Facts:

Dispute arose between M/S. UTTARAKHAND PURV SAINIK KALYAN NIGAM LIMITED (Appellant) and NORTHERN COAL FIELD LIMITED (Respondent).

Agreement dated 21.12.2010 contained an arbitration clause.

Legal Notice issued by Appellant on 29.05.2013 demanding payment.

Notice of Arbitration sent on 09.03.2016, no response from Respondent.

Application filed under Section 11 on 20.09.2016, Respondent raised limitation as a ground to oppose the appointment of arbitrator.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the application filed under Section 11 on the ground of limitation?

Held:

The Court held that, post the 2015 Amendment Act, the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 11 is limited to examining the existence of the arbitration agreement. The doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz empowers the arbitrator to rule on its own jurisdiction. The exception to this rule is when the arbitration agreement is impeached as being procured by fraud or deception. In this case, the issue of limitation, being a jurisdictional issue, is required to be decided by the arbitrator under Section 16, not by the High Court at the pre-reference stage under Section 11. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the issue of limitation to be decided by the arbitral tribunal.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation and application of provisions related to arbitration, specifically Sections 34 to 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The matter also delves into the constitutional validity of the amendments introduced by the 2019 Amendment Act, particularly Section 87, and the relevance of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues:

The interpretation of Sections 34 to 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with a focus on the automatic stay of awards.

The impact of the 2019 Amendment Act on the judgment in the BCCI case.

The constitutional validity of Section 87, including its removal of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act.

The application and interpretation of Section 3(7) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, concerning the term 'Corporate person.'

Held:

Interpretation of Sections 34 to 36: The Court clarified that Section 36 does not automatically stay an arbitral award during the pendency of a challenge under Section 34. The purpose of Section 36 is to enforce a final and binding award under the CPC once the challenge period has expired or the application has been refused.( Paragraphs: 13, 22, 25-27, 30)

Removal of the Basis of the BCCI Judgment: The Court rejected arguments that the 2019 Amendment Act removes the basis of the BCCI judgment. It emphasized the need to examine the substance of the amendment, regardless of its mention in the Statement of Objects and Reasons.(Paragraphs: 41, 45, 46)

Constitutional Validity of Section 87: The Court held that the introduction of Section 87 and the deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act were manifestly arbitrary. It found the amendments contrary to the objectives of the 2015 Amendment Act and the Arbitration Act, 1996.(Paragraphs: 47-49, 50, 51)

Interpretation of 'Corporate person' under the Insolvency Code: The Court rejected suggestions to modify the definition of 'Corporate person' under Section 3(7) of the Insolvency Code. It clarified that entities like NHAI, performing governmental functions, cannot be subjected to insolvency proceedings. (Paragraphs: 57, 58, 59, 63, 65)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between Century Rayon Limited (Appellant) and IVP Limited (First Respondent) regarding the construction of electricity transmission towers on the land owned by the First Respondent. The appellant had sought permission from the authorities, but the first respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction, claiming that the construction was done without prior approval.

Issues:

Validity of the construction of electricity transmission towers without prior approval.

Dispute over the ownership and use of the land.

Whether the interim injunction order should be continued.

Held:

The court acknowledges lapses on the part of the involved parties but emphasizes that the balance of convenience does not justify the continuation of the interim injunction order in favor of the first respondent.( Para 6)

Refers to the Power Grid Corporation case, highlighting the imperative need for unobstructed access for laying down electricity transmission lines in the larger public interest. Mentions relevant sections of the Telegraph Act, emphasizing the power of the telegraph authority and the obligation to pay compensation for any damage caused.( Para 7)

Addresses the argument that the electricity transmission line is for the benefit of the appellant and not the public at large. The court emphasizes the policy decision of the government and the public benefit aspect.( Para 8)

Mentions the failed attempts to settle the matter and the commercial aspect of the dispute, leaving the issue of monetary compensation open.( Para 9)

Sets aside the impugned order and the injunction order, subject to the appellant making an ad hoc payment of Rs. 20,00,000/- to the first respondent. Allows the continuation and completion of the work on the condition of payment. The payment is subject to the outcome of the civil suit or proceedings under the Telegraph Act for quantifying compensation.( Para 10)

The appeal is allowed.( Para 11)

Facts:

A group of individuals (Accused no. 1 to 16) armed with sticks and iron rods trespassed into a newspaper office, vandalized it, and set it on fire. Three employees lost their lives. Accused were charged under various sections, including IPC, Explosive Substances Act, and Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act. Appellant (Accused No.17), the Deputy Superintendent of Police at the time, faced charges under Sections 217 and 221.

Issues:

The appellant's alleged failure to prevent the crime, intentional disobedience of law, and allowing the accused to escape formed the crux of the case.

Held:

Bandobust Duty and Superior Officer (Para 24): Ex.-P82, the bandobust duty list, indicated that PW-30, the Additional Superintendent of Police, was the superior officer. The appellant, as Deputy Superintendent of Police, acted under PW-30's direction during the incident.

Immediate Police Action (Paras 25, 26): Evidence from PW-2 (News Editor) and PW-3 (COO) affirmed the appellant's prompt response to their calls for help. The appellant assured swift action, indicating diligence in his duties.

Disobedience and Intention (Paras 30, 31): No evidence suggested that the appellant disobeyed orders from PW-30, the officer in charge of the bandobust. Section 217 IPC requires intentional disobedience with the intention to save the accused, which was not established.

Conviction under Section 221 IPC (Para 33): For intentional omission to apprehend or aiding escape, the prosecution failed to show that the appellant intentionally avoided apprehending the accused on the spot.

Judicial View (Para 34): The trial court's plausible view that the ingredients of Sections 217 and 221 were not met should not have been substituted by the High Court. The appellant's conviction was not sustainable.

Facts:

The prosecution established harassment under Section 498-A, alleging dowry demand as the motive. The deceased was subjected to harassment to coerce her and her parents to meet an unlawful monetary demand.

Issues:

Whether the proved cruelty under Section 498-A, along with the suicide within seven years of marriage, warrants a conviction under Section 306 with the aid of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act.

Whether the prosecution sufficiently demonstrated that the accused's actions directly led to the deceased's suicide.

Held:

The evidence of PW-10, the deceased's father, corroborated by PW-13, substantiates the harassment for an unlawful demand under Section 498-A.( Para 11)

Mere guilt under Section 498-A and death within seven years doesn't automatically lead to Section 306 conviction. The prosecution must establish a direct link between the accused's act and the suicide.( Para 27)

The prosecution failed to prove that the cruelty left the deceased with no choice but suicide. No evidence showed immediate cruelty prior to the suicide, and a two-month gap existed between the last visit and the suicide.( Paras 33-34)

Unlike previous cases, the charge didn't specify that the deceased was driven to suicide due to harassment. Conviction under Section 498-A is maintained, but the conviction under Section 306 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the Section 306 charge.( Paras 35-37)

Facts:

The case involves the prosecution of the Municipal Commissioner and Chief Officer of the City Municipal Council by the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board for offenses under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.

Issues:

Whether City Municipal Councils can be considered a Department of the Government.

The liability of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers under the Water Act.

The interpretation of Sections 47, 48, and 49 of the Water Act.

Held:

The Water Act, 1974, enacted by Parliament, aims to prevent and control water pollution. It establishes Boards for these purposes and confers powers on them. (Para 7)

Section 48 of the Water Act is applicable when offenses are committed by any Department of Government. City Municipal Councils, created under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, are considered bodies corporate, distinct from government departments. (Paras 11, 15)

Municipal Councils, including City Municipal Councils, are created by State enactments and are controlled by the Government, receiving financial assistance. However, they are not considered Departments of the Government. (Para 14, 18)

The Scheme of the Water Act indicates separate representation for the Government, local authorities, and companies or corporations owned, controlled, or managed by the State Government. Municipalities, including City Municipal Councils, do not qualify as Departments of the Government. (Paras 15)

Article 243P of the Constitution defines "Municipality" as an institution of self-Government. City Municipal Councils cannot be treated as Departments of the State Government. They are entrusted with Municipal functions, including ensuring a clean environment and controlling pollution. (Paras 16, 18)

Section 47 of the Water Act pertains to offenses by companies, defining "company" broadly as "any body corporate." City Municipal Councils fall under this definition. (Paras 19, 20)

Section 47 can be applied to offenses by body corporates like City Municipal Councils. The Karnataka State Pollution Control Board's complaint under Section 49 for the prosecution of Municipal Commissioners and Chief Officers is deemed appropriate. (Paras 29, 31)

Facts:

The spouse of the appellant, a tenant, faced a suit for eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997.

Issues:

Whether the spouse of a deceased original tenant is entitled to protection from eviction for non-residential premises beyond a period of five years from the date of the original tenant's death.

Held:

Discusses the interpretation of Section 2(g) and the differentiation between protection for residential and non-residential premises. Highlights the omission in the legislation regarding the spouse's entitlement under the second proviso.( Para 10)

Expresses agreement with the High Court's conclusion that legislative amendment is necessary to include the spouse in the protection granted to other heirs under the second proviso. Acknowledges the inadvertent omission and calls for attention from lawmakers.( Para 12)

Grants time to the appellant to vacate the premises until 30 June 2020 but upholds the eviction decree. Urges legislative consideration for the inclusion of the spouse in the protective provisions.( Para 13)

FACTS:

Post the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections, no single party had the majority.

Efforts were made by the Governor to explore government formation, leading to President's Rule imposition.

Subsequent developments involved invitations to various parties to form the government, ultimately resulting in the swearing-in of Devendra Fadnavis as Chief Minister.

The Shiv Sena, NCP, and INC challenged the Governor's actions, claiming that the oath of office to Fadnavis was unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

The constitutional validity of the Governor's actions in inviting Fadnavis to form the government.

Whether a floor test should be conducted to determine the majority support for the Chief Minister.

HELD:

The Court emphasized the need to protect democratic values and ordered an immediate floor test to ascertain if the Chief Minister had majority support. Referring to precedents, the Court highlighted the importance of timely floor tests in such situations to prevent horse-trading and ensure a stable government.( Paragraphs 17-20)

The Court issued specific directions for the floor test, including the appointment of a Pro-tem Speaker, administering oaths to elected members, conducting the floor test without secret ballot, and live telecasting the proceedings.( Paragraph 26)

REFERRED CASES:

Anil Kumar Jha vs. Union of India, (2005) 3 SCC 150

Chandrakant Kavlekar vs. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 758

G. Parmeshwara vs. Union of India, (2018) 16 SCC 46

Jagdambika Pal vs. Union of India, (1999) 9 SCC 95

S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1

Union of India vs. Sh. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) SCC Online SC 442

Union of India vs. Shri Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) SCC OnLine SC 618

Facts:

The applicant, a contractor company, filed an application under Sections 11(12)(a) and 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of a sole arbitrator. The grounds cited included the alleged failure of the competent authority to appoint the sole arbitrator within the prescribed period and the necessity for an independent and impartial arbitrator.

Issues:

The maintainability of the application under Sections 11(12)(a) and 11(6) concerning the termination of the contract and the appointment of a sole arbitrator.

The validity of the appointment of the sole arbitrator and concerns about independence and impartiality.

Whether the arbitration qualifies as an International Commercial Arbitration.

Held:

The Court found the application maintainable given the facts of the case, considering it an International Commercial Arbitration. However, the delay in appointing the arbitrator was not of such magnitude to warrant the exercise of power under Section 11.

In cases where only one party has the right to appoint a sole arbitrator, the person with an interest in the outcome must not have the power to appoint. Justifiable doubts about independence and impartiality can warrant the court's appointment of an independent arbitrator.

Considering the circumstances, the application was deemed entertainable, and a retired Judge of the Supreme Court was appointed as the sole arbitrator.

Decision: The application was accepted, annulling the effect of the respondent's appointment of the arbitrator. In the exercise of power under Section 11(6) of the Act, Dr. Justice A.K. Sikri, a former Judge of the Supreme Court, was appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide all disputes arising from the agreement between the parties.