Child Witness Testimony Requires Preliminary Judicial Examination To Rule Out Tutoring: Allahabad High Court

"Before recording evidence of a minor, it is the duty of a Judicial Officer to ask preliminary questions to him with a view to ascertain whether the minor can understand the questions put to him and is in a position to give rational answers." Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling dated September 22, 2026, held that the testimony of a child witness must be subjected to rigorous preliminary judicial scrutiny to ensure the child is capable of understanding questions and is free from the influence of tutoring.

A bench of Justice Siddhartha Varma and Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay observed that while Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 presumes the competency of a child to testify, the court’s failure to record preliminary questions to verify the child's understanding significantly undermines the credibility of such evidence.

Failure To Conduct Preliminary Examination

The Court emphasized that the role of the trial judge is crucial in evaluating the competency of a minor witness. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the bench noted that judges must record their opinion on whether a child understands the duty of speaking the truth. In the present case, the absence of such a record, combined with irreconcilable contradictions in the child's deposition, necessitated a rejection of the sole testimony upon which the conviction was based.

Tutoring and Vulnerability of Child Witnesses

The Court cautioned that child witnesses are inherently impressionable and susceptible to external suggestions, coaching, or tutoring by relatives or authorities. The bench observed that while a child witness is not automatically disqualified, the court must meticulously inspect the evidence for traces of artificial structuring. In this case, the Court found the child’s narrative to be "artificially structured" and inconsistent with the natural conduct of an eight-year-old child who had purportedly witnessed a traumatic crime involving his own mother and siblings.

Nature of Prosecution Case and Probability

The bench further tested the prosecution's narrative against the touchstone of natural human conduct under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. It found the prosecution's theory—that a mother would execute the cold-blooded killing of three children while deliberately sparing the eldest to serve as an eyewitness—to be inherently improbable and against the grain of human nature. This inconsistency further cast a shadow of doubt on the veracity of the prosecution's version.

Adverse Inference for Withholding Material Witnesses

The Court also highlighted the prosecution's failure to examine the Village Pradhan, who was the first person informed of the incident and who had initiated the police response. Citing the principle of "best evidence," the Court held that the deliberate or negligent withholding of a material witness allows the court to draw an adverse inference. The bench concluded that had the Pradhan been examined, the prosecution's narrative, which was riddled with gaps, might have been entirely discredited.

Fatal Lapses in Investigation

The Court sharply criticized the investigating agency for fundamental and pervasive defects in the investigation. These lapses included the failure to record the child's statement on the day of the incident, conflicting accounts regarding the preparation of the site plan, and the delay in lodging the FIR despite a cognizable offense being reported. The Court ruled that such fundamental flaws shake the very foundation of the prosecution's case.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction and death sentence awarded by the trial court, granting the benefit of doubt to the appellants. The Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, ordering the immediate release of the appellants unless required in other legal proceedings.

Date of Decision: 22 September 2026