Facts:

The dispute involves Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL), Canara Bank, and its subsidiary CANFINA. The disagreement arises from a transaction where CANFINA subscribed to bonds floated by MTNL, subsequently transferring them to Canara Bank. MTNL canceled the bond allotment, alleging incomplete payment by CANFINA.

Issues:

Existence of a valid arbitration agreement.

Joinder of CANFINA as a party in arbitral proceedings.

Application of the Group of Companies Doctrine.

Held:

Existence of a Valid Arbitration Agreement: The court establishes that a valid arbitration agreement is crucial for the arbitration process, and it can take various forms. Section 7(4)(b) allows deriving an arbitration agreement from different means of communication, including electronic means. The court emphasizes interpreting arbitration agreements based on the parties' intentions rather than technicalities.

Agreement Evidenced by Documents: The agreement between MTNL and Canara Bank to arbitrate disputes is evidenced by documents exchanged and court proceedings. Once a party consents to arbitration, they are estopped from later denying the existence of a written agreement.

Application of Section 7(4)(c): Section 7(4)(c) is cited, stating that an arbitration agreement can be in the form of exchanged statements of claims and defense. The court highlights that documents filed before the arbitrator can constitute evidence of an arbitration agreement if not denied by the other party.

Tri-Partite Agreement: The court concludes that the agreement is essentially a tri-partite agreement between MTNL, Canara Bank, and CANFINA. The dispute's nature requires the involvement of all three parties for effective resolution.

Joinder of CANFINA: The "Group of Companies" doctrine is invoked to join CANFINA in the arbitration proceedings. The court deems CANFINA a necessary and proper party due to the tri-partite nature of the transaction.

Application of Group of Companies Doctrine: The court applies the "Group of Companies" doctrine, considering the tight group structure, organizational links, and financial support among the companies. The doctrine is deemed applicable to enable the arbitral tribunal to decide disputes involving all three parties in one proceeding.

Remittal to Arbitral Tribunal: The court partly allows the appeals and remits the matter to the Sole Arbitrator to continue with the arbitral proceedings, including all three parties.

FACTS:

Lands acquired in 1985, award declared in 1988, and compensation enhanced to Rs. 30/- per square yard by Reference Court.

High Court in 1996 reduced compensation to Rs. 22-20 per square yard.

Petitioners seek parity with Kasna landowners who received Rs. 65/- per square yard in 2016.

Delay of 21 years in filing special leave petitions.

ISSUES:

Condonation of the substantial delay in filing special leave petitions.

Petitioners' entitlement to enhanced compensation and parity.

HELD:

The Court notes the absence of a sufficient cause for the substantial delay of 21 years and an additional delay in refiling the petitions.

Emphasizes the lack of explanation for the delay, stating no grievance was made for about 21 years after the High Court's judgment.

Invokes principles of acquiescence and laches, highlighting the non-existence of a right not exercised for a long time.

Rejects reliance on previous decisions cited by petitioners, emphasizing the unique circumstances and adverse impact on the acquiring body if directed to pay enhanced compensation after a long delay.

Dismisses applications for condonation of delay and consequently dismisses special leave petitions on the ground of limitation.

REFERRED CASES:

Dhiraj Singh vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127

K. Subbarayudu vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) reported in (2017) 12 SCC 840

Market Committee, Hodal vs. Krishan Murari reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311

Facts:

The respondent No. 2 sought permission to conduct prosecution under Section 302 of the CrPC for offenses under Sections 498A, 406, and 34 IPC.

The Magistrate initially declined permission without providing reasons.

The High Court, upon considering relevant judgments, allowed the respondent No. 2 to prosecute the appellants-accused.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate has the discretion to grant permission to the victim to conduct prosecution.

The role of the Public Prosecutor in criminal proceedings.

The right of the victim to participate in criminal proceedings.

Held:

The Magistrate is not bound to grant permission at mere asking, but the victim has a right to assist the Court in a trial before the Magistrate. The Magistrate may consider the victim's ability to assist the Court and whether the trial involves complexities beyond the victim's handling.( Para 5)

The High Court's order granting permission was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrate. The Magistrate should reconsider whether the complainant should be granted permission to prosecute the offenses under Sections 498A, 406 read with Section 34 IPC.( Para 15)

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The appellant was convicted for causing the death of his wife and injuries to two children by setting them ablaze after pouring kerosene. The incident occurred in the midnight of April 20, 1999, resulting in extensive burn injuries to the deceased.

Issues:

Validity and reliability of the dying declaration made by the deceased.

Alternative defense versions, including the claim of an accidental fall of a lamp.

Examination of burn injuries suffered by the appellant and the two sons.

Held:

The post-mortem report revealed the cause of death as septicemia shock due to extensive burns (92%). The incident occurred on April 20, 1999, and the victim was admitted to the hospital on April 21, 1999.

The medical officer (PW14) certified the fitness of the deceased for giving a dying declaration. Despite severe burn injuries, the victim was found conscious and mentally fit for recording the statement.

The court emphasized that the absence of the deceased's thumb impression was not fatal, given the burn injuries on her hands. The degree of burn did not undermine the credibility of the dying declaration.

The court noted that the continued consciousness of the patient was certified by the medical officer at the foot of the dying declaration. Both PW7 and PW14 corroborated the patient's fitness for making the dying declaration.

Despite the extensive burn, the court emphasized that the patient's consciousness and mental fitness were crucial for the admissibility of the dying declaration.

The court clarified that a dying declaration, if otherwise credible, can be the sole basis for conviction. The casualness in recording the dying declaration was disapproved, but its validity was upheld.

The non-sending of the kerosene can for forensic examination did not cast reasonable doubt, considering the strength of the dying declaration.

The court rejected alternative versions presented by the defense witnesses, including the claim of an accidental fall of a lamp. The appellant's implication was based on the unambiguous words in the dying declaration.

The court concluded that the burn injuries suffered by the appellant and the two sons were reconcilable with the prosecution's version of homicide committed by the appellant. The appellant was implicated by the dying declaration.

Facts:

The appellant, Mahesh Kumar, was convicted for dowry death under Section 304-B IPC.

Allegations included continuous harassment and cruelty towards the deceased, Omwati, on account of dowry demands.

The trial court convicted Mahesh Kumar and the mother-in-law but acquitted other accused due to lack of specific roles.

High Court affirmed Mahesh Kumar's conviction but reduced the sentence; overturned the conviction of the mother-in-law.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution proved the essential elements of Section 304-B IPC.

Whether there was a proximate link between cruelty/harassment and the death.

The reliability of letters and oral statements as evidence.

Held:

The prosecution failed to prove the demand of dowry or that such demand was raised soon before the death.

The letters produced did not demonstrate a connection between harassment and dowry demand close to the time of death.

The prosecution's reliance on oral statements was insufficient, especially in the absence of examination of available independent witnesses.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside Mahesh Kumar's conviction and releasing him.

Facts:

Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by the appellant for road construction in Meghalaya.

Letter of Award (LOA) sent to the respondent, requesting a signed acknowledgment within seven days.

Respondent accepted the bid proposal and returned the signed LOA.

Contract agreement not signed until a later date.

Appellant decided to withdraw the LOA due to the non-availability of a No Objection Certificate.

Issues:

Whether the LOA constituted a binding contract?

If so, whether the arbitration clause in the draft agreement applied at the LOA stage?

Held:

The court rejected the interpretation that the LOA stage constituted a binding contract. It emphasized the clauses in the RFP, including a Disclaimer, Schedule of Bidding Process, and jurisdiction clause. The court held that an agreement would only be enforceable after specific conditions were met. The clauses cited by the respondent did not change this principle. The arbitration clause in the draft agreement did not apply as no enforceable agreement existed at the LOA stage. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. and MANJIT KAUR & ORS., challenging the interpretation of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The matter pertains to a suit for a declaration of title based on adverse possession.

Issues:

The primary issue before the court is whether a person claiming adverse possession can file a suit for a declaration of title under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Held:

The court criticizes previous decisions, including Gurudwara Sahab v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala, for incorrectly opining that a plaintiff cannot seek a declaration of title based on adverse possession. The court overrules these decisions. (Para 31, 32, 39, 43,)

Adverse possession, as a common law concept, is discussed, emphasizing its statutory period of 12 years. The court rejects the notion that adverse possession can only be used as a defense and not as a basis for a plaintiff's claim. (Paras 46-50)

The conclusion reached by the High Court, based on an inferential process related to the language in Column No.3 of Schedule of the Act, is deemed impermissible. The court asserts that there is no bar for the perfection of title by way of adverse possession, whether a person is suing as the plaintiff or being sued as a defendant. (Paras 51, 53-55)

The court clarifies that possession is the root of title, and adverse possession requires continuity, publicity, and hostility to the true owner's title. Trespasser's long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession. (Paras 56-60)

1.5 The decisions in Gurudwara Sahab v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and related cases are overruled. The court asserts that the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession can be taken by a plaintiff under Article 65, and there is no bar under the Limitation Act, 1963, to sue on this basis. (Paras 61, 62)

The court highlights the importance of distinguishing possession types, such as de facto, de jure, constructive possession, and the relevance of personal law in construing the nature of possession. It emphasizes that adverse possession is heritable and can involve tacking by two or more persons. (Paras 56-60)

Decision: The court concludes that the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession can be taken by a plaintiff under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, and there is no bar under the Limitation Act, 1963, to sue on this basis in case of infringement of any rights of a plaintiff. The matters are directed to be placed for consideration on merits before the appropriate bench.

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of appellants for offenses related to the murder of Pitambar Singh.

The prosecution alleged a conspiracy among the accused, leading to the murder.

Eyewitness testimonies formed a significant part of the evidence against the accused.

The recovery of bloodstained articles, including sticks and tabbal, was a key aspect of the prosecution's case.

Issues:

Delay in recording eyewitness statements.

Credibility of eyewitness testimonies and allegations of fabrication.

Lack of evidence linking bloodstained articles to the deceased.

Failure to prove the conspiracy charge.

Held:

The Court expressed skepticism about the delay in recording eyewitness statements, questioning the prosecution's explanation and finding inconsistencies in the story. ( Paragraph 6)

Highlighted the importance of evidence relating to the recovery of bloodstained articles and cited previous cases where mismatches in bloodstains led to reversals of convictions. (Paragraph 8)

Emphasized that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the investigation is untainted, the prosecution may establish human origin of blood, even if blood groups are not matched. ( Paragraph 13)

Expressed doubt about the prosecution's positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused. ( Paragraph 14)

Noted the absence of conspiracy and questioned the genesis of the prosecution's case, leading to suspicion. ( Paragraph 15)

The appeals were allowed, and the appellants were directed to be released. The benefit of the judgment was extended to other accused in the same case who had not appealed. The Court expressed suspicion about the genesis of the prosecution's case and concluded that reliance on eyewitness testimonies and recovery evidence was not justified. (Paragraph 16)

Facts:

The respondent-University advertised a position for Assistant Professor in Physical Education (Yoga Therapy) with specific qualifications, including a requirement of a Post Graduate Diploma in Yoga or Yoga Therapy.

Dr. Sridip Chatterjee applied for the position and was selected by the Selection Committee despite possessing a Diploma in Yoga Education.

Respondent No. 1 challenged Dr. Chatterjee's eligibility, leading to legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether Dr. Chatterjee's Diploma in Yoga Education satisfied the eligibility conditions advertised for the position.

The validity of the Equivalence Committee's findings regarding the equivalence of Dr. Chatterjee's qualification.

Held:

The Court emphasized that in the exercise of judicial review, it could not conclude that Dr. Chatterjee's Diploma did not meet the advertised eligibility conditions based solely on its nomenclature. The Selection Committee, comprised of experts, found him suitable.( Paragraph 16)

The Court rejected the argument that procedural irregularities in not recording Dr. Chatterjee's eligibility during the Selection Committee meeting were fatal. The Equivalence Committee, as directed by the Single Bench, found Dr. Chatterjee's Diploma satisfying the advertised requirements.( Paragraph 17)

The Court reinstated Dr. Chatterjee in service with all consequential benefits but without pay for the period he was out of service.( Paragraph 18)