Order 21 Rule 90(3) CPC | Once Judgement Debtor Have Full Notice And Choose Not To Raise Objections, They Are Barred From Challenging The Sale Post Facto: Supreme

“Judgment Debtor Cannot Rely on Grounds Not Raised Before Auction……A judgment debtor who had notice and failed to act cannot later challenge the sale — procedural rights must be exercised at the right time,” holds Supreme Court.

In a critical decision reaffirming procedural rigour in execution proceedings, the Supreme Court of India on 25 November 2025 allowed an appeal against a High Court ruling that had set aside an auction sale conducted over two decades earlier. The Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe ruled that judgment debtors are barred under Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC from raising objections post-sale that they failed to raise before the sale proclamation, despite having due notice.

Setting aside the Madras High Court’s order dated 10.02.2009, which had invalidated the auction sale held on 12.09.2002, the Supreme Court restored the order of the Executing Court dated 15.10.2004 and that of the Appellate Court dated 13.07.2007, upholding the validity of the auction in favour of G.R. Selvaraj, the auction purchaser.

“Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC is not an empty formality — it forecloses stale and belated objections, especially where notice and opportunity were available but not used.”

The core legal issue before the Court was whether a judgment debtor can, after the auction sale, invoke the ground that only part of the property should have been sold—a point linked to the executing court’s obligation under Rule 64 CPC—when such a ground was never raised earlier. The Supreme Court answered emphatically in the negative, holding that Order XXI Rule 90(3) creates a statutory bar that prohibits such belated objections when they were not raised on or before the proclamation of sale, despite full notice.

The case had its genesis in Original Suit No. 9158 of 1995 (formerly C.S. No. 297/1995), where Rasheeda Yasin, the decree holder, had obtained an ex parte money decree of ₹3.75 lakhs with interest against the defendants, Komala Ammal and her son K.J. Prakash Kumar. When the judgment debtors failed to pay, execution proceedings were initiated, and their property measuring 2120 sq. ft. in Choolai, Chennai, was attached and sold through a public auction.

“Once parties have full notice and choose not to raise objections, they are barred from challenging the sale post facto,” the Court observed.

Over multiple failed auctions between 2000 and 2002, the upset price was gradually reduced—from ₹16.25 lakhs to ₹11 lakhs—due to lack of bidders. At each stage, the judgment debtors were served with notices, and on several occasions, they even appeared and contested the reduction of price. Eventually, on 12.09.2002, the sale was completed in favour of G.R. Selvaraj for ₹11.03 lakhs, and a sale certificate was issued.

Despite full participation earlier, the judgment debtors filed an application under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC to set aside the sale, primarily alleging that the entire property had been sold instead of a part, which they argued was in violation of Order XXI Rule 64 and Rule 66 CPC. However, the Executing Court dismissed the application on 15.10.2004, holding that there was no material irregularity and that the judgment debtors were fully aware of and involved in the process. The Appellate Court confirmed this view on 13.07.2007.

However, the High Court reversed these findings, holding that the executing court had failed to discharge its duty under Order XXI Rule 64 CPC to consider whether only a portion of the property could have satisfied the decree. It relied on earlier Supreme Court rulings in Ambati Narasayya and Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi, which had stressed that the court must not permit sale of more property than necessary.

“The bar under Rule 90(3) CPC applies squarely where the judgment debtor had notice and yet chose silence — acquiescence defeats belated objections,” rules Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, however, clarified that the Ambati Narasayya and Takkaseela rulings were pre-1976 cases, delivered prior to the insertion of sub-rule (3) in Rule 90. Since the 1976 Amendment, Rule 90(3) clearly bars challenges to a sale on any ground that could have been raised before the sale proclamation.

The judgment meticulously distinguished between earlier and later jurisprudence, holding that in post-amendment cases, the applicable standard is laid down in Desh Bandhu Gupta v. N.L. Anand (1994) 1 SCC 131. In that case, the Court held that if the judgment debtor had notice but did not act before the sale, they are precluded from contesting it afterward.

Quoting from Desh Bandhu Gupta, the Court reaffirmed:

“If he had notice from court and acquiesced by taking no action before the date of sale, he would be precluded to assail its legality or correctness thereafter.”

The Court found that in the present case, the judgment debtors were repeatedly served with notices, actively participated in early stages, and then chose not to contest the sale terms or the upset price reductions.

They had every opportunity to raise the argument that only part of the property should be sold, but failed to do so. Therefore, their subsequent invocation of Rule 64 CPC was held to be barred.

“Judicial discipline demands that procedural safeguards be exercised at the right stage — not raised as an afterthought,” said the Bench.

Rejecting the High Court’s view that the executing court’s duty under Rule 64 CPC survives independent of procedural defaults, the Supreme Court held:

“Unfortunately, the High Court, having noted the bar postulated by Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, failed to give effect to it, assuming that the obligation under Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) CPC would operate independently upon the executing Court, irrespective of the lapse on the part of the judgment debtors.”

The Court stressed that such reasoning cannot override the express statutory bar created by Rule 90(3), which is binding when notice and opportunity were available and not utilised.

Procedural Finality Reinforced in Execution Law

Summing up its findings, the Court held:

“Having failed to raise a material irregularity at the appropriate stage… it is not open to them to now raise such a belated plea and blithely place the burden on the executing Court, so as to seek setting aside of a sale held as long back as in the year 2002.”

Accordingly, the auction sale held on 12.09.2002 was restored, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside. The appeal was allowed.

Date of Decision: 25 November 2025