Contempt | Power to Punish Carries Within It the Power to Forgive: Supreme Court Sets Aside Jail Term for Director Who Criticised Judges Over Stray Dog Orders

“Contempt Power Is Not a Sword to Silence Criticism – It Requires Fortitude to Accept Contrition”, In a deeply reflective ruling that reinforces the balance between judicial dignity and freedom of expression, the Supreme Court of India on December 10, 2025, allowed the appeal of Vineeta Srinandan, a former director of Seawoods Estates Ltd., and remitted her one-week jail sentence imposed by the Bombay High Court for criminal contempt. The Court underlined that apology, when genuine and timely, must be given its due weight, and that “mercy must remain an integral part of the judicial conscience.”

Delivering the verdict in Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, a bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed:

“The power to punish necessarily carries within it the concomitant power to forgive... Mercy, therefore, must remain an integral part of the judicial conscience, to be extended where the contemnor sincerely acknowledges his lapse and seeks to atone for it.” [Para 1]

Circular Calling Judiciary Complicit with “Dog Mafia” Led to Contempt Conviction

The case arose from a circular dated 29 January 2025, issued by Srinandan in her capacity as Director (Cultural) of Seawoods Estates Ltd., amid litigation pending before the Bombay High Court concerning stray dog management rules. The circular launched a scathing attack on the judiciary, accusing it of siding with a so-called "dog feeders mafia", and included explosive statements such as:

“Judges don’t want to see [evidence] and completely avoid taking cognizance... we are convinced that there is a big Dog mafia operating in the country, who has a list of High Court and Supreme Court judges having views similar to the dog feeders.”

The High Court took suo motu cognizance of the circular and, after issuing notice and hearing submissions, convicted Srinandan under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, sentencing her to one week of simple imprisonment and ₹2,000 fine. Despite her unqualified apology, the High Court termed it “perfunctory” and lacking in sincerity.

Apology Was Genuine, and High Court Failed to Exercise Its Remission Power Properly

While the Supreme Court agreed that the language in the circular did amount to criminal contempt by scandalising the judiciary and lowering its authority, it took a markedly different view on the rejection of apology and sentencing.

“Once the appellant-contemnor had, from the very first day of her appearance... expressed remorse and tendered an unconditional apology, the High Court was required to examine whether such apology satisfied the statutory parameters under Section 12 of the Contempt Act.” [Para 9.6]

The Court emphasized that the proviso to Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, empowers courts to discharge or remit punishment upon an apology made to the satisfaction of the court, even after conviction.

“The statutory scheme is thus clear – once repentance is demonstrated, the Court may act with magnanimity.” [Para 8.3]

“An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.” [Section 12, Explanation; Para 8.4]

Criticism vs. Scandalising: The Line Must Be Drawn Carefully

The High Court had relied heavily on precedents like Rajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Bar Association, DC Saxena v. Chief Justice of India, and Perspective Publications v. State of Maharashtra to justify the conviction and sentence. However, the Supreme Court held that such reliance was misplaced, stating:

“A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides... The distinguishing features of those cases were not duly appreciated.” [Paras 9.1–9.3]

In Rajendra Sail, the contemnor had alleged bribery against a sitting judge; in Roshan Lal Ahuja, the apology was withdrawn; in D.C. Saxena, no apology was offered at all. By contrast, Srinandan had tendered an unconditional apology at the earliest opportunity and even resigned from her post as an act of atonement.

“In our considered view, the reliance placed by the High Court on the decisions of this Court stands misplaced... the factual matrix of the present case is materially distinct.” [Para 9.3]

“Majesty of Law Must Be Preserved, But Not at the Cost of Forgiveness”

The judgment delicately walked the line between upholding judicial dignity and recognising freedom of expression and human fallibility. While clearly holding that the circular scandalised the court, it also stated:

“The power of contempt is not a personal armour for Judges, nor a sword to silence criticism.” [Para 1]

The contours of fair criticism and scandalising the court were acknowledged to be delicate, but the spirit of the law, as the Court concluded, allows space for forgiveness where contrition is clear.

Sentence Set Aside, Appeal Allowed

The Court ultimately allowed the appeal, holding that:

“We are satisfied that the ends of justice would be met by remitting the sentence imposed by the High Court.” [Para 10(ii)]

“Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 23rd April, 2025... is hereby set aside to the aforesaid extent. Consequently, the appeal is allowed.” [Para 11–12]

Key Legal Takeaways:

• Section 12 CrPC contains not only power to punish but also the discretion to forgive, through discharge or remission upon apology.

• An apology, if unconditional and made bona fide, must not be rejected mechanically.

• Precedents must be applied in context; not all contempt convictions are alike.

• The Court must balance the majesty of law with the capacity for mercy, especially when contrition is demonstrated early and clearly.

Date of Decision: 10 December 2025