3Children’s Court Cannot Abdicate Its Duty of Independent Assessment: Telangana High Court Sets Aside Conviction of Juvenile Tried as Adult Without Proper Procedure

“Merely Endorsing the Juvenile Board’s Report Is Not Enough—Children’s Court Must Make Its Own Assessment” – In a significant judgment safeguarding the statutory rights of children in conflict with law, the Telangana High Court set aside the conviction of Mohammad Dastagir Khan @ Asif—a juvenile tried and sentenced as an adult for kidnapping, unnatural sex, and murder of a minor—and remanded the case to the Children’s Court for a fresh inquiry under Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The Court held that the mandatory requirement of independent judicial assessment by the Children’s Court had not been followed.“By no stretch of imagination, can such findings of the learned Sessions Judge be deemed as an assessment, which is mandatory under Section 19(1)(i) of the Juvenile Justice Act,” observed the Division Bench of Justices K. Surender and E.V. Venugopal.

The appellant was convicted under Sections 364, 377, 302, and 201 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act for abducting a 10-year-old boy, sexually assaulting him, and killing him by binding and twisting his limbs, before disposing of the body. At the time of the offence in 2017, the appellant was 17 years old.

Initially registered under Section 363 IPC, the case was later escalated to heinous offences under IPC and POCSO. The Juvenile Justice Board, after a preliminary assessment, transferred the case to the Children’s Court, concluding that the appellant had the mental and physical capacity to commit the offence, and should be tried as an adult. The Children’s Court thereafter tried and convicted him without independently evaluating whether such a mode of trial was warranted.

The High Court, relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu (2023) and Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023 LiveLaw SC 857), emphasized that two separate stages of evaluation are mandatory under the Juvenile Justice Act: “The Children’s Court cannot brush aside its duty of independent assessment by relying solely on the assessment report by the Board under Section 15 of the Act.”

The Court noted that the Sessions Judge merely stated, “on due assessment of the child in conflict with law, this Court has come to a conclusion that he has to be tried as an adult,” but gave no reasoning or findings.

“The assessment of the learned Sessions Judge is bereft of any reasoning… The details of the assessment ought to have been narrated before concluding that the accused could be tried as an adult,” the Bench remarked.

The Court further clarified that failure to challenge the Board’s decision under Section 15 did not exempt the Children’s Court from independently applying its mind under Section 19. “The child not questioning the preliminary assessment will not absolve the Children’s Court Judge from making an independent assessment,” the Court said.

The ruling underscores that a child tried as an adult faces life-altering consequences, including exposure to life imprisonment and permanent criminal records—unlike the reformatory framework of the Juvenile Justice Board, which limits custody to three years.

Citing the Supreme Court’s concern in Barun Chandra, the Bench highlighted:“The preliminary assessment is not a trial—it is a gateway that may determine the child’s future. The stakes are high, and therefore, the scrutiny must be serious.”

The High Court held that such procedural lapses caused prejudice to the appellant and warranted remand of the case.

The Court set aside the conviction and remanded the case back to the Children’s Court: “If the Children’s Court comes to the conclusion that the appellant can be tried as an adult, there need not be a de novo trial. The Children’s Court can pass judgment on the basis of the evidence available on record, but only after making an independent assessment under Section 19(1).”

The High Court directed that the matter be given expeditious priority, considering the gravity of the charges and the delay already caused.

Date of decision:  April 10, 2025