Facts: The appellants filed an application under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash Charge Sheet No. 1 dated 07.05.2016 in Case Crime No. 441 of 2015 under Sections 420, 406, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The case was pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Khair, Aligarh. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appellants' application without referring to the factual aspects of the case, merely citing legal principles.

Issues: Whether the High Court's dismissal of the appellants' application under Section 482 of the CrPC was justified.

Held and Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court, finding that it failed to consider the factual matrix of the case and only relied on legal principles. The Court remanded the case back to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits, instructing the High Court to consider both legal principles and factual findings. The Court emphasized the importance of providing reasoning in the order to enable higher courts to review the decision. The High Court was directed to reconsider the appellants' application after issuing notices to the respondents (State of Uttar Pradesh and another).

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits, with instructions to provide reasoned findings.

Facts:

Students admitted to the first year MBBS course at Respondent No. 5 College sought transfer to another institution due to concerns regarding the college's infrastructure and compliance with regulatory norms.

Issues:

Whether the students could be transferred to another institution to complete their MBBS course due to deficiencies in Respondent No. 5 College's infrastructure and compliance with regulatory norms.

Held:

The court directed Respondent No. 5 College to transfer its land, building, and assets to the State Government to address concerns regarding its infrastructure. The State Government would then apply for affiliation with Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna, Uttarakhand Medical University, Dehradun, and the university would decide on affiliation within four weeks.

Once the necessary infrastructure is set up, the State Government would apply to the Medical Council of India for permission under Section 10A of the Medical Council of India Act. If affiliation and permission are granted, students completing the first year course can sit for the first year MBBS examination conducted by the affiliating university.

The Director General of Police, Dehradun, was directed to seal the premises of Respondent No. 5 College immediately. Any future litigation regarding the college should be addressed only before the Supreme Court.

Facts:

Dispute arose between STC and GSHL regarding non-payment of outstanding dues under a tripartite agreement.

Parties decided to settle disputes through conciliation proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Two settlement agreements were entered into between the parties, but GSHL failed to fully comply with them.

STC filed an Execution Petition in the Delhi High Court seeking to execute the settlement agreements, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

STC appealed against the Delhi High Court's decision to the Supreme Court.

Payments were made by the respondents during the pendency of the appeal, eventually discharging the entire liability till 10.11.2012.

The only remaining issue was the interest payable from 10.11.2012 onwards.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide the interest payable and its rate.

Determination of the amount payable towards interest and the period within which it should be paid.

Held:

The Court held that it has jurisdiction to decide the interest payable and its rate, and decided to settle the matter by determining the interest payable and its rate.

The respondents are liable to pay interest on the principal sum of Rs. 1610 crores at a rate of 8% per annum from 10.11.2012.

The respondents were directed to pay a lump-sum amount of Rs. 600 crores towards interest within 12 weeks from the date of the order.

Upon payment of the specified amount, all claims arising from the settlement agreements would be finally settled, and all pending proceedings between the parties would be closed.

Failure to pay the specified amount by the deadline would amount to contempt of court, and STC would have the right to take appropriate legal action.

Facts:

The case of Mahender Chawla & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 156 of 2016) involved petitioners alleging threats from the accused if they testified against them. The petitioners contended that numerous witnesses had been attacked, and some had even been killed. The matter concerned the abysmal state of witness protection in India and its impact on the administration of criminal justice.

Issues:

The court was the inadequacy of witness protection measures in India, leading to witnesses facing intimidation and reluctance to testify truthfully.

The court needed to address the constitutional implications of failing to protect witnesses and the consequent denial of a fair trial.

Held:

The court recognized the indispensable role of witnesses in the judicial system, particularly in criminal cases where testimonies often determine factual findings.

Despite their significance, witnesses in India face dire circumstances, including threats and trauma, due to the lack of a comprehensive witness protection program.

The failure to provide adequate protection to witnesses results in many turning hostile, especially in cases involving influential or violent accused individuals.

Witness protection is crucial for ensuring fair trials and upholding the rule of law, as failure to hear material witnesses amounts to a denial of justice.

The Witness Protection Scheme, 2018, prepared by the Union of India, was recognized as a temporary measure until suitable legislation is enacted. The scheme aims to identify threats to witnesses and ensure their safety during legal proceedings.

The court directed the States of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana to provide adequate security to the petitioners.

It mandated the establishment of vulnerable witness deposition complexes in district courts across India within a year to facilitate secure testimony.

Facts:

The appellant, Vivek Mudgil, challenged the order passed by the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board regarding his appointment as Principal.

The appellant's appointment was cancelled due to not fulfilling the required qualification of possessing ten years of teaching experience.

The appellant, initially a Lecturer, had his services regularized in 1990. He had a period of study leave from 1992 to 1996, during which he pursued higher studies in Czechoslovakia.

The Board considered this period as not counting towards teaching experience. The appellant fell short of the required teaching experience by nine months when he applied for the Principal position.

Issues:

Whether the appellant met the eligibility criteria for the position of Principal.

Whether the period of study leave should count towards teaching experience.

Whether the exemption granted by the Board affected the appellant's eligibility.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeals and disposed of the transferred case. The Court held that the possession of ten years of teaching experience was a necessary qualification for the appointment as Principal.

The exemption granted by the Board did not cure the appellant's disqualification as of the last date of application submission and the date of preparing the panel. The Court emphasized that the exemption was not granted retrospectively and did not affect the appellant's eligibility at the time of application.

The Court left open the question of whether the respondent authorities had the power to grant exemptions under Section 16-E(3) of the 1921 Act after the enactment of the 1982 Act, allowing parties to approach the High Court if necessary to decide this issue independently.

Facts:

The case involved a complaint filed by Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (RJIL) alleging anti-competitive practices by three major telecom operators (IDOs) and the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI). RJIL asserted that the IDOs intentionally ignored requests for Point of Interconnection (POI) augmentation, causing network congestion and call failures. Allegations were also made regarding the denial of Mobile Number Portability (MNP) requests by IDOs and COAI's alleged bias towards IDOs.

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around the jurisdiction of the CCI to handle the matter, considering the specialized regulatory framework governing the telecom sector under the TRAI Act.

Additionally, the maintainability of writ petitions challenging CCI's jurisdictional authority was in question.

Held:

The court held that TRAI, as a specialized regulator for the telecom sector, should initially address disputes related to telecom regulations, including interconnection agreements and compliance with license conditions. These issues fall within TRAI's expertise and statutory mandate. Therefore, CCI's jurisdiction is limited until TRAI determines jurisdictional aspects. [

While TRAI deals with regulatory aspects, the CCI retains authority to investigate and address anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector. The CCI's role is crucial in ensuring fair competition and preventing practices that adversely affect competition.

The court affirmed the maintainability of writ petitions challenging CCI's jurisdictional authority, emphasizing the importance of judicial review in such matters.

CCI's order directing an investigation based on prima facie evidence was administrative in nature. The High Court couldn't adjudicate on the merits of the case but could review jurisdictional issues.

Decision: The court upheld the High Court's decision to quash CCI's order, as it was premature for CCI to proceed before TRAI resolved jurisdictional aspects. However, the court emphasized that CCI's role in addressing anti-competitive practices remains significant, complementing TRAI's regulatory functions.

Facts:

The appellant, a contractor, entered into an agreement with the Union of India for the construction of permanent shelters in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Differences arose between the parties regarding the construction work, leading to arbitration.

The arbitrator made an award in favor of the appellant, directing the respondent to pay a certain sum.

The respondent filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to set aside the arbitral award, but faced delays due to jurisdictional issues and administrative difficulties.

Issues:

Whether the delay of 514 days in filing the application under Section 34 can be condoned.

Whether the statutory provisions and precedents support the condonation of such a delay.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the delay of 514 days could not be condoned as it exceeded the strict timeline prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court analyzed the statutory provisions and precedents, emphasizing that the extension beyond the specified timeline of three months could only be granted for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause, but not thereafter.

Despite considering the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which deals with the exclusion of time spent in prosecuting another civil proceeding, the Court found that there remained a delay of 131 days in filing the application. This exceeded the statutory limitation prescribed in Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act.

Therefore, the Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the petition under Section 34, ruling that it was barred by limitation.

Facts:

Indian Oil Corporation issued an advertisement inviting applications for different Kisan Seva Kendra (Retail Outlet) dealerships, including one located on Falka Gerabari Road in Bihar.

Sanjay Kumar Jha (appellant) and Prakash Chandra Chaudhary (respondent) applied for the dealership.

A panel of candidates was prepared, with Jha ranked first and Chaudhary second.

Chaudhary challenged the allotment in the High Court, alleging discrepancies in the evaluation process.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's intervention was justified in this matter.

Whether the decisions of the Single Bench and the Division Bench were erroneous.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's intervention was not justified. It criticized both the Single Bench and the Division Bench for errors in their judgments.

The Court stated that the High Court should not have adjudicated disputed factual issues, as it falls outside the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the High Court erred in making a comparative assessment of the suitability of different candidates for the dealership.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court found fault with the Division Bench for proceeding on a mistaken understanding of the facts, particularly regarding the location of the land in question. It noted that the Division Bench disregarded reports from Revenue Authorities and made errors in its analysis.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments of both the Single Bench and the Division Bench. The writ petition filed by Prakash Chandra Chaudhary was dismissed, and each party was directed to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The appellant, S.C. Singh, challenged a resolution of the High Court of Uttarakhand that terminated the College Development Council (CDC) but allowed its continuation without the appellant as its Director.

The appellant was appointed as Director, CDC, in November 1992, for a tenure of three years, based on an advertisement by the University.

The revised guidelines by the University Grants Commission (UGC) specified a tenure of three years for the Director, extendable for another term of three years.

Issues:

Whether the tenure limitation for the Director of CDC applied only to deputationists or to all appointments.

Whether the appellant could continue as Director, CDC, beyond the prescribed tenure.

Held:

The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant clause of the revised guidelines and rejected the appellant's argument that the tenure limitation applied only to deputationists. It held that the tenure limitation applied to all appointments to the post of Director, CDC.

The Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, stating that the appellant had served the prescribed tenure and could not continue as Director, CDC.

The appeal was dismissed, and consequently, the contempt petition also did not survive. No costs were awarded.