Disciplinary Exoneration Cannot Shield Public Servant from Criminal Trial in Corruption Cases: Supreme Court

“Departmental Enquiry and Criminal Prosecution Are Independent — Exoneration on Preponderance of Probabilities Cannot Defeat Trial Requiring Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt”: SC Clarifies Scope of Radheshyam Kejriwal and Ajay Kumar Tyagi

In a significant reaffirmation of the legal principle that disciplinary exoneration does not nullify criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court on January 6, 2026, set aside a Karnataka High Court order that had quashed criminal proceedings against a government engineer who was allegedly caught red-handed accepting a bribe. The Court categorically held that the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings is markedly different from that required in criminal trials and that an exoneration in the former does not ipso facto warrant quashing of the latter.

Allowing the appeal filed by the Karnataka Lokayuktha, a Bench comprising Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah restored the criminal proceedings, holding that the High Court committed a serious error in applying the ratio of Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal while ignoring the binding precedent in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi. The Court held that there was no conflict between the two judgments, and that the High Court was wrong in declaring the later judgment per incuriam.

“Criminal Court Not Bound by Disciplinary Findings — Trial Must Proceed Unless Exoneration Is on Merits and Identical in Scope”

The core allegation pertained to demand and acceptance of a ₹10,000 bribe by an Executive Engineer from a contractor for clearing five pending bills. Upon complaint, the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) laid a trap and caught the engineer with tainted currency notes, with the accused’s hands turning pink in the sodium carbonate solution test—indicating direct handling of the chemically treated notes.

However, in parallel disciplinary proceedings, the official was exonerated, primarily because the Inspector who led the trap was not examined, and the two panch witnesses stated they were standing outside the room at the moment of the bribe’s handing over. Relying solely on this exoneration, the High Court quashed the ongoing criminal case.

The Supreme Court strongly disagreed: “The departmental enquiry is governed by the principle of preponderance of probabilities whereas criminal trial demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. Failure in the former does not ipso facto mean failure in the latter.” [Para 2, 9]

“Radheshyam Kejriwal Doesn’t Apply Where Exoneration Is Not on Merits and Proceedings Are by Different Authorities”

The High Court had relied on Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581, to hold that since the respondent was exonerated on merits in a departmental enquiry, the criminal prosecution must end. However, the Supreme Court clarified that this principle applies only when the adjudication and prosecution arise under the same statute, by the same authority, and the exoneration is on the merits, finding that the substratum of the allegations did not exist.

The Court observed: “In Radheshyam Kejriwal, the very transaction alleged to constitute the offence was found not to have taken place. In contrast, in the present case, the departmental exoneration was due to lack of examination of the trap officer, not due to a finding that the demand and acceptance did not occur.” [Para 8]

“The ratio decidendi of that case cannot be extended to every situation where a statute provides for a civil liability and a criminal liability, in which event Courts would be presuming what logically follows from the finding, without any application on the facts.” [Para 8]

“Ajay Kumar Tyagi Is Binding – No Ipso Facto Quashing of Criminal Case on Departmental Exoneration”

Reaffirming the law laid down in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi, (2012) 9 SCC 685, the Court observed that disciplinary and criminal proceedings are not part of the same hierarchy, and that quashing a criminal case solely on departmental exoneration is erroneous.

“We are of the opinion that in the present case the distinction as brought out in Ajay Kumar Tyagi squarely applies... The findings in the enquiry report also do not persuade us to quash the criminal proceedings.” [Para 13]

The Bench emphasized that Ajay Kumar Tyagi is not in conflict with Radheshyam Kejriwal, and that the High Court misinterpreted both precedents.

“Even Without the Trap Officer’s Testimony, There Was Sufficient Evidence to Proceed to Trial”

The Court meticulously examined the evidence led in the departmental enquiry — not to re-open those proceedings — but to evaluate whether there was complete exoneration on merits, which is the only situation where quashing of a criminal case could be considered under Kejriwal.

The Court found that the complainant’s deposition was clear, narrating the demand, the pre-arranged signal, the acceptance of money, and the trap resulting in the recovery of tainted notes from the engineer's pocket.

The Court held: “Even without the examination of the Inspector who laid the trap, we are of the opinion that there was sufficient proof on the standard of preponderance of probabilities to find the delinquent guilty.” [Para 18]

Importantly, the Court also noted that criminal courts have coercive powers to summon witnesses, unlike departmental enquiries. Therefore, non-examination of the trap officer in departmental proceedings does not preclude examination in the criminal trial. [Para 16]

“Retired Judge as Enquiry Officer Does Not Elevate Value of Report”

The respondent argued that since a retired District Judge conducted the departmental enquiry, its findings deserved special weight. The Court firmly rejected this contention:

“A retired judicial officer being appointed as an enquiry officer does not confer the enquiry report any higher value or greater sanctity... The Enquiry Officer in this case fell into an error by requiring proof at a higher level than that necessary under preponderance of probabilities.” [Para 15]

The Court reiterated that only the disciplinary authority's decision matters, and while it had accepted the exoneration in this case, it did so with a clear caveat — reserving consequences subject to the outcome of the criminal trial. [Para 11]

No Abuse of Process – Criminal Proceedings Must Continue

The Supreme Court concluded that this was not a case of “exoneration on merits” such that criminal proceedings should be quashed. Instead, it held:

“We are not convinced that this is a fit case where the criminal proceedings can be quashed on the exoneration of the delinquent employee in a departmental enquiry.” [Para 19]

At the same time, the Court clarified that since the disciplinary authority had accepted the exoneration, it cannot now reopen the departmental proceedings on the basis of the Court’s findings. However, if the accused is convicted in the criminal case, service consequences will follow as per rules. [Para 19]

The Supreme Court's judgment strengthens the wall between disciplinary exoneration and criminal accountability, making it clear that departmental clean chits cannot insulate public servants from facing trial for corruption, especially when there is prima facie material indicating bribe acceptance. It also reinforces the authority of criminal courts to independently assess evidence, undeterred by administrative conclusions.

Date of Decision: January 6, 2026