Facts:

The National Law School of India University, Bengaluru (NLSIU) was required to obtain a recommendation from the Academic Council before conducting the National Law Aptitude Test (NLAT) for admission to its five-year integrated B.A.LL.B (Hons.) Programme for the academic year 2020-21. However, NLSIU issued an admission notification for NLAT on September 3, 2020, without such a recommendation. This resulted in a delay in the conduct of the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT), which was eventually scheduled for September 28, 2020. The petitioners challenged the validity of the NLAT notification.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners have the locus to file the writ petition?

Whether NLSIU was required to obtain a recommendation from the Academic Council before issuing the NLAT notification?

Whether NLSIU, as a member of the Consortium of National Law Universities, was bound by its Bye-Laws and should have conducted admission through CLAT 2020?

Whether the online home-proctored examination proposed by NLSIU lacked transparency and violated the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution?

Whether the NLAT conducted on 12.09.2020 with a re-test on 14.09.2020 was marred by malpractices and should be set aside?

Held :

The petitioners have the locus to file the writ petition as they represent students aggrieved by the NLAT notification.

NLSIU was required to obtain a recommendation from the Academic Council before conducting NLAT. The admission notification dated 03.09.2020 issued without such recommendation is not in accordance with the National Law School of India Act, 1986.

NLSIU, as a member of the Consortium, was bound by its Bye-Laws, which required admissions to be conducted through CLAT. The obligation under the Bye-Laws is binding on the members, and NLSIU should not have proceeded with a separate admission test (NLAT).

The online home-proctored examination proposed by NLSIU lacked transparency and violated the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. A large number of students were denied the opportunity to appear in the test due to short notice and technical requirements.

The court did not express any opinion on the issue of malpractices in the NLAT conducted on 12.09.2020 and 14.09.2020, as it is a matter of scrutiny of facts and evidence.

Facts:

The appellants in this case filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the NCLT's order after a delay of more than 45 days. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal along with the application for condonation of delay. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court seeking to revive the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal beyond the prescribed 45-day period under Section 421(3) Proviso of the Companies Act, 1956?

Whether the order of the Supreme Court extending the limitation due to Covid-19 pandemic can be applied to condone the delay beyond the prescribed 45-day period?

Held:

Section 421(3) of the Companies Act prescribes a limitation period of 45 days for filing an appeal from the date of the NCLT's order. The starting date for limitation can be fixed based on the availability of a certified copy of the order. However, if the appellants chose to apply for the certified copy after a delay, they cannot rely on Section 421(3) to fix the starting date. (Para 13-14)

The appellants had 45 days from the date of receiving the certified copy to file the appeal, which expired on 02.02.2020. The Appellate Tribunal can condone the delay only up to this period, which expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020. The subsequent lockdown, imposed on 24.03.2020, does not alter this calculation. (Para 15-17)

The order of the Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020, which extended the limitation period due to the Covid-19 pandemic, only applies to the "period of limitation" and not the period for condonation of delay. The appellants cannot claim the benefit of this order to further condone the delay beyond the prescribed 45-day period. (Para 18-19, 25)

The expression "prescribed period" appearing in Section 4 of the Limitation Act refers to the period of limitation and not the period during which the Court or Tribunal can exercise discretion to allow proceedings. Any period beyond the prescribed limitation cannot be considered as part of the "prescribed period." (Para 20-23)

Cases Referred

Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 624

Facts:

The vendor and vendee entered into an agreement for the sale of a 300 sq. yard land for a total consideration of Rs. 75,000.

The vendee paid Rs. 45,000 as part of the consideration, and the total amount was supposed to be paid within 45 days.

Subsequently, the vendor executed a registered deed of conveyance in favor of another party ('P') for 100 sq. yards of the land covered by the agreement.

The vendee filed a suit for specific performance against the vendor, seeking the remaining 200 sq. yards of the land.

Issues:

Whether the vendee was ready and willing to perform her obligations under the agreement.

Whether the agreement was subject to the condition that the vendee would negotiate with 'P' to get his earlier agreement with the vendor cancelled.

Whether specific performance can be granted in part for the remaining 200 sq. yards of land.

Whether the suits filed against 'P' for specific performance and declaration were barred by limitation and non-joinder of the vendor as a necessary party.

Held:

The trial court and the High Court found that the vendee was ready and willing to perform her obligations under the agreement (Para 57).

The vendor's contention that the agreement was subject to the condition of negotiating with 'P' was rejected for lack of evidence (Para 58).

The relief of specific performance is no longer discretionary after the amendment of Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, and the Court is obliged to enforce it subject to certain provisions (Para 70).

The Court has the power to direct specific performance of a contract in part, as per Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act (Para 73).

The vendee was entitled to specific performance of the remaining 200 sq. yards as she had performed her obligations and not caused the breach (Para 89).

The suits filed against 'P' were barred by limitation and non-joinder of the vendor as a necessary party (Paras 82 and 84).

Clubbing of suits is for convenience and does not convert the suits into one action (Para 91).

Decision: The appeals by both the vendor and the vendee were dismissed. The judgments of the trial court and the High Court were upheld, and the specific performance was granted in part for the remaining 200 sq. yards of land (Para 92).

Facts:

The appellant, H.C. Dhandra Trust's Executors/Trustees, passed a resolution to transfer and vest immovable properties to beneficiaries through a Deed of Transfer. However, they later executed a Deed of Assent with stamp duty of Rs. 200, giving their assent to complete the title and vest it absolutely in favor of the beneficiaries. The Collector of Stamps treated this Deed of Assent as a "Gift Deed" and demanded a higher stamp duty of Rs. 1.28 lakhs and imposed a ten times penalty.

Issues:

Whether the imposition of the ten times penalty under Section 40(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, was valid and justifiable.

Held:

The court examined the statutory scheme of Section 40(1)(b) and emphasized that the discretion to impose a penalty not exceeding ten times the deficient stamp duty lies with the Collector. However, the imposition of such an extreme penalty cannot be automatic or mechanical. The Collector should exercise the discretion reasonably and fairly, in furtherance of the objectives of the enactment.

The court observed that the purpose of penalty is generally for deterrence, not retribution. When a public authority is given discretionary power, it must exercise it reasonably and not oppressively. The court clarified that the imposition of the extreme penalty should be based on relevant factors, such as fraud, deceit, or intent to deprive the Revenue.

In this case, the Collector justified the penalty based on the party's failure to mention the actual nature of the document to escape the duty. However, the court found no other reasons to justify the imposition of the maximum penalty. Additionally, the Collector did not establish dishonest or contumacious conduct on the part of the appellant.

Considering all facts and circumstances, the court decided to partly allow the appeals and reduce the penalty to five times the deficiency in the stamp duty.

Cases Referred

Gangtappa and another vs. Fakkirappa, 2019(3) SCC 788

Peteti Subba Rao vs. Anumala S. Narendra, 2002 (10) SCC 427.

Facts:

M/S. MSD Real Estate LLP (the appellant) was involved in a property transaction where a deficit stamp duty demand and a penalty were imposed by the Collector of Stamps. The appellant contested the penalty amount, leading to litigation. The Supreme Court later modified the penalty, reducing it to half of the original amount. The appellant paid the reduced penalty and fulfilled the stamp duty requirement. Subsequently, the appellant sold the property to another purchaser who sought permission for construction and submitted post-dated cheques towards the outstanding penalty. However, the competent authority issued a notice demanding the remaining penalty and denied permission for construction. The High Court upheld the penalty demand and observed that the payment of penalty by post-dated cheques was not acceptable. The High Court also stated that the new purchaser could reapply for permission after paying the full penalty.

Issues:

The liability of the subsequent purchaser for depositing the outstanding penalty.

Compliance with the Supreme Court's order on the penalty amount.

Validity of the Municipal Corporation's denial of permission for construction.

Consideration of subsequent actions and orders by the Municipal Corporation and other State Authorities in the present appeal.

Held:

The High Court rightly upheld the demand for penalty, stating that the subsequent purchaser (the appellant) was liable to deposit the outstanding penalty amount against the property. The appellant's payment of penalty through post-dated cheques was not acceptable. The High Court did not interfere with the Addl. Tehsildar(Recovery)'s order dated 04.06.2020, demanding Rs. 8,80,97,025 as outstanding penalty.

The Supreme Court had previously modified the Collector's order dated 22.09.2008, reducing the penalty to half of the initial amount. All parties were directed to act in accordance with the Supreme Court's judgment on the penalty issue.

The High Court's direction to reconsider the application for building permission after the appellant's deposit of stamp duty and penalty adequately protected the appellant's rights. The appellant was free to apply for building permission as per the High Court's observation.

The subsequent orders and notices by the Municipal Corporation and other State Authorities were not part of the writ petition before the High Court and could not be considered in the present appeal. The parties were granted liberty to seek remedies for subsequent actions and orders as permissible by law.

Facts:

The appellant, a 20-year-old data entry operator, suffered a permanent disability of amputation of his right hand. The disability was initially assessed as 89%, but the Claims Tribunal and the High Court re-assessed it to be 45%. Compensation was awarded for loss of earning capacity, but future prospects were denied. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court seeking proper assessment of disability and compensation.

Issues:

Whether the disability was correctly assessed at 45% by the lower courts?

Whether compensation for future prospects should be awarded?

Whether the income of the appellant was correctly assessed by the lower courts?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the disability was incorrectly assessed at 45%. The severity of the loss of a limb should be judged in relation to the profession or vocation of the victim. The extent of the appellant's disability was reassessed at 65% (Para 13 and 20).

The Court held that compensation for loss of future prospects should be awarded. The appellant was entitled to compensation for loss of future prospects at 40% (Para 12 and 21).

The Court found that the lower courts wrongly disregarded the appellant's assertion of earning Rs. 12,000/- per month. Considering the evidence and future prospects, the Court determined the appellant's income at Rs. 14,000/- per month for the purpose of calculating compensation (Para 21).

The compensation was modified to Rs. 19,65,600/-, which includes compensation for the loss of earning capacity and future prospects. The assessment of amounts payable under other heads by the High Court was upheld (Para 23).

Facts:

The appellant, Jugut Ram, was convicted by the lower courts under Section 302 IPC for murder based on an assault he committed using a lathi. The victim succumbed to his injuries one day after the incident. The appellant appealed the conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of India.

Issues:

The appropriate application of Section 304 (Part II) IPC in cases where the assault was carried out using a lathi, and to ascertain whether there was an intention to cause death or mere knowledge that death was likely to occur.

Held:

A lathi is a common item carried by villagers in India and is linked to their identity. While it can be used as a weapon of assault, it cannot be considered a weapon of assault simpliciter. In cases of assault using a lathi, the court must examine whether there was an intention to cause death or only knowledge that death was likely to occur. The court must consider various factors such as the circumstances of the assault, the manner of the assault, the nature and number of injuries inflicted, etc., to determine the intention or knowledge of the accused.( Para 7)

In the present case, the appellant's conviction is altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 (Part II) IPC, as it was held that the assault with the lathi did not amount to murder but constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The appellant had already served the maximum period of sentence prescribed under this section since 2004. Hence, the appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless wanted in any other case.( Para 11)

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case pertains to the death of the deceased, initially sought to be passed off as accidental or suicidal due to depression. The filing of the FIR under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was delayed and only done reluctantly after the petitioner and her husband approached higher authorities. Despite a long pendency of investigation, the respondents insisted on the accidental nature of the death, leading to inconclusive investigation. A closure report was filed hastily after the Supreme Court ordered the conclusion of the investigation within a specific period.

Issues:

Whether a fair investigation is a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and is integral to a fair trial.

Whether the Constitutional Court has the power to direct de novo investigation in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice and ensure the truth is revealed.

Whether the closure report filed by the police lacked bona fide and necessitates a fresh investigation to uphold the confidence of society in the rule of law.

Held:

The Court held that a fair investigation is indeed a part of the constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and it is essential for a fair trial. When an investigation has been concluded and a police report has been submitted under Section 173(2) Cr. P.C., further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr. P.C. is the norm. However, the Constitutional Court has the power to order de novo investigation in exceptional circumstances where it is satisfied that the investigation was not conducted properly or was aimed at helping someone evade the law. This power can be exercised even after the trial has commenced, and some witnesses have been examined.( Para 9)

In the present case, the Court observed that the entire investigation lacked bona fide. The death of the deceased was initially attempted to be passed off as accidental or suicidal, and the investigation remained at a standstill. The closure report filed was a hasty action and failed to provide conclusive evidence. The Court held that a de novo investigation was necessary to uphold the interest of justice and to maintain society's confidence in the rule of law.( Para 10)

Therefore, the Court set aside the closure report and directed a de novo investigation to be conducted by a fresh team of investigators from the State Police. This team should be led by a senior police officer and consist of efficient personnel well-versed in modern investigation technology. No officer from the original investigating team should be part of the fresh investigation. The Court mandated that the new investigation must be concluded within a maximum period of two months.( Para 14)

Facts:

The case involves the enforcement of a foreign award in India. The dispute arose in an international commercial arbitration, and the award was rendered in a foreign country. The party seeking enforcement filed a petition under Sections 47 and 49 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking recognition and enforcement of the foreign award in India.

Issues:

Whether the limitation for filing an enforcement petition for a foreign award is governed by Indian law?

What is the scope of judicial intervention based on public policy grounds in the enforcement of foreign awards in India?

Whether the amendments to Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, have retrospective application?

Whether the foreign award is in conflict with the public policy of India?

Held:

The limitation for filing an enforcement petition for a foreign award under Sections 47 and 49 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is governed by Indian law. The Indian Arbitration Act does not specify a specific period of limitation for filing such applications. Therefore, the general law of limitation, i.e., Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies, which prescribes a three-year limitation period from the date when the right to apply accrues.

The enforcement court, while deciding on recognition and enforceability of a foreign award, does not sit in appeal over the findings of the seat court. The enforcement court has a limited power to refuse enforcement only if the conditions mentioned in Section 48 of the Act are met. The enforcement court's primary purpose is to enforce the foreign award and not to correct errors or review the merits of the award.

The amendments made to Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by Act 3 of 2016, are substantive amendments and are considered prospective. The amendments narrowed the definition of "public policy" by adding specific criteria, and they do not have retrospective application.

The foreign award cannot be refused enforcement on the grounds that it is contrary to the basic notions of justice or in violation of the substantive public policy of India. The enforcement court is not permitted to review the merits of the arbitral award, and such matters fall within the purview of the seat court.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that the foreign award could be enforced in India as it was not found to be in conflict with the public policy of India.