Age Determination Must Strictly Follow Hierarchy Of Documents Under JJ Act: Orissa High Court Acquits Man Of POCSO Charges

"Determination of minority not in compliance with the hierarchy of documents under Rule 12(3) JJ Rules 2007 and Section 94 JJ Act; Ext-4 and Ext-5 cannot be relied upon to hold the victim a minor.", Orissa High Court, in a significant ruling dated April 17, 2026, held that the determination of a victim's minority must strictly adhere to the statutory hierarchy of documents prescribed under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act and its accompanying rules.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Biraja Prasanna Satapathy observed that school records from a second institution, without examining the author of the entries, carry no probative value in proving age. The Court set aside the conviction of a man sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment for rape and causing miscarriage.

The case originated from an FIR lodged in 2015 where the victim alleged that the appellant, Siba Hans, had established a physical relationship with her on the pretext of marriage, leading to her pregnancy and a subsequent forced miscarriage. The Special Court (POCSO), Bolangir, convicted the appellant under Sections 376(2)(n) and 313 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant challenged this judgment, contending that the victim was not a minor and that the sexual relationship was entirely consensual.

The primary question before the court was whether the school admission register and transfer certificate from a school other than the one "first attended" could be conclusive proof of age. The court was also called upon to determine whether a consensual long-term love affair followed by a breach of promise to marry constitutes rape under the IPC.

Statutory Hierarchy For Age Determination

The Court emphasized that for the provisions of the POCSO Act to apply, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was below 18 years of age. It noted that Section 94 of the JJ Act read with Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007, provides a specific hierarchy of documents: first, the matriculation certificate; second, the date of birth certificate from the school first attended; and third, a certificate from a local authority.

Court Explains Scope Of Rule 12 JJ Rules

Justice Satapathy observed that in the absence of a matriculation certificate, the court must look for the date of birth recorded in the school first attended by the child. In the present case, the prosecution relied on records from a High School where the victim had taken admission on transfer from a primary school. The Court held that since these were not records from the school "first attended," they did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 12(3)(a)(ii).

"The date of birth certificate from the school first attended is a mandatory requirement under the statutory scheme."

Evidentiary Value Of School Records Under Section 35 Evidence Act

The Court further noted that while school registers are admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, their probative value depends on the source of the information. It highlighted that the Assistant Teacher (P.W.4) who produced the documents was not the author of the entries, nor did he know who provided the date of birth. Furthermore, the parents of the victim admitted during cross-examination that they were illiterate and did not know her actual date of birth.

Benefit Of Doubt In Medical Age Estimation

Regarding the medical evidence, the Court pointed out that the doctor (P.W.10) estimated the victim's age to be between 16 to 18 years. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the Bench observed that when medical opinion provides a range, a flexibility of two years is often permitted. Given the lack of reliable documentary evidence, the Court held that the benefit of the doubt regarding the victim’s minority must lean in favor of the accused.

"The ossification test indicating 16 to 18 years raises a reasonable doubt as to minority; the benefit must go to the accused."

Consensual Relationship vs. Rape On False Promise Of Marriage

The Court then examined the charge of rape under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. It found that the victim, in her own testimony, admitted to having a love affair with the appellant for one and a half years. During cross-examination, she explicitly stated that she had consented to the sexual acts. The Bench noted a distinction between a "false promise to marry" made at the inception and a "breach of promise" that occurs later due to circumstances.

Criteria For A Sterling Witness

The Bench held that for a conviction to be based solely on the victim's testimony, she must qualify as a "sterling witness" whose version is unassailable and consistent. In this case, the Court found material contradictions between the victim's FIR, her statement under Section 164 CrPC, and her deposition in court regarding how the relationship progressed and the circumstances under which she eloped.

"If there is merely a breach of promise to marry, no case of rape is made out, especially where the relationship was long-term and consensual."

Inconsistencies Regarding Causing Miscarriage

Finally, the Court addressed the conviction under Section 313 IPC for causing miscarriage without consent. It noted that the victim’s account was riddled with inconsistencies: she mentioned taking one tablet in her 164 statement but five tablets in her court deposition. The Court also found it "unbelievable" that the victim’s parents remained unaware of her six-month pregnancy while she was living in the same house.

Failure Of Prosecution To Prove Intent

The Court observed that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellant intentionally administered drugs to cause a miscarriage. The variations in the victim’s testimony regarding the discovery of the dead child—initially stating it was left in a field, while the police recovered it from a well—further weakened the prosecution's case.

The High Court concluded that the trial court committed a gross illegality by treating the victim as a minor without following the statutory mandate of the JJ Act. It further held that the prosecution failed to prove the charges of rape and forced miscarriage beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgment of conviction and ordered the immediate release of the appellant.

Date of Decision: 17 April 2026