Facts:

The case concerns the authority of the PNGRB under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2008, to fix transportation tariffs for consumers of natural gas.

Issues:

Whether the PNGRB has the power to regulate transportation tariffs for consumers of natural gas, including the maximum retail price and network tariffs.

Held:

The PNGRB is empowered under Section 22(1) of the Act to regulate transportation tariffs for common carriers, contract carriers, or city/local natural gas distribution networks, subject to the provisions of the Act.

Section 11 and the expression "subject to" in Section 22 indicate that the PNGRB's powers are conditional and must yield to other provisions of the Act. The focus is on common carriers or contract carriers, not consumers.

The legislative intent, as per the scheme of the Act, does not include entities beyond common carriers or contract carriers. The Act deliberately excludes entities not specified under Section 11.

The Act does not confer the power to regulate network tariffs or compression charges for consumers on the PNGRB. Therefore, the regulations framed by the PNGRB in this regard are declared ultra vires.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the regulations in question are ultra vires the PNGRB's powers under the Act.

Facts:

The respondent filed a civil suit against the appellants seeking various reliefs, including injunctions and damages for alleged defamation.

The respondent also filed a notice of motion seeking interim relief during the pendency of the suit.

The court granted ex parte ad-interim relief to the respondent but did not conclude the hearing on the notice of motion for two years.

The respondent filed a contempt petition alleging violations of the ex parte interim order by the appellants.

The court entertained the contempt petition and issued a show cause notice to the appellants.

Subsequently, the respondent filed another affidavit alleging fresh contempts by the appellants.

Issues:

Prompt disposal of the main case and related motions.

Alleged violations of the ex parte interim order by the appellants.

Held:

The Court refrained from making findings on the merits of the issues and instructed the lower courts to decide the matter strictly in accordance with the law. The Court directed the single judge of the High Court, who was handling the main civil suit and the notice of motion, to dispose of the notice of motion on its merits promptly, preferably within three months. The Supreme Court stayed the contempt proceedings until the disposal of the notice of motion. All issues, including the appellants' potential remedies under the Contempt of Courts Act, were kept open for consideration at the appropriate stage.

The appeals stand accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The Appellant owned land leased to the Indian Oil Corporation for operating a retail outlet dealership.

The dealership agreement was terminated due to a Supreme Court decision, prompting eviction proceedings by the Corporation.

The Appellant challenged the eviction order, claiming the lease agreement terminated with the dealership agreement.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the dealership agreement automatically terminated the lease agreement.

Applicability of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.

Held:

The lease agreement and dealership agreement were separate documents, and termination of one did not affect the other (Para 18).

The Public Premises Act applied, and the Appellant was considered a trespasser after termination of the dealership (Para 19).

The Appellant's argument for reconsideration under a new policy was rejected; if policy permits, the Appellant could apply without obstructing Corporation's operations (Para 20).

The appeal was dismissed, and the Appellant directed to vacate the premises within four weeks, failing which would result in contempt of court (Para 22).

Facts:

The case involved a bomb blast resulting in fatalities and injuries. The charge sheet was filed under sections of the TADA Act, IPC, and Explosives Substance Act. A confession was recorded under section 15 of the TADA Act, implicating the accused. The trial court rejected the confession due to language discrepancies.

Issues:

Admissibility of confession under Section 15(1) of the TADA Act.

Language requirement for recording confessions.

Corroboration requirement for using confessions against co-accused.

Held:

The confession under Section 15(1) of the TADA Act is admissible against the maker, co-accused, abettor, or conspirator if recorded in accordance with statutory requirements and guidelines.

The requirement to record confessions in a specific language under Rule 15(1) of the TADA Rules is discretionary, not mandatory. Recording in the language of communication between the accused and the recording officer is permissible.

The confession must be corroborated generally by other evidence on record when used against co-accused.

Decision: The acquittal of one accused was set aside as his confession was admissible and sufficiently corroborated. However, the acquittal of the other accused was affirmed due to lack of corroboration.

Facts:

The dispute arose when the Tahasildar imposed luxury tax on a building consisting of 13 residential apartments based on the total plinth area of the entire building. The respondent challenged this tax imposition in the Kerala High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether luxury tax should be levied on each residential apartment individually, considering the plinth area of each apartment, or whether the plinth area of all apartments should be aggregated for tax calculation.

Held:

The Court extensively analyzed the relevant sections of the Kerala Building Tax Act, particularly Section 2(e), Section 2(k), and Section 5A. It emphasized the importance of purposive interpretation to serve the legislative intent. The Court concluded that luxury tax should be levied based on the plinth area of each residential apartment, considering them as separate units. It rejected the idea of aggregating the plinth area of all apartments for tax calculation. The Court clarified that if an individual owns multiple apartments in a building, luxury tax should be computed based on the aggregate plinth area subject to the cap provided under Section 5A of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remanded to the revenue authority to compute the luxury tax accordingly.

Facts:

Tikaram, the victim, was attacked and burned alive by a group of individuals including the respondents.

The trial court convicted all accused including the respondents.

The High Court acquitted the respondents, citing lack of evidence to establish their participation in an unlawful assembly.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's acquittal of the respondents was justified based on the evidence presented.

Whether the respondents were part of an unlawful assembly and guilty of the crime of burning Tikaram alive.

Held:

The Court found that the evidence, including dying declarations and eyewitness testimony, clearly established the respondents' participation in the crime.

The court concluded that the respondents were part of an unlawful assembly with a shared purpose and intent to commit the crime.

Therefore, the Court overturned the judgment of the High Court, restored the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court against the respondents, and ordered them to be taken into custody to serve their sentences.

Facts:

The case involved the appellant, the State of M.P., challenging the High Court's decision to set aside the conviction of the respondent, Madanlal, under Section 376(2)(f) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and instead convicting him under Section 354 IPC.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in its approach to the evidence and reasoning for converting the offense.

Whether the compromise entered into between the parties, especially considering the victim's minor status, influenced the High Court's decision.

Held:

The Court criticized the High Court's approach, stating that it failed to properly appreciate the evidence and did not provide sufficient reasoning for the decision. The Supreme Court emphasized the duty of the appellate court to thoroughly review the evidence and provide reasoned judgments.

The Court also addressed the issue of compromise in rape cases, stating that rape is a non-compoundable offense and cannot be settled through compromise. It stressed the importance of preserving the dignity and honor of the victim and condemned any attempt to pressure the victim into a compromise.

The Court decided to set aside the High Court's judgment and remit the matter back to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing the need for a proper reappraisal of the evidence.

Facts:

The Respondents were retired government college teachers, who were granted Lecturers (Selection Scale) before 1.1.1986 and retired between 1991 to 2004. They had completed three years of service in the said pay-scale prior to 1.1.2006. The government revised pay scales for college teachers in 1999 and issued a circular in 2008 for the revision of pension/family pension of pre-1.9.2006 pensioners. Disputes arose regarding the applicability of revised pay scales and pension rules to the Respondents.

Issues:

Whether the Respondents were entitled to the revised pay scale and pension benefits.

Interpretation of pension rules and circulars issued by the government.

Applicability of UGC regulations and guidelines.

Held:

The Division Bench held that the Respondents were entitled to the revised pay scale and pension benefits as per the applicable rules and circulars. It was observed that pension is a right and not a bounty, and the government is obligated to provide it based on the rules in force. The Bench emphasized that the language in the rules may vary, but the essence remains the same, as seen in a similar case decided by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The financial burden on the state was not considered a valid reason to deny the pension benefits to the Respondents. The appeals were dismissed, and the state was directed to extend the benefits to the Respondents within three months, failing which interest would be payable.

Facts:

The case involved the murder of a boy named Akash, with the respondents accused of the crime. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimony of a single witness, PW2 Mewa Ram, who claimed to have seen the respondents taking the victim inside their baithak and later discovering the victim's dead body in a pool of blood.

Issues:

Whether the testimony of the sole witness could be relied upon to establish the guilt of the respondents beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held and Decision:

The Court found several inconsistencies and gaps in the testimony of PW2. Firstly, there was no corroboration of his presence at the scene or the events he described. Secondly, there was no evidence regarding the movements of the victim prior to the incident, nor were other potential witnesses examined to confirm the victim's presence with the respondents. Thirdly, the prosecution failed to establish the direct involvement of the respondents in the crime beyond the testimony of PW2. Additionally, no blood-stained clothes or significant evidence linking the respondents to the crime scene were recovered. Considering the gravity of the charges and the lack of conclusive evidence against the respondents, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to acquit them. The court emphasized the need for stricter scrutiny in cases involving capital punishment and concluded that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of doubt.