Expression ‘Physical Relations’ Cannot Be Automatically Read As Penetrative Sexual Assault: Delhi High Court

In a significant ruling that re-emphasizes the need for legal precision and judicial diligence in sexual offence trials, the Delhi High Court set aside a conviction under Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, holding that vague and unclarified references to “physical relations” are not sufficient to establish penetrative sexual assault.

Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri, while allowing the appeal, observed that the foundational facts necessary to invoke the stringent presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act had not been established by the prosecution. The Court further flagged serious procedural lapses in the trial, including failure by the Trial Court and prosecution to seek clarification on the nature of the alleged sexual act, and an unexplained delay of nearly 1.5 years in filing the FIR, which critically impaired the credibility of the case.

“Expression ‘Physical Relations’ Cannot Be Automatically Read As Penetrative Sexual Assault”: Court Finds Conviction Legally Unsustainable

The case arose from a complaint filed in March 2016, alleging that the appellant, a relative of the victim, had established “physical relations” with her over a year and a half on the pretext of marriage when she was 16 years old. According to the victim, the appellant refused to marry her, following which she consumed poison in November 2014. The prosecution argued that she had been rendered mute due to poisoning and therefore could not report the offence earlier.

Rejecting the basis of the conviction, the Court held: “The term ‘physical relations’, unaccompanied by any supporting evidence or specific detail, is too vague to satisfy the legal requirements of Section 3 of the POCSO Act or Section 376 IPC.”

The Court relied on earlier rulings, including Sahjan Ali v. State and Dipesh Tamang v. State of Sikkim, which held that terms like "physical relations" or "sambandh banaya" must be explained or corroborated to prove penetrative sexual assault. The absence of such explanation, the Court said, precluded a presumption of guilt under Section 29 POCSO.

“Judiciary Cannot Remain A Mute Spectator – It Must Clarify Ambiguities in Testimony of Vulnerable Witnesses”: Court Faults Trial Court for Not Using Section 165 Evidence Act

Justice Ohri sharply criticized the Trial Court’s passive approach during trial proceedings, holding that it had a statutory duty under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act and the Delhi High Court Rules to seek clarification where the prosecution failed.

“The Trial Court failed to ask the prosecutrix what she meant by ‘physical relations’. No attempt was made to ascertain whether the acts, as alleged, amounted to penetrative sexual assault. This is a serious procedural lapse.”

The Court emphasized that Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act gives judges wide powers to elicit truth from witnesses, especially in criminal trials involving child victims and vulnerable witnesses. It further referenced the ‘Guidelines of the High Court of Delhi for Recording of Evidence of Vulnerable Witnesses, 2024’, stating that courts must ensure clarity in testimony without causing trauma or confusion to child victims.

“Delay of Over One and a Half Years in FIR Without Medical Proof of Incapacity to Speak Casts Serious Doubt on the Prosecution Story”

A crucial factor influencing the Court’s decision was the long, unexplained delay in filing the FIR. The incident allegedly occurred in late 2014, but the FIR was lodged only in March 2016. The prosecution claimed that the victim was unable to speak due to poisoning. However, no medical record, including the discharge summary, supported the claim of speech impairment.

The Court noted: “In absence of concretely established reasons, the delay of one and a half years in reporting the incident assumes critical importance.”

It found that the IO’s claim about the victim’s vocal cord being damaged was based only on personal observation, not on any formal medical evidence.

“Section 29 POCSO Presumption Does Not Apply Unless Prosecution First Establishes Penetrative Sexual Assault”

The Court reiterated the settled legal position from the Supreme Court in Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar v. State of Gujarat that Section 29 of POCSO Act (presumption of guilt) is not automatic, and is triggered only when foundational facts indicating penetrative sexual assault are first established.

In this case, the prosecution failed to establish such foundational facts.

“The leap from ‘physical relations’ to penetrative sexual assault must be supported by evidence—it cannot be presumed or inferred by guesswork.”

With no medical or forensic evidence, and a non-specific testimony, the Court held that the case failed to meet the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

“Convictions in Sexual Offence Cases Must Rest on Clear, Legally Sufficient Testimony — Not on Ambiguities or Emotional Appeal”

While the Court acknowledged the sensitivity of the allegations and the vulnerability of the victim, it emphasized that criminal convictions, particularly in sexual offences, must be based on legally tenable evidence.

“Indeed, this is an unfortunate case. However, the court is bound to decide the case on its own merits and the evidence that has surfaced on record.”

The Court ultimately found that neither the language used by the prosecutrix, nor the circumstantial evidence, met the threshold for conviction under Section 376 IPC or Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

Accordingly, the Delhi High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. The appellant, who had been sentenced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment, was ordered to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

“The appellant’s conviction under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act is unsustainable. The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. The appellant is acquitted.”

The Court directed that a copy of the judgment be communicated to the Trial Court and Jail Superintendent immediately, and uploaded on the official website.

Date of Decision: 17 October 2025