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Article 226 Writ Maintainable For Eviction Of State Instrumentality Upon Lease Expiry Despite Sections 5 & 8 Arbitration Act: Rajasthan High Court

21 November 2026 3:46 PM

By: kapil


"Sections 5 and 8 of the Act of 1996 cannot be construed so as to curtail or exclude the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."

JAIPUR: Holding that an arbitration clause cannot serve as an indefeasible licence for a public sector corporation to indefinitely occupy private property after the efflux of lease tenure, the Rajasthan High Court bench of Justice Anand Sharma on November 18, 2026, ruled that extraordinary constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 226 remains maintainable to direct restoration of possession against State instrumentalities, notwithstanding the statutory restrictions in Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The petitioner, Suma Minerals Private Limited, leased its land to Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) for 19 years and 11 months on March 16, 2004, to operate a retail petroleum outlet, with the term expiring on February 15, 2024. Clause 1(j) of the lease deed specifically struck out the word "automatic" and mandated that any renewal up to 2034 required the execution of a separate lease deed signed by both parties. Despite the lease expiring by efflux of time and subsequent closure demands, IOCL retained possession and initiated civil and arbitral proceedings, prompting the petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for vacant possession and removal of hazardous petroleum equipment.

Whether the presence of an arbitration clause in a lease agreement and invocation of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in prior civil proceedings bars the High Court from exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to restore possession of private land from a State instrumentality?

Whether unilateral notices and continued occupation by an oil corporation constitute a valid lease renewal when the governing covenant explicitly deleted "automatic" renewal and mandated the execution of a separate registered lease deed?

Constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be curtailed by statutory arbitration provisions

Addressing the preliminary maintainability objection raised by IOCL under Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court clarified that constitutional powers directly flow from the Constitution of India and cannot be restricted by statutory enactments. The bench noted that the definition of "Court" under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 does not encompass constitutional writ jurisdiction exercised under Article 226.

The Court held that while courts exercise self-restraint in contractual matters, the availability of an alternative forum is not an absolute jurisdictional bar. Citing the Supreme Court's rulings in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Unitech Limited v. TSIIC, the bench emphasized that writ jurisdiction is a vital constitutional safeguard when a State instrumentality acts arbitrarily in violation of Article 14.

Arbitration clause does not confer an indefinite right to occupy private land post-lease expiry

The bench drew a fundamental distinction between ongoing contractual disputes and unauthorized occupation by an Article 12 authority after the expiry of a lease. It observed that while monetary disputes, rent calculations, and damages may fall within arbitration, an arbitration agreement cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate unauthorized possession of private land.

"The controversy relating to continued occupation of immovable property after expiry of a lease stands on a somewhat distinct footing from disputes concerning performance of contractual obligations during the subsistence of the contract. An arbitration clause may govern disputes concerning payment of rent, contractual liabilities, damages, breach of obligations and other monetary consequences. However, the existence of such a clause cannot, by itself, be treated as an independent source of authority for a lessee to continue occupying the property indefinitely after expiry of the lease."

Relying on National Company v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, the Court reiterated that public sector oil marketing companies have no indefeasible right to retain private property once the lease term has lapsed by efflux of time.

Prior Section 8 application in civil suit does not waive constitutional public law remedies

Rejecting IOCL's argument that the petitioner was estopped because it had earlier succeeded in referring IOCL's civil suit to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act of 1996, the Court ruled that estoppel cannot operate against substantive legal rights or validate unauthorized state action.

The bench held that relegating parties to arbitration under Section 8 merely concerned arbitrable disputes under the contract and did not create, revive, or adjudicate the validity of a renewed lease. Consequently, invoking Section 8 in an ordinary civil suit does not amount to a waiver of the petitioner's prerogative to seek public law remedies under Article 226 against arbitrary deprivation of property.

Unilateral intention cannot substitute the mandatory requirement of executing a fresh registered lease deed

Examining the lease covenants, the Court observed that Clause 1(j) was the only clause where handwritten alterations were made and attested, specifically deleting the word "automatic" and inserting that a separate lease deed must be signed. Applying the Supreme Court precedent in State of U.P. v. Lalji Tandon, the bench highlighted the strict legal distinction between a lease extension and a lease renewal.

"The striking off of the expression 'automatic' and insertion of the phrase 'for which separate lease deed shall be signed by both parties' cannot be treated as an insignificant or inconsequential alteration. It indicates that the parties consciously did not intend renewal to operate automatically upon expiry of the original lease. The requirement of execution of a separate lease deed by both parties further strengthens the position that continuation of the lease beyond its original tenure was contemplated through a legally recognised process of execution of fresh lease deed and not merely by unilateral assertion of either party."

The Court noted that IOCL failed to produce any evidence proving service of its alleged renewal notices, and the petitioner had promptly returned partial rent payments, leaving no doubt that the lease had definitively expired on February 15, 2024.

Monetary and dealership claims left for arbitral adjudication while granting eviction

The High Court held that while the relief of restoration of possession and removal of fixtures must be granted under writ jurisdiction to prevent arbitrary state conduct, claims regarding outstanding rent, dealership dues, occupation charges, and reimbursement for unsold stock remain contractual questions properly referable to arbitration.

The High Court allowed the writ petition and directed IOCL to hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the land to the petitioner within 60 days. The Court also ordered IOCL to remove all fixtures, equipment, and hazardous petroleum installations within the same period in coordination with the Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation (PESO), while leaving all monetary and damages claims open for determination before the arbitral tribunal in the pending Section 11 proceedings.

Date of Decision: November 18, 2026

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