Death Occurring After Interval Due To Septicemia Does Not Vitiate Homicidal Nature Of Offence Under Section 302 IPC: Bombay High Court

"The law does not require that a declarant, at the time of making the statement, to be under the shadow of death or the expectation that death is imminent." Bombay High Court, in a significant ruling dated September 22, 2026, upheld the conviction of an appellant for murder under Section 302 of the IPC, holding that a delayed death resulting from septicemia or other complications following fatal injuries does not break the causal chain of homicide.

A division bench comprising Justice Manish Pitale and Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat observed that when injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the person responsible for inflicting them remains liable for murder, even if the victim succumbed after a considerable interval of time.

The case originated from an incident on May 21, 2013, where the deceased and the appellant, both fruit sellers, were drinking together in Daman. Following an altercation over lifting a bag, the appellant allegedly assaulted the deceased with a knife. The victim was hospitalized for 15 days before succumbing to septicemia with perforative peritonitis on June 4, 2013. The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court, Daman, in 2017, leading to the present appeal.

The court was primarily tasked with determining whether a statement recorded by the police after the incident but before death qualifies as a valid dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, despite the absence of a Magistrate or medical fitness certification. Furthermore, the court addressed whether a causal nexus between the assault and death remains intact when the victim dies 15 days later due to medical complications, and whether a minor variance in the last digit of an IMEI number invalidates the prosecution's digital evidence.

Nature of Homicidal Death

The court emphasized that the interval between the assault and death does not absolve the assailant if the primary cause of death is the original injury. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, the bench noted that complications like septicemia, which are practically inevitable sequences of deep abdominal stab wounds, fall squarely within the scope of Section 300 of the IPC. The court found that the victim sustained multiple grievous injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

Validating Dying Declarations

The bench rejected the appellant's argument that the absence of a doctor’s certificate or the lack of a Magistrate's involvement invalidated the dying declarations. The court reaffirmed that a statement recorded by a police officer under Section 161 CrPC assumes the character of a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act upon the death of the declarant. The court held that fitness of mind is a matter of fact to be determined by the court, and testimonies of police and witnesses confirming the victim's consciousness were sufficient to establish credibility.

Dying Declaration Needs No Imminent Expectation of Death "Section 32 does not require that the statement sought to be admitted in evidence should have been made in imminent expectation of death." The court emphasized that the evidentiary value of such statements rests on their consistency, voluntariness, and the absence of tutoring, rather than a technical expectation of imminent demise.

Identity and Digital Evidence

Addressing the discrepancy in the IMEI number found on the recovered handset versus the CDR records, the court applied the algorithm-based logic from Sundar alias Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police. It held that a mismatch in the final "Luhn check digit" is a technicality that does not indicate a different device. Because the first 14 digits were identical, the court concluded that the mobile handset link was conclusively established, dismissing the appellant's plea of false implication as an unsubstantiated afterthought.

Rejection of Untested Supplementary Statements The bench categorically refused to consider a supplementary statement allegedly recorded by the police at J.J. Hospital, as it was neither exhibited nor proved during the trial. The court noted that such documents, if not brought on record as per the Indian Evidence Act, carry no evidentiary weight and cannot be used to cast doubt on the consistent dying declarations already established.

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The court reaffirmed that the combination of multiple consistent dying declarations and reliable medical evidence regarding the nature of the injuries was sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC.

Date of Decision: 22 September 2026