Facts:

A turtle was seized from the respondent, leading to the initiation of criminal proceedings against the respondent under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.

The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the respondent.

Issues:

• Whether the seized turtle belonged to the species "Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)" listed in Part II of Schedule I of the Act.
• Whether the High Court's decision to quash the criminal proceedings was correct.

Held:

Section 9 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, prohibits hunting of any wild animal listed in Schedule I, II, III, and IV of the Act, except as provided under Sections 11 and 12.

The Veterinary Surgeon's letter identified the seized turtle as 'Indian Flap Shell (Lissemy's Punctata),' while the species "Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)" is the one listed in Part II of Schedule I of the Act.

Lissemys punctata is a species of which Lissemys punctata punctata is an infraspecies.

The turtle seized was not of the infraspecies "Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)" listed in Part II of Schedule I.

Consequently, the High Court's decision to quash the criminal proceedings related to wildlife offenses was justified.

Decision: The review petition was allowed, and the appeal was dismissed. The Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash the criminal proceedings against the respondent, as the seized turtle was not of the specific infraspecies listed in Part II of Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.

Facts:

The petitioner filed nominations from two Lok Sabha Constituencies. Her nominations were rejected on the ground that she was convicted in two criminal cases and sentenced to three years of imprisonment in each case. The High Court suspended the conviction in one case and stayed the execution of sentence in another case. After the elections, the petitioner filed two election petitions challenging the rejection of her nomination as illegal and unjustified. The High Court, noting several defects in the election petitions, including an incomplete prayer and lack of proper verification, rejected both petitions under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act. The High Court also held that the petitioner was disqualified under Section 8(3) of the 1951 Act read with Article 102(1)(e) of the Constitution.

Issues:

• Whether the defects in the verification and prayer made by the petitioner were curable.
• Whether the petitioner's nominations were validly rejected due to her conviction and disqualification under Section 8(3) of the 1951 Act.

Held:

The defects in the verification and prayer made by the petitioner were curable. The High Court erred in holding them as incurable. The petitioner should have been given an opportunity to cure the defects before rejecting the petitions.

The disqualification under Section 8(3) of the 1951 Act would continue as long as there is no stay of conviction. In this case, the petitioner only obtained a stay of execution of the sentence and could not obtain a stay of conviction. Therefore, her nominations were validly rejected.

Facts:

The Public Works Department of the State issued a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for the construction of an Elevated Corridor (Flyover) of a length of 7.473 Km.

Eleven companies, including UPSBC, 'R' Builders, and 'Ra' Construction Co., bid for the project.

The State rejected UPSBC's bid of Rs. 306.27 crores, alleging that the bidder suppressed information required under paragraph 13 of Appendix-I-A and clause 7(b) of Annex-I of the NIT.

'Ra' Construction Co.'s bid of Rs. 293.25 crores was considered non-responsive as it did not fulfill the criteria under clause 2.2.2.2(ii) of the NIT.

'R' Builders had bid for Rs. 315.80 crores.

Issues:

• Whether UPSBC's bid was rightly rejected on the ground of suppression of facts relating to a pending investigation.
• Whether 'Ra' Construction Co.'s bid was rightly rejected for not fulfilling the criteria under clause 2.2.2.2(ii) of the NIT.

Held :

UPSBC's bid was correctly rejected as it failed to disclose the fact of indictment against it, even though the investigation was no longer pending, and there was no conviction by a court of law. The omission of such a relevant fact constituted suppression, disqualifying the bid.[ Para 19]

The Court upholds the rejection of 'Ra' Construction Co.'s bid since it would not be appropriate for the Constitutional Court to substitute its view for that of the tendering authority. The construction of the clause in question was not rendered perverse, and 'R' Builders' argument in support of the State was taken into consideration.[ Para 23]

Facts:

The victim, along with other occupants, was traveling in a car driven by respondent no. 2 at night. The car collided head-on with a truck coming from the opposite direction, resulting in injuries to all occupants. The victim, after being discharged, suffered complications and eventually succumbed to injuries. The victim's dependents filed a claim petition alleging negligence by respondent no. 2.

Issues:

• Whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the car driver?
• Whether the witness AW-3 is reliable?

Held :

The Court found that the High Court had overlooked certain material facts, including who lodged the FIR. The informant was not an eyewitness and had some closeness with respondent no. 2. Therefore, the informant's version was hearsay and unreliable.

The High Court's adverse inference against AW-3 for not reporting the accident to the police was unwarranted. AW-3 had taken the injured to the hospital for immediate medical aid, and it was natural that he did not simultaneously go to the police station to lodge the FIR.

The failure of the respondents to cross-examine AW-3 led to an inference of tacit admission on their part. Respondent no. 2's choice not to depose in support of his written statement suggested his involvement in the accident.

The High Court erred in applying strict principles of evidence and standards of proof applicable in criminal trials to this motor accident claim case. The standard of proof is one of preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and held that the claimants were entitled to compensation as awarded by the Tribunal, along with a 40% addition in the annual income of the deceased towards 'future prospects.'

Facts:

The appellant, Daulat Singh, was the owner of 254.2 bighas of land.

On December 19, 1963, he gifted away 127.1 bighas of land to his son, leaving him with 17.25 standard acres of land.

A proceeding was initiated under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, to determine the ceiling limit on agricultural holdings, but it was dropped on April 14, 1972, with the observation that the gift was valid since it was executed before the amendment of Section 30DD of the Act, 1955.

On March 15, 1982, the Revenue Ceiling Department reopened the case, and it was held that the appellant was holding land in excess of the ceiling limit.

Issues:

• Whether the registered gift deed executed by the appellant was valid in the eyes of law, specifically under Section 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
• Whether the transfer of land under the gift deed falls within the ambit of Section 30DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, thus exempting it from the rigors of Section 30D and Section 6 of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973.

Held:

Section 15 of the Ceiling Act of 1973 confers the power to reopen cases if the earlier order was in contravention with the Act and prejudicial to the State interest. The relevant dates for determination of limitation are the date of the order sought to be reopened and the date of issuance of the show-cause notice under Section 15. The case was validly re-opened within the prescribed time frame (paras 13-16).

For a gift to be valid under Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it must be gratuitous and made voluntarily. Acceptance of the gift can be inferred from the donee's conduct, and in this case, the recitals in the gift deed and the statements of the parties indicated valid acceptance (paras 20-31).

The transfer of land under the gift deed falls within the purview of Section 30DD of the Tenancy Act, 1955. The donee was an agriculturalist capable of agriculture and accepted the gift during the lifetime of the donor. Thus, the transfer was valid under Section 30DD, and the appellant's holding falls within the ceiling limit prescribed under Section 30C (paras 35-47).

Section 6 of the Ceiling Act of 1973 does not apply to the gift deed as it was executed before the relevant date, and there was no extraneous consideration involved. Hence, it constitutes a bona fide transfer exempt from Section 6 (para 48).

Facts:

The petitioner, Amish Devgan, hosted a debate on a news channel about the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. During the debate, he made derogatory remarks about Pir Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti, a religious figure, which led to the filing of several FIRs against him in various states. The petitioner sought the quashing of these FIRs and also requested the transfer of all cases to a specific police station in Rajasthan.

Issues:

• Whether the petitioner's statements during the debate amounted to hate speech as defined under relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code.
• Whether the FIRs filed against the petitioner suffer from a jurisdictional defect.
• Whether the petitioner's defense of "trifle" under Section 95 of the Penal Code is applicable in this case.
• Whether the petitioner's right to freedom of speech was violated, and if so, to what extent.
• Whether the quashing of the FIRs is justified at this stage of the proceedings.

Held:

The Court explained the three elements that define hate speech - content-based element, intent-based element, and harm-based element. It emphasized that criminality under relevant sections requires deliberate and malicious intent to outrage religious feelings, not merely offensive speech. (Para 65)

The Court ruled that Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code permits prosecution at the place where the consequences of the offense have ensued. It clarified that the impugned FIRs do not suffer from a jurisdictional defect. (Para 84)

The Court held that the defense of "trifle" under Section 95 of the Penal Code cannot be accepted without ascertaining facts and evidence. The defense was not applicable in this case without proper examination. (Para 67, Para 71)

The Court recognized the importance of dignity, unity, and integrity of the nation while dealing with hate speech cases. It emphasized that hate speech can have long-term negative effects and must be addressed with caution to protect the rights of all citizens. (Para 69)

The Court declined the petitioner's prayer for quashing the FIRs but granted interim protection against arrest during the investigation. It held that the investigation should continue to ascertain relevant facts. The Court also accepted the transfer of all FIRs to a specific police station in Rajasthan where the first FIR was registered. (Para 79, Para 85)

Facts:

The dispute arose following the division of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh into two States, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. The power utilities of the two newly formed States could not agree on the modalities for the allocation and distribution of personnel. Telangana unilaterally relieved 1157 employees working with power utilities in Telangana to join the power utilities in Andhra Pradesh based on the principle of nativity. Writ petitions were filed before the High Court, which set aside Telangana's actions and issued further directions. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment and entrusted the task of personnel distribution to a One-Man Committee. The Committee submitted its Final Report on 26.12.2019, supplemented by a Supplementary Report on 11.03.2020, and a Concluding Report on 20.06.2020, approving an allocation list submitted by Andhra Pradesh utilities.

Issues:

• The objection to the Concluding Report not being the final report and the authorization to modify the list.
• The objection regarding the reciprocity of 655 employees' allocation between the two States.

Held:

The objection regarding the Concluding Report's status: The direction in the Concluding Report, stating that employees attaining the age of 58 in 2020 would be kept out of the allocation process, was an extension of the agreement between both parties before the One-Man Committee. This direction was found to be equitable, and the Committee had taken into account all relevant factors before making this decision.

The objection regarding the reciprocity of 655 employees' allocation: The Court found no error in the reciprocity decision, as the One-Man Committee's choice to allocate 655 employees from Telangana to Andhra Pradesh and vice versa was based on a reasonable approach. The final allocation list annexed to the Concluding Report was clear and unambiguous.

Challenge to the allocation made by the One-Man Committee: The Court clarified that the allocation finalized by the One-Man Committee could not be challenged by any employee, officer, or utility before any forum.

 Facts:

 The appellant, Sumedh Singh Saini, applied for anticipatory bail after an FIR was lodged against him for offenses under various sections of the IPC, including section 302, based on statements from co-accused who were alloed to become approvers. The appellant contended that the present FIR was not maintainable as it was a second FIR on the same facts, and it was registered after a delay of 29 years from the alleged incident. The appellant referred to the quashing of a similar FIR in the case of *Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar.

Issues:

• Whether the delay in filing the present FIR renders it maintainable?
• Whether the addition of charges under section 302 IPC is justified based on statements from approvers?

Held:

The Court considered the delay of 29 years in filing the FIR and observed that the brother of the deceased, who was the informant, had not initiated any criminal proceedings during this period. The Court held that the appellant made out a case for anticipatory bail based on this delay. (Para 8)

The Court noted the appellant's retirement as Director General of Police, Punjab, and the fact that the initial FIR did not include charges under section 302 IPC. The Court found that the section 302 IPC charge was added solely based on the statements of approvers. Considering these factors, the Court held that the appellant was eligible for anticipatory bail. (Para 9)

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and granted anticipatory bail to the appellant based on the delay in filing the FIR and the subsequent addition of charges under section 302 IPC. (Para 9)

Facts:

The Magistrate suo motu directed the registration of an FIR for illegal mining, storage, and transportation of minerals. The private appellants filed applications to quash the FIRs for offenses under Sections 379, 414 of the IPC, Sections 4, 21 of the MMDR Act, and Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules. The High Court dismissed their applications.

Issues:

• Whether the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act is attracted at the stage of the Magistrate directing the registration of an FIR for offenses under the Act and its rules.
• Whether the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act applies to offenses under the MMDR Act that have been compounded by the competent authority.
• Whether criminal complaints/proceedings for offenses under the IPC (Sections 379, 414) can be proceeded with even after compounding offenses under the MMDR Act.

Held:

The bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act is attracted only when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offenses under the Act and orders issuance of process/summons. At the stage of directing the registration of an FIR, the bar is not attracted (Para 8.1).

The Magistrate's order directing the registration of an FIR does not affect the power of the authorized person to compound the offense under the MMDR Act. It is a pre-cognizance stage (Para 10).

The bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act is attracted when the offender compounds the offenses under the Act or its rules. Proceedings for such compounded offenses shall not be continued. However, the bar does not apply to offenses under the IPC, which are distinct and separate offenses (Para 11).

The appeals of the private appellants are partly allowed, quashing the proceedings for offenses under Sections 4 and 21 of the MMDR Act only. The State of Madhya Pradesh's appeal is dismissed (Para 13).