Once Prima Facie Truth of Terror Charges is Found, Section 43D(5) of UAPA Leaves No Scope for Bail: Karnataka HC Decline Bail To Engineering Student Accused of Aiding ISIS

Crypto Wallets, Petrol Bombs & Recon Missions: Karnataka High Court Says No Bail for ISIS-Linked Accused Under UAPA. In a sharply reasoned judgment, the Karnataka High Court dismissed a bail appeal filed under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, by a 24-year-old engineering graduate accused of active participation in a radical Islamist conspiracy involving the Islamic State. The Bench comprising Justice H.P. Sandesh and Justice Venkatesh Naik T upheld the decision of the NIA Special Court rejecting the appellant’s bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, holding that “the statutory bar imposed by Section 43D(5) operates squarely when prima facie evidence reveals active involvement in terrorist activities.”

The Court ruled that the material collected by the NIA—ranging from digital propaganda, cryptocurrency trails, voluntary statements, and physical evidence of reconnaissance and arson—“cumulatively supports the inference that the appellant was consciously furthering the objectives of a proscribed terrorist organisation.”

Engineering Student Turned ISIS Foot-Soldier

The case arises from an NIA probe into a suspected ISIS-linked module operating in and around Mangaluru, where several youth were allegedly recruited, radicalised, and deployed for arson, reconnaissance, and logistics support. The appellant, Reeshaan Thajuddin Sheikh @ Rishaan Thajuddin @ Rishan, was booked under Sections 120B, 121A, 427, 435 of the IPC, Sections 16, 17, 18, 20, 38, 39 and 40 of the UAPA, and Section 2 of the Karnataka State Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act, 1981.

The NIA alleged that the appellant was radicalised by Accused No.2, a college friend at P.A. College of Engineering, and thereafter participated in coordinated arson attacks and conducted reconnaissance of strategic locations such as oil tankers, substations, and gas stations. It was further alleged that he received cryptocurrency-based terror funding from an online handler identified as “Colonel”, converted it into cash, and handed it to co-accused for operational use.

“Terrorism is Not a Mere Allegation; It is an Ideological War Waged with Clandestine Tools like Digital Money and Online Radicalisation”

Digital Evidence, Crypto Trails and Admissions: Trial Court’s Findings Endorsed

The Court noted that “the appellant’s own voluntary statement recorded by the NIA reveals chilling details of ISIS propaganda being circulated via PDFs and videos showing beheadings, jihad sermons, and demonstrations on making petrol bombs.”

Referring to the forensic analysis of the appellant’s seized mobile device, the Court remarked that “the FSL report revealed images of sensitive installations and news clippings of arson incidents, clearly establishing participation in reconnaissance missions and post-offence glorification.”

Importantly, the Bench took note of the crypto-financial linkages: “The appellant admitted to receiving terror funds into his Zebpay crypto wallet and those of his friends, which were then converted into cash and used for furthering the objectives of the Islamic State.”

“Section 43D(5) UAPA Is a Bar With Teeth – If You’re Prima Facie Guilty, Bail Is Statutorily Prohibited”

High Court Rejects Plea That Accusations Were “Based on Conjecture”

The defence had argued that there was no direct evidence of the appellant participating in any act of terror as defined under Section 15 of the UAPA, and that mere association or logistical help could not constitute a terrorist act. However, the High Court decisively rejected this line of defence.

“This is not a case of mistaken identity or peripheral association. The digital and documentary evidence collected is sufficient at this stage to meet the threshold of prima facie truth under Section 43D(5),” the Court held, adding that “active assistance in receiving and routing terror funds, reconnaissance and arson, cannot be brushed aside as passive conduct.”

The Bench further cautioned that “bail proceedings are not trials. The question at this stage is not whether the prosecution will ultimately secure a conviction, but whether there exist reasonable grounds for believing the accusations to be prima facie true.”

Citing Supreme Court Precedents, Court Emphasises National Security Over Procedural Hyper-technicalities

While the appellant relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement to argue procedural lapses in arrest and investigation, the Court held that these decisions “do not dilute the legislative command under Section 43D(5) when incriminating material exists on record.”

“The Supreme Court’s observations on arrest safeguards in PMLA cases do not apply to UAPA bail considerations in the presence of material showing active terror involvement,” the Court clarified.

Refusing to grant relief, the High Court concluded:
“This is not a case to enlarge the appellant on bail. The Trial Court has examined the cumulative evidence in meticulous detail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

In times when terror activities are increasingly financed through digital modes and planned through online radicalisation, the Karnataka High Court’s judgment sends a clear signal—prima facie involvement in terrorism, especially under UAPA, invokes a strict statutory bar that cannot be side-stepped through technical pleas.

Date of Decision: 22 January 2026