Constitutional Law - Article 136 - Judicial Review - Employment Regularization:Special Leave Petition against High Court order dismissing writ petition for regularization of employment in non-statutory non-recognized canteen - Tribunal and High Court found canteen not recognized by Railway Board - No interference by Supreme Court with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts - Petitioners not entitled to claim status as railway employees. [Paras 1-21]

Employment Law - Railway Canteen Workers - Classification and Regularization:Workers in non-statutory non-recognized canteens not entitled to regularization as railway employees - Detailed analysis of categories of canteens and their recognition status as per M.M.R. Khan case - Petitioners failed to prove canteen's recognition by Railway Board. [Para 7-18]

Decision:Special Leave Petition dismissed, affirming High Court and Tribunal decisions - No error in findings that canteen was non-statutory non-recognized - No grounds for regularization of petitioners' employment. [Para 21]

Referred Cases:

Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala and Another, AIR 2006 SC 3028:

M/s. Reliance Silicon (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise, Thane, AIR 1997 SC 1617:

Piara Singh and others v. Natha Singh and others, AIR 1991 SC 1529:

Asian Paints India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1988 SC 1087:

S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 853:

Metroark Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta, (2004) 92 ECC 489:

M.M.R. Khan and others etc. v. Union of India and others, etc., AIR 1990 SC 937:

Pragati Computers Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Madras, (2000) 68 ECC 231:

Traders and Traders v. Ramnarayan Bhattad, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 661:

Criminal Law - Conspiracy and Cheating - Criminal Appeal against conviction and enhancement of sentence - The case involved the procurement of Damp Proof Cement (DPC) at an inflated price by Deva Prasad Sharma (A-1), the Chief Engineer of NEHU, in collusion with Edmund S. Lyngdoh (A-4) and others - Allegation that A-1 invited quotations and approved inflated rates, causing financial loss to NEHU - High Court convicted A-1 and A-4 under Sections 120B and 420 IPC, and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - Enhanced the sentence of A-1 - Reversed the acquittal of A-4 and imposed sentences.

Role of Chief Engineer in Conspiracy - Analysis - Held - A-1, as a Technical Member, played a dominant role in misleading the Purchase Committee of NEHU to purchase DPC at an inflated rate - Evidence showed that A-1 invited quotations without ascertaining market rates and approved rates of Rs. 42.75 per kg against the prevailing market rate of Rs. 5-10 per kg - Conviction upheld based on oral and documentary evidence.

Role of Supplier in Conspiracy - Analysis - Held - A-4, as a supplier and dealer in DPC, quoted and supplied DPC at an inflated rate, causing wrongful gain to himself and loss to NEHU - Conviction under Sections 120B and 420 IPC upheld - Sentence modified considering age and health of A-4, and duration of the case.

Decision - Appeal by legal representative of deceased A-1 dismissed - Appeal by A-4 partly allowed - Sentence of imprisonment modified to the period already undergone with additional fine imposed.

Referred Cases:

Balwant v. State of U.P. (2008) 9 SCC 974 Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 13 SCC 1

Civil Procedure - Amendment of Decree - Scope of Section 152 CPC - Partition Suit: The Supreme Court examined the scope and application of Section 152 of the CPC, determining that the section is intended for correcting clerical or arithmetical errors or accidental slips or omissions in judgments, decrees, or orders. The Court held that amendments under this section should not involve reappraisal of evidence or affect substantive rights. The High Court’s correction of the decree to accurately allot shares to the heirs was upheld, affirming that the corrections were within the scope of Section 152. [Paras 11-20]

Partition of Property - Joint Ownership - Rights of Co-Heirs: The Court reiterated that in cases of joint ownership, the possession of one co-heir is presumed to be on behalf of all co-heirs. The partition of matrooka properties under Muslim Law involves redistribution among heirs, with the possession of one heir not being adverse to others. The Court noted that the trial court's findings on exclusive possession were incorrect, affirming the High Court's correction to reflect joint ownership and entitlement accurately. [Paras 7-10, 17-18]

Interpretation of Preliminary Decree - Rights of Parties: The Supreme Court emphasized that a preliminary decree in a partition suit can declare the rights and interests of all parties involved, as per Order 20, Rule 18(2) CPC. This includes specifying shares of each heir. The High Court’s order clarifying the shares of the heirs of Shahzadi Bee, Khadar Nawaz Khan, and Feroz Khan was consistent with this provision. [Para 20]

Decision: The appeals were dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order amending the preliminary decree to correctly reflect the shares of the parties, finding no error in the exercise of powers under Section 152 of the CPC. The amendment did not alter the substantive rights of the parties but corrected an omission in the original decree. No costs were awarded. [Paras 21-23]

Referred Cases:

Shub Karan Bubna @ Shub Karan Prasad Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna and Others, (2009) 9 SCC 689

Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Another, AIR 1966 SC 1047

Bijay Kumar Saraogi v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2005 SC 2435

State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh, AIR 2003 SC 4179

U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Imtiaz Hussain, AIR 2006 SC 649

Service Law - Pension and Gratuity - Departmental Proceedings - Civil Appeal challenging High Court order on the entitlement of gratuity upon superannuation while departmental proceedings were pending - Respondent placed under suspension and subsequently superannuated - Question of whether gratuity could be withheld under Rule 9 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Held that departmental proceedings were validly initiated within the meaning of Rule 9(6)(a) by virtue of the respondent's suspension during service - Appeal allowed, Tribunal and High Court orders set aside. [Paras 1-14]

Entitlement to Gratuity - Analysis - Held - Gratuity could be withheld if departmental proceedings were initiated during service - Suspension deemed initiation of proceedings as per Rule 9(6)(a) - Charge sheet issued post-retirement but within four years of the alleged misconduct considered valid - Orders requiring the release of gratuity reversed - Respondent to provide a bank guarantee as a condition for retaining gratuity until proceedings conclude. [Paras 9-14]

Decision - Validity of Withholding Gratuity - Supreme Court set aside orders directing the release of gratuity to the respondent - Directed the respondent to furnish a bank guarantee equivalent to the gratuity amount until the final outcome of departmental proceedings - Interest paid on gratuity to be refunded forthwith. [Paras 13-14]

Referred Cases:

N/A

Arbitration Law - Termination of Arbitral Tribunal's Mandate – Appointment of Sole Arbitrator by Court – Failure of the Arbitral Tribunal to perform its functions either de jure or de facto leads to the termination of its mandate under Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court can terminate the mandate of an inefficient Arbitral Tribunal and appoint a new arbitrator to ensure speedy and fair resolution of disputes. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, emphasizing that the Court is not powerless to remedy situations where the arbitration process is unduly delayed. [Paras 1-25]

Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators – Deviation from Contractual Procedure – The High Court's power under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, allows deviation from the contractual procedure of appointing arbitrators if there are justifiable doubts regarding the independence and impartiality of the designated arbitrators. The Supreme Court affirmed that the appointment of an independent arbitrator by the High Court, in this case, was justified due to the repeated delays and dilatory tactics by the original tribunal. [Para 19-20]

Decision – Dismissal of Appeal – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the High Court's decision to terminate the mandate of the initial Arbitral Tribunal and appoint a sole arbitrator. The Court underscored the necessity of prompt and effective arbitration, particularly when the designated arbitrators fail to act in accordance with their duties. [Para 24-25]

Referred Cases:

Yashwith Construction P. Ltd. vs. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. and Another, AIR 2006 SC 2798

Union of India (UOI) vs. Bharat Battery Manufacturing Co. (P) Ltd., (2007) 10 SCC 684

Ace Pipeline Contracts Private Limited vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, AIR 2007 SC 1764

Datar Switchgears Ltd. vs. Tata Finance Ltd. and Another, (2000) 8 SCC 151

Deep Trading Company vs. Indian Oil Corporation and Others, AIR 2013 SC 1479

Union of India (UOI) vs. Singh Builders Syndicate, (2009) 4 SCC 523

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others vs. Raja Transport (P) Ltd., (2009) 8 SCC 520

Northern Railway Administration, Ministry of Railway, New Delhi vs. Patel Engineering Company Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 240

Tax Law – Interpretation of Proviso to Section 113 – Prospective vs. Retrospective Application – Proviso added to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act by the Finance Act, 2002 – Clarification sought whether the proviso is clarificatory and curative in nature with retrospective effect or prospective only – Held, the proviso is prospective in nature and not retrospective – Tax surcharge on block assessments only applicable prospectively from 1st June 2002. [Paras 3, 8, 38]

Retrospective Legislation – Principles – Held – General principles against retrospectivity unless a clear intention from the legislature – Proviso to Section 113 not meant to be retrospective as clarified by legislative intent, notes on clauses, and CBDT circulars – Legislative amendments, unless expressly stated or necessarily implied, presumed to be prospective – No justification to apply the surcharge retrospectively causing undue hardship to taxpayers – Proviso interpreted to apply only from 1st June 2002. [Paras 30-35, 38]

Previous Judicial Interpretation – Reversal – Supreme Court overrules the decision in Commissioner of Income Central II vs. Suresh N. Gupta, which had held the proviso to Section 113 as clarificatory and retrospectively applicable – Supreme Court concludes that Suresh N. Gupta did not correctly interpret the legislative intent or the legal principles concerning retrospective operation. [Paras 40-41]

Decision – Appeals by Income Tax Department dismissed – Appeals by Assessees allowed – Surcharge levied for block assessments pertaining to periods prior to 1st June 2002 deleted. [Para 41]

Referred Cases:

Government of India and Others Vs. Indian Tobacco Association, AIR 2005 SC 3685

Keshavlal Jethalal Shah Vs. Mohanlal Bhagwandas and Another, AIR 1968 SC 1336

Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1633

Commnr. of Income Tax, Jalandhar-I Vs. Shri Rajiv Bhatara, (2009) 13 SCC 315

Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat I, Ahmedabad Vs. M.A. Merchant, AIR 1989 SC 1710

Govind Das and Others Vs. The Income Tax Officer and Another, AIR 1977 SC 552

Commissioner of Income Central II Vs. Suresh N. Gupta, (2008) 4 SCC 362

Govind Saran Ganga Saran Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax and Others, AIR 1985 SC 1041

Criminal Law – Cancellation of Bail – High Court's Jurisdiction: Special Leave Petitions against High Court order canceling bail granted to petitioners – Petitioners initially granted bail under Section 167(2) CrPC for default in filing charge sheet within 90 days – High Court later canceled bail citing misrepresentation and procedural errors – Supreme Court emphasizes that High Court lacks jurisdiction to review or alter its own judgment once final, except to correct clerical errors – Cancellation of bail by High Court deemed improper. [Paras 1-33]

Section 362 CrPC – Bar on Review: Section 362 CrPC prevents courts from reviewing or altering final orders – High Court’s cancellation of bail amounted to a review of its own previous order – Supreme Court holds such review outside the purview of Section 362 – Bail cancellation not justified in absence of new adverse facts or misconduct by accused post-grant of bail. [Paras 25-31]

Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC – Parameters for Cancellation: Section 167(2) CrPC grants bail if charge sheet not filed within stipulated period – Such bail is on default grounds, not merits – Bail can be canceled if new evidence surfaces or if accused misuses liberty – Supreme Court notes bail granted on default cannot be canceled simply due to procedural deficiencies unless strong grounds exist. [Paras 17-20]

Review vs. Cancellation – Legal Distinction: Distinction between setting aside an unjustified or perverse order and cancellation due to subsequent misconduct – High Court’s order fell into review category, prohibited under Section 362 – Supreme Court reiterates only appellate courts can set aside bail on grounds of being perverse, not the same court that granted it. [Paras 21-24]

Decision – Setting Aside High Court's Order: High Court's order canceling bail quashed – Supreme Court directs continuation of interim bail granted by itself until disposal of ongoing criminal case – High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reviewing its own bail order. [Paras 31-33]

Referred Cases:

Bay Berry Apartments Pvt. Ltd. v. Shobha (2007) AIR SC 226

Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat (2008) 6 JT 205

Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 9 JT 457

Central Bureau of Investigation v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy (2013) 7 SCC 452

Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar (1987) AIR SC 149

Puran v. Rambilas (2001) AIR SC 2023

Rashmi Rekha Thatoi v. State of Orissa (2012) 5 SCC 690

Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) (1978) AIR SC 179

Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa (2001) AIR SC 43

Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P. (2013) 4 RCR(Criminal) 600

Legal Profession - Professional Misconduct - Notary Misconduct- Professional misconduct involving the misuse of the position as a Notary by attesting blank stamp papers and affixing his signature and Notary seal on them - Supreme Court held that such actions violate the provisions of the Notaries Act and the Advocates Act - Appellant Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh's disciplinary action reinstated with modified punishment - Respondent debarred from practicing as an Advocate for a further two months, beyond the period he already served. [Paras 1-11]

Notary Misconduct - Impact on Advocacy- Violation of Notaries Act directly impacts the status of an Advocate as the role of a Notary is intrinsically linked to being an Advocate - Supreme Court emphasizes that misconduct as a Notary affects the professional integrity of an Advocate - Respondent’s argument that his Notary role should be seen as separate from his status as an Advocate rejected. [Para 4-6]

Punishment for Misconduct – Proportionality- While recognizing the professional misconduct, the Supreme Court modifies the punishment to ensure it is commensurate with the degree of misconduct - Previous suspension period considered sufficient with an additional two-month suspension - Respondent permanently barred from being recognized as a Notary in future. [Para 10-11]

Decision- Appeal allowed - Impugned order of the Bar Council of India set aside - Order of Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh dated 5th December 2009 reinstated with modifications regarding the suspension period - Respondent to serve an additional suspension of two months in October and November 2014. [Para 11]

Referred Cases:

Narain Pandey v. Pannalal Pandey, (2013) 116 CLT 27 : (2013) 1 CTC 104 : (2012) 12 JT 383 : (2013) 1 RCR(Civil) 598 : (2012) 12 SCALE 47

Noratanmal Chouraria v. M.R. Murli and Another, AIR 2004 SC 2440 : (2004) 4 JT 552 : (2004) 4 SCALE 755 : (2004) 5 SCC 689 : (2004) 1 SCR 266 Supp : (2004) AIRSCW 2894 : (2004) 3 Supreme 321

Civil Procedure - Deficiency in Court Fee - Appeal Stage - Power of Appellate CourtThe Supreme Court emphasized that the appellate court possesses the authority to allow a party to make up the deficiency in court-fee at the appellate stage. The High Court's view that such deficiency could only be rectified during the trial stage was held to be erroneous. It was clarified that the appellate proceedings are a continuation of the suit, thereby empowering the appellate court to exercise the same powers as the trial court in the interest of justice. [Paras 12-14]

Interpretation of Section 6 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 - Payment of Deficient Court FeeThe Supreme Court elucidated the proper interpretation of Section 6, especially Sub-sections (2) and (3), stating that these provisions mandate the court to grant time for the payment of deficient court-fee and that such a deficiency must be rectified before the delivery of judgment. In the present case, since no order was passed by the trial court directing the payment of deficient court-fee, the provisions were not applicable against the appellants. [Paras 8-10]

High Court's Erroneous Invocation of Article 227The High Court's intervention under Article 227 was deemed unjustified as the first appellate court's order was just and proper, advancing the cause of justice. The appellate court's power to require the payment of additional court-fee was validated under Clause (ii) of Section 12 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. [Paras 15-16]

DecisionThe Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the first appellate court's decision, allowing the appellants to pay the deficient court-fee at the appellate stage. The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs. [Para 17]

Referred Cases:

Bhagwan Das v. Jankidevi (1971) 2 SCC 238

K.C. Nambiar v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 198

Mathai v. Varkey Varkey & Anr. (1964) 1 SCR 495