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by Admin
23 April 2026 6:44 AM
"Balance of interest, in the facts of case, clearly tilts in favour of protecting the legitimacy and rights of the child rather than permitting a roving inquiry through DNA examination," High Court of Uttarakhand, in a significant ruling, held that a DNA examination cannot be directed to prove adultery in matrimonial proceedings without first rebutting the conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act.
A bench comprising Justice Manoj Kumar Tiwari and Justice Pankaj Purohit observed that DNA testing cannot be ordered as a matter of routine or merely on the asking of a party, as it has the potential to "bastardise" a child and intrude upon their fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The appellant-husband instituted divorce proceedings under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, against his wife, alleging matrimonial misconduct and adultery. During the pendency of the suit, he moved an application seeking a DNA examination of the minor child to substantiate his allegations of adultery. The Principal Judge, Family Court, Nainital, rejected the application on December 16, 2025, prompting the husband to approach the High Court.
The primary question before the court was whether a husband is entitled to a direction for DNA testing of a minor child to prove adultery without first establishing "non-access" to the wife. The court was also called upon to determine whether the evidentiary need for scientific proof in matrimonial disputes outweighs the child's right to dignity and the statutory protection of legitimacy.
The Conclusive Presumption Under Section 112 Of The Evidence Act
The Court began by examining the foundational principles of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The bench noted that the provision is based on the maxim pater est uem nuptiae demonstrant, which implies that the father is he whom the marriage points out. This legal framework seeks to protect children from the social consequences of destitution and vagrancy.
The bench emphasized that Section 112 creates a "conclusive presumption" of legitimacy for any child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage. This presumption can only be displaced by establishing "non-access" between the spouses at the time the child could have been begotten. The Court noted that the burden to prove non-access lies heavily on the person seeking to dislodge this statutory presumption.
DNA Testing Is An Exceptional Measure, Not A Routine Procedure
The High Court reiterated that scientific tests like DNA examinations are not to be ordered as a matter of course. It observed that such a direction can only be issued in "exceptional circumstances" where strong prima facie material is available to show non-access or where the interests of justice absolutely demand it.
The Court warned that a direction for DNA examination may have the effect of bastardising the child by conclusively determining non-paternity. Consequently, courts must exercise "utmost caution and restraint" while dealing with such requests, ensuring they do not facilitate a fishing or roving inquiry into a child's parentage.
"DNA testing cannot be ordered as a matter of routine or merely on the asking of a party."
Failure To Plead Non-Access Renders DNA Request Invalid
Crucially, the bench found that the appellant-husband had neither specifically pleaded nor attempted to establish "non-access" between himself and his wife during the relevant period. In the absence of such foundational material, the Court held that the statutory presumption under Section 112 remained fully intact.
The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the DNA test was sought only to prove adultery and not to challenge paternity. The bench held that permitting a DNA test without first discharging the burden of rebutting the presumption of legitimacy would render the protection of Section 112 "otiose" and "invalid."
"The attempt of appellant to seek DNA examination directly, without first discharging the burden of rebutting presumption of legitimacy, cannot be countenanced in law."
Balancing Evidentiary Needs Against Article 21 Rights Of The Minor
The Court further delved into the constitutional aspects of the prayer, noting that a child’s privacy and dignity are facets of the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21. Allowing the DNA test in this case would constitute an "unwarranted intrusion" into these rights.
The bench referred to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Dipawita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy and Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, acknowledging that while DNA tests can be ordered to reach the truth, they must pass the test of "essentiality" and "balancing of interests." In this instance, the Court found that the child’s right to legitimacy outweighed the husband's need for scientific evidence.
"Allowing the prayer for DNA examination... would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy and dignity of minor child, which are facets of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21."
Dismissing the appeal, the High Court upheld the Family Court's order, concluding that the husband could not bypass the legal requirement of proving non-access. The Court affirmed that the protection of the child’s legal status is a priority over the use of DNA testing as a primary tool to prove a spouse's adultery.
Date of Decision: 02 April 2026