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by sayum
29 August 2026 7:20 AM
"Filing of suits for the protection of rights conferred under the statute, per se cannot be held to be intimidatory or vexatious." Supreme Court, in a significant ruling, affirmed that a corporation’s act of filing infringement suits against farmers cannot be labeled as "predatory" or "vexatious" simply by virtue of the initiation of legal proceedings.
A bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran observed that when a holder of a registered plant variety initiates litigation to protect its intellectual property, it is exercising a statutory right that cannot be restrained absent clear proof of mala fide intent.
The dispute originated from the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001, concerning the variety 'FL 2027'. Petitioner Kavitha Kuruganti had sought the revocation of registration granted to PepsiCo India Holdings, alleging that the company’s legal actions against individual farmers constituted a public interest concern under Section 34(h) of the Act. While the High Court had balanced the rights of both parties in a previous round of litigation, the matter reached the Apex Court on the question of whether such corporate legal action inherently violates the rights of the farming community.
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the institution of infringement suits by a registered variety holder against farmers constitutes a ground for revocation of the registration under Section 34(h) of the Act as a "predatory" or "vexatious" tactic. Additionally, the Court was tasked with interpreting the scope of Section 39(1)(iv), which protects the traditional rights of farmers to save, use, and exchange seeds, provided they do not sell "branded" protected seeds.
Court Rejects 'Predatory' Tag On Corporate Litigation
The Court firmly rejected the contention that legal actions taken by the respondent against farmers were inherently intimidatory. The Bench emphasized that the judicial process is open to all, and a entity is well within its rights to defend its statutory intellectual property. The Court noted that the High Court had correctly examined the factual matrix and found no evidence to substantiate the claim that the suits were instituted as a predatory tactic to suppress farmer rights.
Defining The Limits Of Vexatious Litigation
The judges observed that the mere filing of a suit does not constitute a legal wrong or an act of harassment under the 2001 Act. If an individual farmer believes a specific suit is vexatious or intended to harass, that argument must be raised as a defense within the specific proceedings of that suit, rather than as a broad, generic attack on the corporation’s right to litigate.
"Filing of suits for the protection of rights conferred under the statute, per se cannot be held to be intimidatory or vexatious."
Safeguarding Individual Farmer Defenses
While the Court declined to interfere with the respondent's right to pursue legal remedies, it clarified that the ruling does not leave farmers defenseless. The Court explicitly held that any farmer accused of infringement remains fully entitled to invoke the protection granted under Section 39(1)(iv) of the Act. This statutory provision allows farmers to save, use, sow, resow, exchange, or sell their farm produce, provided they avoid the sale of branded seeds of a protected variety.
No Blanket Injunction Against Legal Recourse
The Court underscored that it cannot issue a blanket restraint against a company from seeking legal redress for perceived infringement. The bench held that if a farmer believes their actions are protected by the law, they must prove the same before the appropriate forum in the specific case brought against them. This approach ensures that the statutory balance between breeder rights and farmer rights remains intact without bypassing the judicial process.
The Supreme Court disposed of the Special Leave Petitions, finding no merit in the challenge against the High Court's judgment. By affirming the breeder's right to access courts, the ruling reinforces the principle that legitimate legal action, even against vulnerable parties, cannot be characterized as predatory without concrete proof of abuse of process.
Date of Decision: 05 August 2026