Age Cannot Be Presumed by Utterance Alone: Delhi High Court Upholds Acquittal in Alleged Sexual Assault of Minor

“Prosecution Failed to Prove Victim Was a Minor; Absence of Age Proof and Medical Evidence Undermines Entire Case” - In a significant ruling Delhi High Court (Division Bench comprising Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Manoj Jain) upheld the acquittal of Ajay Kumar Yadav, who had been charged with kidnapping and repeated sexual assault of a minor under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) IPC and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO). The Court dismissed the State Government of NCT of Delhi's appeal against the 2016 trial court judgment, finding no perversity or illegality that warranted interference.

The judgment underscores the mandatory obligation on the prosecution to prove the age of the prosecutrix through documentary or medical evidence and reiterates the principle that appeals against acquittal demand a higher threshold of scrutiny.

“Prosecutrix’s Claimed Age of 13 Not Supported by Documents or Medical Opinion—Adverse Inference Drawn Against Prosecution”

The Court began by noting that the central plank of the prosecution’s case rested on the minor status of the prosecutrix, referred to as Miss A, who allegedly went missing on 30 December 2014 and later accused the respondent of sexual assault and abduction. While Miss A and her mother orally claimed she was 13 years old, the prosecution failed to produce any documentary proof—such as a birth certificate or school records—and no bone ossification test was conducted.

The Court observed:

“Age cannot be presumed on the verbal utterances alone, particularly when the victim is, admittedly, a teenager.” [Para 24]

“This Court cannot find any fault in the impugned judgement and quite clearly, prosecution, itself, is to be blamed as… no effort of any kind was made to collect any documentary proof with respect to her age.” [Para 25]

The Court held that the investigating officer’s admission—that no document or medical evidence regarding age was collected—was a serious lapse. It drew an adverse inference against the prosecution for failing to establish the age of the prosecutrix, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite under POCSO and relevant IPC provisions.

“Medical Examination Was Refused, But Investigation Did Not Compel It—Another Failure That Weakened the Case”

The Court also found that no medical evidence was available in support of the alleged sexual assault. The prosecutrix’s mother refused to allow internal gynaecological examination, despite the serious nature of the allegations. The refusal was formally recorded in Exhibit PW-3/A.

The bench noted:

“Since it was, allegedly, a case of sexual assault upon a minor, the Investigating Agency should have… convinced victim and her mother to permit such gynecological examination… Refusal to undergo medical has also caused substantial damage to the case of prosecution.” [Paras 29–31]

The lack of Medical Legal Certificate (MLC) and absence of any forensic or medical corroboration cast further doubt on the prosecution’s case.

“Voluntary Travel, No Alarm, Prior Affection—Evidence Points to Consensual Elopement, Not Abduction”

In its meticulous review of witness testimonies, the Court observed that Miss A’s conduct and deposition suggested a voluntary relationship. She admitted in Section 164 CrPC statement that she was in love with the accused, wished to marry him, and had accompanied him willingly.

She also revealed that they travelled in public transport, covering over 300 kilometers, stayed at his village home for 2–3 days, and interacted with his family members—all without raising any alarm or complaint.

The Court stated:

“They both boarded bus together and travelled for more than 300 kms in crowded bus and for some inexplicable reasons, she raised no alarm whatsoever.” [Para 35]

“It is thus quite palpable that Miss A, voluntarily, accompanied and stayed with accused and his family, and, thus, was herself a consenting party.” [Para 36]

The Court referred to its own previous ruling in Raju v. State 2025 DHC 8935-DB and several precedents including Tameezuddin v. State, Rajak Mohammad v. State of Rajasthan, and State v. Rahul, where courts held that unraised alarms and sustained cohabitation with the accused negate the theory of forcible abduction or rape, especially in the absence of reliable proof of minority.

“In Acquittal Appeals, Interference Only If Judgment Is Perverse or Illegal—Neither Condition Met”

In reaffirming the limited scope of appellate interference in acquittal, the Court cautioned that a mere possibility of a different view is insufficient to overturn a trial court’s findings. The Court emphasized:

“Appellate Court cannot overturn order of acquittal, merely, on the premise that another view was possible. Thus, a judgment of acquittal can be upset where it is found to be perverse.” [Para 40]

Finding that the trial court had properly appreciated the evidence, and that its conclusions were neither perverse nor contrary to settled principles, the Court held that no interference was warranted.

Conclusion: Prosecution Must Meet Evidentiary Standards, Especially in POCSO Cases

This ruling illustrates a key principle in criminal jurisprudence: statutory presumptions must be supported by foundational evidence, especially when the age of the prosecutrix determines the applicability of stringent penal provisions like those under POCSO.

While affirming that victim testimony holds significant weight in sexual assault cases, the Court clarified that inconsistent statements, lack of corroboration, and failure to establish essential legal criteria, such as age and force, will undermine the prosecution’s case, even in sensitive cases.

Date of Decision: 15 October 2025