District Court Cannot Remand Charity Commissioner's Order: Bombay High Court Division Bench Settles Conflicting Views

"Word 'remand' is conspicuously absent from Section 72(2) — its omission is intentional, and it is impermissible to read into the provision a power the legislature has consciously not conferred", Bombay High Court.

Resolving a conflict between two Single Judge decisions that had left trust litigation in Maharashtra in a state of uncertainty, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) has authoritatively held that a District Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 72(2) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 has no power to remand proceedings back to the Charity Commissioner. The Court held that when the legislature expressly empowers a court to only confirm, revoke or modify a decision, it is impermissible for any court to read into those words a power of remand that the legislature has consciously omitted.

A Bench of Hon'ble Justice Anil L. Pansare and Hon'ble Justice Urmila Joshi Phalke answered the reference in these terms, endorsing the view taken by the Aurangabad Bench and rejecting the contrary position adopted by the Nagpur Bench, in a judgment that settles the law on the scope of District Court powers under one of Maharashtra's most significant trust statutes.

Legal Issue

The core question was whether the words "confirm, revoke or modify" in Section 72(2) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 — which govern the District Court's powers while hearing applications against decisions of the Charity Commissioner — could be construed to include a power of remand, or whether the conspicuous absence of the word "remand" from the provision was a deliberate legislative choice that the courts are bound to respect.

Court's Observations and Judgment

The Plain Meaning Rule — Words Must Mean What They Say

The Division Bench began with the foundational principle of statutory interpretation: where the words of a statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences, and it is not open to the courts to adopt any hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the object and policy of the Act. The Court quoted with approval the Supreme Court's exposition in Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan and Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar that "the words used declare the intention of the legislature."

Examining the words of Section 72(2) — "the court after taking evidence if any, may confirm, revoke or modify the decision or remit the amount of the surcharge" — the Court endorsed the detailed analysis of the Aurangabad Bench in Shaikh Abdul Razak Yaseen Patel, which had examined the dictionary meanings of all three operative words. "Confirm" means to verify or approve; "revoke" means to annul, cancel or make void; "modify" — though broader — means to partially change, alter without radical transformation, to narrow or enlarge. The Constitution Bench in M/s Burrakar Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India had settled that "modify" means to make partial changes, to limit or restrict, to alter without radical transformation. None of these words, the Court held, could be stretched to include a power to remand and redirect the lower forum to rehear and determine the matter.

"The word 'remand' is conspicuously absent, which means it is intentionally omitted," the Division Bench declared. "It will then be impermissible to read into the provision such a power of remand. To do so would amount to amending the provision, which is an exclusive jurisdiction of the legislature."

The Scheme of the Act — A Telling Legislative Contrast

The Court found decisive support for this interpretation in the internal architecture of the Act itself. Under Section 70(3), the Charity Commissioner — when hearing appeals from the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner — is expressly empowered not only to annul, reverse, modify or confirm the finding, but also to "direct the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to make further inquiry or to take such additional evidence as he may think necessary." This is, in substance, a power of remand.

The legislature conferred this power expressly in Section 70(3) but made no such provision in Section 72(2). The Court held that this legislative contrast was not accidental but deliberate: "When it comes to scope under Section 72(2), the power to direct further inquiry or additional evidence — effectively a remand — is conspicuously absent. This legislative intent is clear."

The Full Bench Did Not Decide This Question

A significant part of the judgment addressed the respondents' reliance on the Full Bench decision in Prabhakar Sambhu Chaudhary, which had referred to the appellate court's powers to "reverse, modify the decision or remand the matter to the lower forum." The Division Bench firmly rejected the contention that these observations were binding on the question of remand under Section 72(2).

Drawing on the Supreme Court's recent exposition in Secunderabad Club v. CIT-V on the law of precedent, the Court held that "the principle underlying a decision is binding and must be discerned in the context of the question involved in that case from which the decision takes its colour. A decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition it did not decide."

The Full Bench had been constituted to answer two questions concerning Section 72(4) — specifically, whether the second appeal under that sub-section was subject to the limitations of Section 100 CPC. Its observations about appellate court powers were made in that context, to determine whether the High Court hearing an appeal under Section 72(4) was restricted like a second appeal court. The Full Bench had no occasion to consider the specific limitation imposed under Section 72(2). Those observations, therefore, could not be treated as a finding on the scope of Section 72(2), and could not bind the Division Bench on the reference question.

On the Argument of "Plenary Powers"

The respondents also relied on the Supreme Court's observation in Ramchandra Goverdhan Pandit v. Charity Commissioner of State of Gujarat that the District Court's jurisdiction under Section 72 is "plenary in nature." The Division Bench held that this observation too was rendered in a different context — the availability of Letters Patent Clause 15 — and the Supreme Court had no occasion to delve into the scope of Section 72(2) specifically. "Merely because the Supreme Court has used the word 'plenary powers', that will not permit the court to read something which is intentionally omitted by the legislature," the Bench held.

The Answer to the Reference

The Division Bench answered the reference question in unequivocal terms: "The District Court while exercising the power under Section 72(2) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 has no power to remand the proceedings." The matter was directed to be placed before the learned Single Judge for further consideration on merits.

Date of Decision: April 10, 2026