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by Deepak Kumar
23 May 2025 2:02 PM
Disciplinary Parity Must Consider Role and Responsibility—Not Just Common Enquiry:- In a ruling that reaffirms the nuanced understanding of "parity in punishment," the Bombay High Court overturned an order of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal that had reinstated a dismissed government doctor. The High Court held that merely because a common departmental enquiry was conducted does not mean all co-delinquents must receive identical punishment, especially when their professional responsibilities differ.
The Respondent, Dr. Aruna P. Katke, was a Medical Officer (Class-II) with the Government of Maharashtra. During an audit, discrepancies in drug inventory—including shortages and excess—were found, prompting her suspension in 1991 and the initiation of a departmental enquiry (DE). She was charged with misappropriation of drugs worth ₹50,837.
Despite being a temporary employee who could be dismissed without DE, the State proceeded with a full enquiry process. However, there was significant delay—her charge-sheet was served in 1992 and the enquiry started only in 1998. Eventually, she was dismissed from service in 2001. Her departmental appeal was dismissed, and she subsequently filed an Original Application (OA) before the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, which also failed.
She then filed a review petition, which the Tribunal allowed, ordering her reinstatement with pay and liberty to the government to impose a minor penalty in parity with her co-delinquents—some of whom had only been fined or received pay cuts.
Whether Disparate Punishment to Co-Accused in Common Enquiry Is Arbitrary
The Tribunal had held that dismissal of Dr. Katke, while other co-delinquents received lesser punishments despite being charged in a common enquiry, was “patently unfair.” However, the High Court sharply disagreed.
Justice M.M. Sathaye, writing for the Division Bench, observed: “The responsibility of a doctor in the hospital and the responsibility of the compounder and nurse are clearly distinct… Therefore, the gravity of misconduct is also different.”
“In the impugned order, this aspect of parity in punishment… is not considered. On a simplistic approach that in a common enquiry, only the Respondent is dismissed and others are awarded lesser punishment, review seems to have been allowed.”
The Court noted that both doctors involved (Dr. Katke and Dr. Kembhavi) were dismissed, while a nurse and compounder received lighter penalties—establishing internal parity based on role and responsibility.
“Review Jurisdiction Cannot Be Invoked for Re-appreciation of Merits”
The Court faulted the Tribunal for exceeding its review jurisdiction: “Without considering the material showing comparative punishments… the Tribunal has exceeded the scope of review jurisdiction while granting relief.”
Citing the Supreme Court judgment in P.C. Kakkar v. UCO Bank [(2003) 4 SCC 364], the Court reiterated:
“Where the Court finds the punishment to be shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons and should normally direct the disciplinary authority to reconsider the penalty. Since we do not find the punishment imposed upon the Respondent shockingly disproportionate… the Petitioner’s case is supported.”
The Court also distinguished judgments relied upon by the Respondent, including Raj Pal Singh, Jitendra Singh, and Arvind K. Waghmare, noting that none were applicable in light of the specific facts and context of this case.
Finding the Tribunal’s order legally unsustainable, the Court allowed the writ petition and restored the dismissal order: “The impugned order dated 29.04.2011… is quashed and set aside. The writ petition is disposed of and Rule is made absolute.”
This ruling underscores a fundamental principle in service jurisprudence: equality in punishment requires more than similarity in charges—it requires contextual evaluation of duty, role, and gravity of misconduct.
Date of Decision: 30 April 2025
