Facts:

The Magistrate suo motu directed the registration of an FIR for illegal mining, storage, and transportation of minerals. The private appellants filed applications to quash the FIRs for offenses under Sections 379, 414 of the IPC, Sections 4, 21 of the MMDR Act, and Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules. The High Court dismissed their applications.

Issues:

• Whether the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act is attracted at the stage of the Magistrate directing the registration of an FIR for offenses under the Act and its rules.
• Whether the bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act applies to offenses under the MMDR Act that have been compounded by the competent authority.
• Whether criminal complaints/proceedings for offenses under the IPC (Sections 379, 414) can be proceeded with even after compounding offenses under the MMDR Act.

Held:

The bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act is attracted only when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offenses under the Act and orders issuance of process/summons. At the stage of directing the registration of an FIR, the bar is not attracted (Para 8.1).

The Magistrate's order directing the registration of an FIR does not affect the power of the authorized person to compound the offense under the MMDR Act. It is a pre-cognizance stage (Para 10).

The bar under sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act is attracted when the offender compounds the offenses under the Act or its rules. Proceedings for such compounded offenses shall not be continued. However, the bar does not apply to offenses under the IPC, which are distinct and separate offenses (Para 11).

The appeals of the private appellants are partly allowed, quashing the proceedings for offenses under Sections 4 and 21 of the MMDR Act only. The State of Madhya Pradesh's appeal is dismissed (Para 13).

 Facts:

 The appellant, Sumedh Singh Saini, applied for anticipatory bail after an FIR was lodged against him for offenses under various sections of the IPC, including section 302, based on statements from co-accused who were alloed to become approvers. The appellant contended that the present FIR was not maintainable as it was a second FIR on the same facts, and it was registered after a delay of 29 years from the alleged incident. The appellant referred to the quashing of a similar FIR in the case of *Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar.

Issues:

• Whether the delay in filing the present FIR renders it maintainable?
• Whether the addition of charges under section 302 IPC is justified based on statements from approvers?

Held:

The Court considered the delay of 29 years in filing the FIR and observed that the brother of the deceased, who was the informant, had not initiated any criminal proceedings during this period. The Court held that the appellant made out a case for anticipatory bail based on this delay. (Para 8)

The Court noted the appellant's retirement as Director General of Police, Punjab, and the fact that the initial FIR did not include charges under section 302 IPC. The Court found that the section 302 IPC charge was added solely based on the statements of approvers. Considering these factors, the Court held that the appellant was eligible for anticipatory bail. (Para 9)

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and granted anticipatory bail to the appellant based on the delay in filing the FIR and the subsequent addition of charges under section 302 IPC. (Para 9)

Facts:

The 2nd Respondent-Director General of Police invited applications for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive) in the State.

The 2nd respondent published the select list province-wise, and unsuccessful candidates challenged it in a writ petition.

A fresh redrawn State-wise merit list was notified by the Division Bench of the High Court, appointing 259 candidates and canceling the appointment of 47 candidates.

The ousted candidates challenged the redrawn list in a second round of litigation, and the High Court held that those not within the merit zone cannot continue.

The Supreme Court, without examining the inter se dispute, accommodated all 47 ousted candidates and 22 impleaded candidates on the post of Sub-Inspector based on a statement by the Advocate General of the State.

Candidates higher in the order of merit than the 22 appointed candidates filed a writ petition, claiming they were denied their legitimate right of fair consideration.

Issues:

• Whether the appointments of the 22 candidates were legally sustainable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
• Whether the appointments of 22 candidates were irregular and could be considered legal.

Held:

The Court held that appointments are to be made strictly in the order of merit in accordance with the select list prepared by the competent authority. Any appointment made in contravention is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The appointments of the 22 candidates were irregular and not in conformity with the recruitment rules, but the Court refused to disturb their appointments due to their 12 years of service and rich experience in the field.

The reasoning that appointments were made by the Supreme Court u/Art. 142 of the Constitution was not approved. The appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

The petitioner, Skill Lotto Solutions Pvt. Ltd., filed a writ petition alleging violation of Article 14 and impugning the definition of 'goods' under Section 2(52) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner contested the inclusion of actionable claim in the definition and argued that it was contrary to the legal meaning of goods and unconstitutional. The petitioner also challenged the exclusion of lottery, betting, and gambling from Item No.6 of Schedule III, claiming it to be hostile discrimination.

Issues:

• Whether the writ petition challenging the provisions of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, under Article 32 alleging violation of Article 14 is maintainable.
• Whether the inclusion of actionable claim in the definition of goods under Section 2(52) of the Act is contrary to the legal meaning of goods and unconstitutional.
• Whether the Constitution Bench judgment in Sunrise Associates has held that lottery is an actionable claim, and if so, whether it is a binding declaration of law or obiter dicta.
• Whether the exclusion of lottery, betting, and gambling from Item No.6 of Schedule III of the Act is hostile discrimination and violative of Article 14.
• Whether prize money should be excluded for determining the face value of lottery tickets for the purpose of levying GST.

Held :

The Court held that the writ petition under Article 32 alleging violation of Article 14 with respect to a parliamentary Act is maintainable.( Para 14-16:)

The Court held that the inclusion of actionable claim in the definition of goods under Section 2(52) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, is not contrary to the legal meaning of goods and is not unconstitutional. The definition of goods in Article 366(12) of the Constitution is inclusive, and the Constitution framers did not intend to give a restrictive meaning to the term "goods."( Para 20, 24, 33, and 34:)

The Court rejected the argument that the Constitution Bench judgment in Sunrise Associates was merely an obiter dicta. It held that the judgment categorically held that lottery is an actionable claim after due consideration, and hence, it is a binding declaration of law.( Para 38:)

The Court ruled that the exclusion of lottery, betting, and gambling from Item No.6 of Schedule III of the Act is not hostile discrimination and does not violate Article 14. The Parliament had the power to include these three actionable claims for GST purposes while leaving others.( Para 49, 57, and 58:)

The Court held that prize money should not be excluded while determining the face value of lottery tickets for levying GST. The value of taxable supply is governed by statutory provisions, and it is not permissible to exclude prize money for this purpose.( Para 63, 70, and 71:)

Facts:

The case pertains to a dowry death where the wife died under suspicious circumstances within seven years of marriage. The husband, father-in-law, and mother-in-law were accused of causing her death due to cruelty and harassment related to dowry demands. The trial court acquitted the appellants, but the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted them.

Issues:

• Whether the ingredients of Section 304B of the Penal Code are satisfied in this case.
• Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that the deceased died of poisoning.
• Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal by the trial court.

Held:

The Court analyzed the essential elements of Section 304B of the Penal Code and found that the prosecution failed to establish the demand for dowry before or at the time of marriage.

The Court examined the evidence relating to poisoning and found that there was no credible evidence that the deceased died of poisoning. The police did not recover any poison from the appellants' house, and the Forensic Science Laboratory report ruled out the presence of any poison.

The Court observed that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal without sufficient justification. The trial court's findings, which did not find the evidence reliable, could not be termed as perverse.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, and restored the judgment of the Sessions Judge, thereby acquitting the appellants of the charges.

FACTS:

The appellant, an elder brother of the deceased's husband, was convicted along with the husband and father-in-law for allegedly causing the dowry death of the deceased. The High Court had confirmed the conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the testimonies of the witnesses to determine whether the appellant-accused involvement was adequately established.

ISSUES:

• Whether the prosecution provided specific instances of hostile attitude or persistent demands of dowry against the appellant-accused.
• Whether the ingredients of Section 498A IPC were proved against the appellant-accused beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

The Supreme Court, in its judgment, acquitted the appellant-accused of the charges levelled against him. The Court found that the prosecution failed to present concrete evidence of specific instances of hostile behavior or persistent dowry demands against the appellant-accused. The testimonies of the witnesses were vague, and even the letters written by the deceased from her matrimonial place did not mention any harassment due to dowry demands. Moreover, several independent witnesses turned hostile and did not support the prosecution's case.

The Court, after analyzing the oral testimonies, concluded that the ingredients of Section 498A IPC were not proven against the appellant-accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the conviction of the appellant-accused could not be sustained, and he was acquitted of all the charges.( Para 13-17)

FACTS:

 The Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2012, provided an exemption from payment of 50% of the electricity duty for five years. The State government failed to issue the necessary notification within the stipulated one-month period. The issued notification was made effective from 08.01.2015 instead of the date of the industrial policy's issuance.

ISSUES:

• Whether the State government's notification, issued prospectively from 08.01.2015, violated the legitimate expectation created by the Industrial Policy 2012.
• Whether the respondent (Brahmaputra Metallics Ltd.) was entitled to a rebate/deduction from electricity duty for the financial years 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14, considering the commencement of production on 17.08.2011.

HELD:

The State government's action of making the exemption prospective was arbitrary and violated the legitimate expectation created by the Industrial Policy 2012. The respondent was entitled to a rebate/deduction from electricity duty for the financial years 2012-13 and 2013-14, but not for 2011-12, as per the policy terms.

The Court held that the State government made a solemn representation in the Industrial Policy 2012 to encourage industrialization and provided specific incentives, including the exemption from electricity duty. The failure to issue the notification within the stipulated time and making it prospective violated the legitimate expectation created by the policy. (Paragraph 43,)

The Court emphasized that the State must act fairly, transparently, and provide justifications for any deprivation of entitlements. The lack of reasons or public interest justifications for the delay in notification made the State's action arbitrary and violative of Article 14. (Paragraph 44)

The Court confirmed the respondent's entitlement to the rebate/deduction for the financial years 2012-13 and 2013-14, as the industrial production began on 17 August 2011. However, the respondent was not entitled to the rebate/deduction for the financial year 2011-12, as per the policy's terms. (paragraph 46)

Facts:

The plaintiff/respondent filed a suit seeking a declaration and permanent injunction to restrain the appellants from copying, using, or enabling others to use the plaintiff's registered design of container and lid. In response, the defendant/appellant filed a written statement along with a counter-claim before the Commercial Court, seeking the cancellation of the registered designs, arguing that they could not be registered under Section 4(a) of the Design Act, 2000. Additionally, the appellant filed an application under Section 22(4) read with Section 19(2) of the Design Act, 2000, to transfer the suit to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench. The District Judge allowed the application and transferred the suit to the Calcutta High Court.

Issues:

• Whether the High Court has parallel jurisdiction to entertain applications for cancellation of registration of designs under Section 19 of the Design Act, 2000.
• Whether the suit should be transferred to the High Court where the cause of action arises.

Held:

The judgment in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Reckitt Benckiser Australia Pty. Ltd. (2010) 2 SCC 535 clarified that applications for cancellation of registration under Section 19 must be filed before the Controller of Patent & Designs, and the High Court's jurisdiction is limited to appeals against the Controller's order. The High Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain suits for infringement that involve a plea for revocation of registration under Section 22(4) of the 2000 Act.

The suit should be transferred to the High Court where the cause of action arises, and since no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Kolkata, the suit is liable to be transferred to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench.

Decision: The matter is remitted to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench, to decide the suit in accordance with the law.

Constitutional Law – Contempt of Court – Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution – The Supreme Court has inherent powers as a Court of Record to punish for contempt – These powers cannot be abridged or taken away even by legislative enactment – Comparison of Articles 129 and 142 shows no restriction on the Supreme Court's powers to punish for contempt, unlike clause (2) of Article 142 which can be subject to any law made by Parliament [Paras 9-10, 31].

Contempt Proceedings – Scandalising the Court – The raison d'être of contempt jurisdiction is to maintain the dignity of judicial institutions – Not a vindictive exercise but necessary when persistent and unwarranted attacks are made against the judiciary – Repeated unjustified allegations and attempts to scandalise the court amount to contempt – Apologies, if not genuine, do not mitigate the offense [Paras 1, 20, 33].

Judicial Precedent – Roshan Lal Ahuja In Re – The Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in previous cases like Roshan Lal Ahuja In Re and others where motivated attempts to malign judiciary's reputation warranted strict action – Apologies must be sincere and demonstrate remorse, not serve as a tactic to avoid consequences [Paras 27-33].

Decision: Contemnor is found guilty of contempt – Conduct aimed at scandalising the court cannot be countenanced – Sentencing deferred to allow the contemnor a chance to be heard on the issue of final sentence [Paras 33-34].