Land Acquisition Act | Award Passed In Favour Of Sole Claimant Who Died Before Hearing Without Substitution Is A Nullity: Bombay High Court

"The Award passed by the Reference Court in favour of the deceased sole claimant is a nullity. The objection to its validity is not an objection to a mere error in the Award. It goes to the foundation of the adjudication." Bombay High Court, in a significant ruling dated September 22, 2026, has held that an award passed by a Reference Court in favour of a sole claimant who died during the pendency of proceedings—without their legal representatives being brought on record—is a "nullity" and lacks legal force.

Dealing with a condonation of delay application for 2958 days, a bench of Justice Amit Borkar emphasized that such a fundamental jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by the mere passage of time or the expiry of the limitation period.

The Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation (Applicant) sought to challenge an award passed in 2017 by the District Judge, Pune, in a land reference case. The sole claimant had passed away during the pendency of the reference, and the proceedings were concluded and the award passed in the name of the deceased individual without any substitution of legal representatives. The Applicant filed an appeal only after a delay of 2958 days, citing administrative delays and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic as reasons for the lapse.

The primary question before the court was whether the death of a sole claimant before the final hearing of a land reference, coupled with the failure to bring legal representatives on record, results in the abatement of the proceedings. The court was further tasked with determining whether an award passed in such circumstances constitutes a "nullity" and whether a delay of nearly eight years in challenging such an award can be condoned on the ground that the order itself is void.

Applicability of Order XXII CPC to Land Reference

The court reiterated that under Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) apply to reference proceedings. Rejecting the argument that strict procedural rules do not apply to land acquisition references, the court held that the claimant acts as a plaintiff and carries the burden of establishing the inadequacy of compensation. Consequently, the duty to seek substitution under Order XXII of the CPC lies with the claimant's side, and failure to do so upon the death of the sole claimant leads to the abatement of the reference by operation of law.

"The reference (in case of sole claimant) qua the deceased claimant or the claim (in case where there are more than one claimant in the reference case) would abate (upon death of the claimant)."

Court Explains Doctrine of Nullity

The bench distinguished between a mere "erroneous" order and a "nullity." While an order that is merely wrong due to a misappreciation of evidence remains valid until set aside by a higher court, a judgment passed in favour of a dead person without substitution affects the very authority of the court. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade, the court observed that such an adjudication lacks the force of law and does not become valid merely because it was not challenged within the prescribed limitation period.

"The defect is not merely an error committed while deciding the reference. The sole claimant had ceased to be alive before the Reference Court heard and decided the matter. No legal representative was brought on record."

Impact of Delay on Void Orders

Addressing the significant delay of 2958 days, the court held that while a party is normally required to provide "sufficient cause" for delay, this requirement operates differently when the challenge is against a nullity. The court held that if an adjudication is a nullity, the principle that it can be questioned "whenever and wherever" it is relied upon applies. Therefore, the lapse of time cannot retrospectively validate a proceeding that lacked the essential foundation of a living, represented party at the time of the final adjudication.

"Once the Award is found to be a nullity, the lapse of time cannot validate it. The Applicant cannot be denied examination of the said fundamental defect merely on the ground that the challenge was filed after 2958 days."

The court allowed the interim application and condoned the delay, stating that the fundamental defect in the award necessitated a review of the matter on merits. By holding that the award was a nullity, the court cleared the path for the appeal to be heard, emphasizing that the legal system cannot permit a void order to be treated as a binding decree simply because the acquiring authority failed to challenge it earlier.

Date of Decision: 22 September 2026