Court Cannot Convict One Accused and Acquit Others on Identical Evidence: Allahabad High Court Grants Benefit of Doubt in Dowry-Murder

“When Evidence Is Shaky, Conviction Cannot Stand” –  High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench setting aside the conviction of a husband who had been sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302/34 IPC for allegedly shooting his wife over dowry demands.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Rajnish Kumar and Justice Zafeer Ahmad held that the prosecution had failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to “material contradictions in ocular evidence,” doubtful witness conduct, non-production of key witnesses, and acquittal of all co-accused on similar evidence. The Court ruled that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt and directed his immediate release.

The judgment stands as a critical reminder that criminal conviction cannot rest on probabilities and assumptions when the foundational evidence is itself unreliable.

The prosecution case stemmed from an FIR lodged on 20 May 2000 by the deceased’s brother, alleging that his sister had been harassed for dowry — specifically for a Suzuki motorcycle — by her husband Omkar Mishra and his family members.

According to the complaint, the deceased, a government school teacher, was returning home from school on a tricycle loader when she was intercepted near Tara Talab. It was alleged that the appellant fired a close-range shot at her face, and a second shot was fired thereafter, resulting in her death.

The trial court framed charges under Sections 498-A, 147, 148, 302/149 IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Ultimately, while acquitting all co-accused, the trial court convicted Omkar Mishra under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

Notably, no appeal was filed against the acquittal of the co-accused.

Contradictions in Ocular Evidence

The Bench closely examined the testimony of P.W.1 (complainant) and P.W.2 (the tricycle driver). The Court noted glaring contradictions:

P.W.1 stated that the second shot was fired by Sachidanand, whereas P.W.2 claimed that Hari Shankar fired the second shot.

Further, P.W.2 admitted fleeing from the scene and returning only after police arrival, raising serious doubts about his status as an eye-witness.

The Court observed: “Presence of P.W.-2 at the place of occurrence is doubtful. It appears that he has been tutored to show him an eye witness and gave evidence accordingly.”

Additionally, the conduct of the complainant was termed unnatural. He neither attempted to remove the tricycle allegedly overturned on the deceased nor sought medical assistance.

Dowry Motive Disbelieved

A major blow to the prosecution was the inconsistency regarding dowry demand. The deceased’s prior statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. did not mention any demand for a Suzuki motorcycle.

The High Court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the dowry demand was not proved. It also noted that the appellant already possessed a scooter.

Though acknowledging that motive is not essential where ocular evidence is strong, the Court clarified that:

“When ocular testimony itself is shaky, failure to establish motive adds to the doubt.”

False Statement About Parents’ Death

The complainant claimed his parents had died, but P.W.2 contradicted this, stating they were alive and capable of movement. Documentary evidence supported that the parents were indeed alive.

The Court made a striking observation:

“If a person can state in his evidence on oath that his parents are not alive then he can do anything.”

This deliberate concealment significantly damaged the complainant’s credibility.

Withholding of Material Witness

The alleged eye-witness, uncle Kamlesh, was never produced in court. The Bench viewed this omission seriously, observing that withholding a material witness casts serious doubt on the prosecution’s fairness.

Parity Principle and Acquittal of Co-Accused

All other accused persons were acquitted after their alibi was accepted and their presence at the crime scene disbelieved.

Relying on Yogarani v. State and Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat, the Court reiterated:

“The Court cannot convict one accused and acquit the other when there is similar or identical evidence pitted against two accused persons.”

Since the same prosecution witnesses implicated all accused similarly, acquitting some while convicting one was legally untenable.

Appellate Duty to Reappreciate Evidence

Citing State of U.P. v. Raghuvir Singh, the Bench emphasized the appellate court’s duty to independently evaluate evidence:

“If, from the evidence, any probability consistent with the innocence of the accused is equally strong as the probability pointing to his guilt… the benefit of reasonable doubt must go to the accused.”

The Court concluded that the trial court had convicted the appellant “discarding it on probabilities and assumption” despite acknowledging contradictions and weaknesses in prosecution evidence.

Allowing the appeal, the High Court held: “The prosecution story and the involvement of the appellant in the murder of the deceased, cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.”

The conviction and sentence under Section 302/34 IPC were set aside. The appellant was acquitted and directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

This judgment reinforces foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence — presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the parity doctrine.

It sends a strong message that courts cannot selectively rely on fractured testimony to convict one accused while disbelieving the same evidence against others.

Where ocular testimony is inconsistent, material witnesses are withheld, motive is unproven, and key aspects of the prosecution story collapse, benefit of doubt must prevail.

Date of Decision: 24 February 2026