was involved and that an efficacious alternative statutory remedy was available under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.
Aggrieved, the appellant filed an intra-court appeal challenging the order, asserting that even private trusts discharging educational and charitable activities should be subjected to constitutional scrutiny.
The Court delivered a stern message:"A dispute arising purely out of private animosity cannot be entertained under Article 226 without any public law element."
The Bench made it clear that writ jurisdiction is not meant for private aggrandizement and cannot be allowed to become a substitute for civil or statutory remedies.
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Binny Ltd. vs. V. Sadasivan, the Court stated: "A writ of mandamus against a private entity is permissible only when it discharges a public function or public duty. The mere fact that an entity is engaged in education or charity does not automatically subject it to writ jurisdiction."
On the issue of pervasive state control, the Court rejected the appellant’s arguments, remarking:
"Mere regulatory supervision by statutory authorities does not clothe a private body with the character of 'State' under Article 12."
The Court highlighted that the respondents, being private trusts and societies, were not funded by the State and did not perform functions closely connected with governmental duties.
Further, the Bench castigated the appellant’s attempt to bypass the alternate remedy available under the Bombay Public Trusts Act:
"Writ jurisdiction is discretionary. When efficacious statutory remedies exist, the High Court should refrain from entertaining such petitions unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated."
The Court found that the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 provided an exclusive mechanism for addressing grievances concerning the administration of trusts. It underlined: "The petitioners have a complete remedy under Section 41-A and related provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. Resorting to a writ petition is wholly unwarranted."
Moreover, the Court held that many of the issues raised were already adjudicated upon by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and were thus barred by principles of res judicata. Emphasizing this, the Court said:
"The petitioner seeks to reopen matters which have attained finality. Courts cannot be made arenas for endless litigation at the whims of dissatisfied parties."
In addition, the prayers relating to wrongful termination of employees were found to be within the domain of industrial and labor law, not within the scope of writ jurisdiction: "Employment disputes are to be ventilated before competent labor forums, not before the constitutional courts under the garb of a public law action."
The High Court concluded emphatically: "A writ petition devoid of a public law element, based on personal vendetta or private disputes, must be nipped in the bud to protect the sanctity of constitutional remedies."
Consequently, the writ appeal was dismissed with costs, reinforcing the vital jurisprudential boundary that distinguishes public law remedies from private litigation.
Date of Decision: 23rd April 2025
