Facts:

The case pertains to the liability of Bangalore Club to pay wealth tax under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The Assessing Officer found the club liable to be taxed under the Act, and the CIT (Appeals) dismissed the appeal. However, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the orders of the Assessing Officer and CIT (Appeals). The High Court decided in favor of the revenue, but the Review Petition was also dismissed.

Issues:

The primary issue was whether Bangalore Club fell under Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act as an association of persons and was liable to pay wealth tax.

Held:

Section 3 of the Wealth Tax Act is the charging section that applies to individuals, Hindu undivided families, and companies. Bangalore Club does not fall under these categories and cannot be brought into the wealth tax net under this provision.( Para 9-13)

Section 21AA was introduced to prevent tax evasion by certain assesses creating associations of persons without defining members' shares to evade tax. The section aims to rope in associations of persons with a business or commercial object to make income or profits.( Para 19, 24 & 26)

Bangalore Club is an association of persons, but it is not created to evade tax, and its members' shares are determinate on the date of liquidation. Thus, Section 21AA does not apply to the club.( Para 28, 30-32)

The Income Tax Act's definition of "person" includes both "association of persons" and "body of individuals." For income tax purposes, Bangalore Club might be treated as a "body of individuals," but Section 21AA does not expand the field of taxpayers; it only targets associations of persons with indeterminate shares.( Para 33)

The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment, and held that Bangalore Club is not liable to pay wealth tax under Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act.

Facts:

The appeals were filed by insurance companies challenging the judgments of the High Courts that upheld the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) in favor of the claimants. The compensation was awarded under two categories - 'loss of consortium' and 'loss of love and affection.'

Issues:

The main issue before the Court was to determine the scope of consortium compensation and whether 'loss of love and affection' could be awarded as a separate head of compensation.

Held:

The Constitution Bench in the case of "National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Ors." had referred to an amount of Rs. 40,000/- for 'loss of consortium,' but it did not specifically address whether this consortium amount is payable only as spousal consortium. The judgment did not limit consortium compensation to only the spouse.

A Three-Judge Bench in the case of "United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur alias Satvinder Kaur and others" categorically stated that, apart from spousal consortium, parental and filial consortium are also payable.

The concept of 'loss of love and affection' was found to be comprehended within the broader term 'loss of consortium,' and thus, there was no justification to award separate compensation for 'loss of love and affection.'

Decision: The Court partially allowed the appeals. It upheld the judgments of the High Courts awarding consortium compensation to each claimant, as it was in accordance with the law laid down in the referred cases. However, the Court accepted the submission of the appellants that there is no justification for awarding compensation under the separate head of 'loss of love and affection.'

REFERRED CASES:

General Manager Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum vs. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and others, (1994) 2 SCC 176.

Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130

National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680

Sangita Arya and others vs. Oriental Insurance Company ltd. and others, (2020) SCC Online 513

Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121

United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Satinder Kaur alias Satvinder Kaur and others, (2020) SCC Online 410

Facts:

The case involves a dispute concerning the elevation of Judges to the High Court. The petitioners and respondent nos. 24 to 29 were appointed as District Judges through direct recruitment in 2011, while respondent nos. 5 to 23 were initially appointed as Judicial Officers and later promoted to the post of District Judges. Due to the timing of promotions, the petitioners became seniors to respondent nos. 5 to 23. The petitioners alleged that despite being the senior-most District Judges, they were overlooked, and their juniors were recommended for elevation to the High Court.

Issues:

The primary issue was whether the eligibility criteria prescribed in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (2) of Art. 217 are to be considered in the alternative or create separate streams for appointment with independent quotas for such streams.

The court needed to interpret Explanation (a) in relation to sub-clause (a) and determine if it permits clubbing of experience at the Bar before joining Judicial service for the purpose of eligibility.

It was also essential to address the contention regarding Article 14 and ascertain if there was any violation of this article in the interpretation of Art. 217(2).

Held:

The court observed that clause (2) of Article 217 consists of two parts - sub-clauses (a) and (b) outlining the eligibility criteria and Explanation (a) and (aa) explaining the computation of periods. Explanation (a) is related to sub-clause (a), and Explanation (aa) is related to sub-clause (b).

The court clarified that under Explanation (a), the additional period to be considered in judicial service should follow, not precede, the judicial service. The use of the word "after" in Explanation (a) denotes this condition.

The court rejected the petitioners' plea to club their Bar experience before joining Judicial service with their judicial service, as it was not permissible under the interpretation of Article 217(2).

The court emphasized that Article 217(2) creates two separate queues for eligibility - one from the Bar and another from Judicial service. A person's queue is determined by their status on the date of consideration for elevation.

Article 217(2) does not guarantee anyone the right to be appointed as a High Court Judge; therefore, there was no violation of Article 14 in the interpretation of Art. 217(2).

Decision: The writ petition was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant financial creditor filed an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) before NCLT against the corporate debtor. The Committee of Creditors (CoC) approved the Resolution Plan submitted by M/s Sai Agro. However, the Director/Promoter of the corporate debtor also sought permission to submit a Resolution Plan. NCLT rejected the Director's application and approved M/s Sai Agro's Resolution Plan, making them the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA). The Director filed an appeal before NCLAT, which allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back to NCLT.

Issues:

Whether the question of viability and feasibility was examined appropriately by the CoC and Resolution Professional before approving the Resolution Plan.

Whether there was a breach of confidentiality in the Resolution Plan submission process.

Whether the uncertainty surrounding the ethanol plant and machinery ownership affects the viability of the Resolution Plan.

Whether the advertisement issued by the Resolution Professional complied with the applicable regulations.

Held:

The Court held that all relevant factors needed for determining the viability and feasibility of the Resolution Plan were placed before the CoC and Resolution Professional. The Director's contention that the ethanol plant and machinery ownership was disputed was known to all parties involved. The Court found the NCLAT's interference with NCLT's approval of the Resolution Plan unjustified.

The Court rejected the claim of breach of confidentiality, stating that the date discrepancy in the Resolution Plan was minor and not evidence of collusion or cover-up.

The Court affirmed that the SRA, CoC, and Resolution Professional were aware of the ethanol plant and machinery ownership issue. The Resolution Plan did not solely rely on these assets, and the SRA had committed to continuing operations regardless of their availability. The Court rejected the contention that this issue undermined the viability of the plan.

The Court clarified that the advertisement issued by the Resolution Professional complied with the regulations applicable at the time of issuance and cannot be judged under later amendments.

Facts:

M/S Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. had a business relationship with Prasad Vassudev Keni, and a dispute arose between them. The appellants filed suits, and the respondents filed written statements and counter-claims. The appellants then filed criminal complaints, alleging false evidence and forgery. The Magistrate converted the complaints into private complaints and issued process under ss.191, 192, and 193 of the IPC. The respondents filed revision applications, contending that s.195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.PC and the procedure u/s.340 Cr.PC were mandatory and could not be circumvented. In response, the appellants argued that offenses u/ss.463, 464, 465, 467, 468, 469, 471, 474, 475, and 477-A of the IPC were also made out, justifying private complaints. The Additional Sessions Judge allowed the revision and quashed the complaints, and the High Court dismissed the writ petitions.

Issues:

Whether the offenses fall under Section 195(1)(b)(i) or Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC?

Whether the offenses of forgery as defined in Section 463 of the IPC are made out?

Held:

The difference between offenses under Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC was clarified. Section 195(1)(b)(i) applies when offenses are alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) applies when offenses are alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a Court proceeding.

The Iqbal Singh Marwah case clarified that in cases falling under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC, the forged document should be custodia legis after the forgery takes place.

Supreme Court judgments established that when Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.PC is attracted, the ratio of Iqbal Singh Marwah case is not applicable. Thus, if false evidence is created outside the Court premises, attracting ss.191/192 of the IPC, the Iqbal Singh Marwah ratio does not validate a private complaint for offenses under these sections

.

The complaints filed in this case attracted the provisions of s.191 and s.192 of the IPC. However, the debit notes created by the respondents were not "false documents" under s.464 IPC, as they were not made with the intention to be believed as made by someone else.

The complaints, initially invoking s.195 r/w. s.340 of the Cr.PC, were incorrectly converted into private complaints. While the order of conversion was not correct, the complaints can still be pursued in their original form.

Decision: The Court reinstated the two complaints in their original form to be proceeded further following the procedure of Sections 195 and 340 of the Cr.PC.

Facts:

The appellant, ILANGOVAN, along with three other accused, faced charges under Sections 302 and 324 IPC for causing death and injuries. The Trial Court convicted ILANGOVAN while acquitting the other co-accused. On appeal, the High Court modified the conviction of ILANGOVAN to Section 304 (Part II) IPC based on Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the testimony of related or interested witnesses could be considered, and if so, how the court should scrutinize such evidence.

Whether the principle of rule of parity would require the automatic acquittal of the appellant due to the acquittal of the co-accused.

The applicability and nature of the legal maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus."

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the testimony of related or interested witnesses can be taken into consideration. However, the court must scrutinize such evidence carefully, and a mere plea that witnesses were related cannot lead to disregarding their testimonies. The Court relied on the case of Sudhakar v. State (2018) 5 SCC 435 for this proposition.( Para 7)

The Court ruled that there is no principle of law requiring the automatic acquittal of an accused because of the acquittal of co-accused. Each accused's case must be assessed based on the nature and quality of evidence against them. In this case, the evidence against ILANGOVAN was distinct from that against the other co-accused. The Court referred to the case of Yanob Sheikh v. State of West Bengal (2013) 6 SCC 428 to support this point.( Para 8)

The Court rejected the application of the maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" as a mandatory rule of evidence. The maxim is merely a rule of caution, and Indian courts have been reluctant to apply it rigidly. The Court referred to Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 366 to emphasize this position.( Para 11)

The High Court's judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court found no infirmity in the findings of the High Court, and hence, there was no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.( Para 13-14)

REFERRED CASES:

Nisar Ali vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 366

Rohtas vs. State of Haryana, (2019) 10 SCC 554

Sudhakar vs. State, (2018) 5 SCC 435

Yanob Sheikh vs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 6 SCC 428

Facts:

The landowner had been granted exemption under sections 20 and 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, subject to certain conditions. However, the landowner failed to comply with the conditions and did not handover seven tenements to Government nominees. Despite the breach, the competent authority did not take any action to withdraw the exemption. Subsequently, the tenements were constructed and sold.

Issues:

Whether there has been a breach by the landowner in terms of the exemption conditions?

Whether the demand for the market value of the seven tenements, along with interest, penalty, and recovery expenses, as arrears of land revenue, is sustainable under the Act?

Whether the competent authority possesses the power to recover the market value of the seven tenements?

Held:

The court held that there has been a breach by the landowner in terms of the exemption conditions provided under sections 20 and 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The authority failed to withdraw the exemption despite the breach.

The court determined that the demand for the market value of the seven tenements falls outside the purview of the Act and cannot be considered as money due to the Government to vest in it the nature of arrears of land revenue recoverable under section 265 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. As a result, the demand is deemed arbitrary and unsustainable.

The court clarified that while the competent authority could have withdrawn the exemption for breach under the Act, its powers remain circumscribed by the provisions of the Act. The undertaking provided by the landowner does not expand the statutory powers of the competent authority, and hence, the demand for the market value of the remaining seven tenements is dehors the provisions of the Act and is thus invalid.

Decision: The appeal was allowed in favor of the landowner, and the demand for the market value of the seven tenements, along with interest, penalty, and recovery expenses, was deemed arbitrary and unsustainable.

Facts:

M/S. L. R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd., a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) engaged in the production of cut flowers and flower buds, was exempted from paying customs duty on imported inputs used in the production of exported articles. The exemption also extended to inputs used in producing articles sold in the domestic market. However, a later amendment notification dated 18.05.2001 changed the customs duty levy on inputs for non-excisable goods, making them liable for customs duty if there was a violation of the EXIM Policy.

Issues:

Whether customs duty can be charged on non-excisable goods sold in DTA by an EOU in violation of the EXIM Policy?

Whether the amendment notification dated 18.05.2001, relating to the criteria for determination of duty on inputs, is prospective or retrospective in its application?

Held and Decision:

The DTA sales of excisable goods, made in conformity with the conditions of the EXIM Policy, are subject to excise duty. However, if there is a contravention of the EXIM Policy conditions, regardless of whether the goods are excisable or non-excisable, the benefit of exemption notification is unavailable. In such cases, the goods become liable to imposition of customs duty as if they were imported goods (Para 15).

The notification providing exemption on import of inputs and prescribing conditions for availing the exemption must be understood as "any other law" under the 1962 Act. Thus, the appellant, having availed exemption under the notification, cannot evade customs duty on the imported inputs at the prescribed rate (Para 17).

The demand for customs duty in the present case, pertaining to non-excisable goods (cut flowers), has been rightly made under the 1962 Act for the imported inputs used in the production of goods sold in DTA in violation of EXIM Policy conditions (Para 20).

The amendment notification dated 18.05.2001 did not clarify the date of its application, and there was no indication of retrospective effect. As per settled law, legislation is deemed prospective unless expressly specified or intended to have retrospective effect. In this case, the amendment was not clarificatory and must be considered prospective (Para 24).

The charging rate prescribed under the exemption notification for non-excisable goods equates the duty for both excisable and non-excisable goods. Therefore, the amendment cannot be considered clarificatory in nature (Para 28).

The burden of proof lies on the appellant to show that the imported inputs were not used in the production of cut flowers sold in DTA. Failure to prove this led to the invocation of Section 28 of the 1962 Act for extended limitation (Para 33-34).

This appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. It is so ordered. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Facts:

The case pertains to the erosion of Shivalinga in the Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple, Ujjain. An Expert Committee consisting of experts from ASI and GSI was appointed by the Supreme Court in an earlier order dated 02.05.2018 in Sarika v. Administrator, Shri Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee, Ujjain (M.P.) & Ors. to monitor compliance and recommend measures for preservation.

Issues:

Prevent the deterioration of the Shivlinga, preserve the temple structure, and undertake necessary restoration and maintenance work.

Held:

The Court took cognizance of the erosion of the Shivalinga in the Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple, Ujjain, and appointed an Expert Committee comprising experts from ASI and GSI to monitor compliance and recommend measures for preservation. The Court issued several directives based on the Committee's reports and project proposals. These included submission of a preservation plan by the Expert Committee, yearly surveys, provision of purified water, restoration work, removal of modern additions, eradication of encroachments, and a comprehensive plan for Chandranageshwar Temple. The Temple Committee was required to comply with these orders and ensure regular religious rituals. The judgment emphasized the urgent need to safeguard the religious heritage and maintain the structural integrity of the temple. (PARA 9)

The Supreme Court's decision focused on the preservation of the Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple, outlining specific measures to prevent the deterioration of the Shivalinga and maintain the overall temple structure. The Court's directives involved cooperation between various agencies and committees to address immediate concerns and ensure the temple's protection and religious significance for future generations.