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by sayum
25 September 2026 6:47 AM
"Where there is an express provision barring a particular remedy, the court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers... grant of directions to register FIR and investigate here would be gross injustice to the accused persons, who would be arm-twisted on the basis of those directions and would be compelled to settle what appears to be only a civil dispute, synthetically tainted with criminality." Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling, held that criminal proceedings cannot be used as a shortcut to settle contractual and commercial disputes, while refusing to interfere with concurrent orders declining police investigation under Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
A bench of Justice Girish Kathpali observed that invoking inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS to bypass the statutory bar against a second revision petition under Section 438(3) BNSS is impermissible unless a clear case of gross injustice or remedilessness is made out.
The case arose from a complex web of financial transactions involving a non-banking financial company which alleged that its company secretary and other respondents fabricated an Inter-Corporate Loan Agreement worth Rs. 60 crores by misusing stolen confidential documents. The petitioner sought registration of an FIR and police investigation under Section 175(3) BNSS, corresponding to Section 156(3) of the CrPC. The Magistrate declined the application, holding that the dispute was civil in nature and that the complainant was fully aware of the identities and roles of the accused, an order subsequently upheld by the Court of Sessions in revision.
The primary question before the court was whether the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS, can entertain a petition against the dismissal of a revision petition, which is otherwise barred as a second revision under Section 438(3) BNSS. The court was also called upon to determine the parameters for invoking Section 175(3) BNSS in commercial disputes.
Interplay Between Revisional Bar And Inherent Jurisdiction
Analyzing the statutory framework, the court noted that the provisions of Section 438(3) and Section 528 BNSS mirror Section 397(3) and Section 482 of the CrPC respectively. The object behind barring second revisions is to prevent delays and multiplicity of proceedings. The bench emphasized that what is explicitly prohibited by law cannot be given a backdoor entry through inherent powers, which must be exercised sparingly and only in the rarest of rare cases.
"What Is Explicitly Prohibited Cannot Be Given Backdoor Entry"
The court reiterated the doctrine laid down in landmark precedents such as Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and Shakuntala Devi v. Chamru Mahto, emphasizing that the doors of the High Court are not completely closed in cases of gross failure of justice. However, routine invocation of inherent powers would render the statutory bar against second revisions completely otiose.
Magisterial Discretion Under Section 175(3) BNSS
Examining the scope of police investigation mandates, the court referred to binding precedents including Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat and Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., noting that a Magistrate is not a mere post office. Directing an FIR under Section 175(3) BNSS is warranted only where custodial interrogation is required, where evidence is beyond the reach of the complainant, or where complex State machinery is indispensable for unearthing facts.
"Commercial Disputes Synthetically Tainted With Criminality"
The bench observed that the petitioner was already in possession of all material documents, knew the identities of the proposed accused, and had actively pursued civil remedies before the High Court concerning the exact same agreement. Citing Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., the court deprecated the growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal prosecutions to exert pressure for settlement.
"Granting FIR Direction Would Be Gross Injustice To The Accused"
Concluding that the petitioner was not left remediless and could freely lead pre-summoning evidence before the Magistrate with statutory recourse to Section 225 BNSS if required, the bench dismissed the petition. Holding the challenge to be a frivolous and mischievous attempt to abuse the judicial process, the High Court dismissed the petition with costs of Rs. 25,000 to be deposited online with Bharat Ke Veer.
Date of Decision: 17 August 2026