Criminal Law – Kidnapping and Consensual Affair – The appellant argued that the minor girl's consent should be a defense due to their consensual relationship. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, emphasizing that the consent of a minor is immaterial under Section 361 IPC. The Court noted that the statutory provisions do not allow for the consent of the minor as a valid defense and highlighted that the appellant had failed to demonstrate any grounds for acquittal [Paras 1-19].

Sentencing – Mitigating Factors – The Court observed several mitigating factors, including the absence of force, the young age of the appellant, the long passage of time since the incident, and the appellant's reformation. The sentence was reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone, considering these factors [Paras 20-27].

Decision – Appeal Partly Allowed – Conviction upheld under Sections 363 and 366 of IPC, but the sentence was reduced to the period already served by the appellant. The appellant was ordered to be released immediately [Para 28].

Environmental Law – Unauthorized Construction – The appellant constructed a Hotel-cum-Restaurant in the Bus Stand Complex without requisite permissions, in violation of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. The Supreme Court upheld the NGT's findings, directing the demolition of the illegal structure, emphasizing the necessity of strict compliance with environmental laws and the statutory provisions of the Forest Act [Paras 1-64].

Environmental Rule of Law – Emphasized the necessity for a rule of law framework in environmental governance to ensure compliance with environmental regulations. The Court highlighted the significance of procedural and institutional elements in safeguarding environmental interests [Paras 46-53].

Role of Courts in Environmental Protection – The judgment underscored the judiciary's critical role in enforcing environmental laws and ensuring sustainable development. It reinforced that courts must provide meaningful legal remedies to redress environmental harm and deter future violations [Paras 54-58].

Illegal Activities on Forest Land – Confirmed that construction on forest land for purposes other than those permitted is illegal. Reiterated that unauthorized use of forest land without central government approval constitutes a violation of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 [Paras 59-62].

Jurisdiction of NGT – Clarified that the NGT has the authority to adjudicate on violations of environmental obligations even if they involve statutes not listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act, provided the issue pertains to the implementation of an enactment specified in Schedule I [Paras 63].

Decision – Appeals disposed of – Held – The structure of the Hotel-cum-Restaurant in the Bus Stand Complex to be demolished within the stipulated timeline. The appellant and second respondent directed to comply strictly with the original orders issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) regarding the use of forest land for parking and bus stand purposes only [Paras 64-68].

Income Tax – Deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) – The appeals involved the interpretation of Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and Section 80P(4) of the Income Tax Act, concerning the eligibility of cooperative societies providing credit facilities to their members. The Supreme Court held that the benevolent provisions of Section 80P must be read liberally and in favor of the assessee. The Court clarified that a cooperative society registered under a state law is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) if it is engaged in providing credit facilities to its members, irrespective of whether the credit facilities are agricultural or not. The Court also emphasized that Section 80P(4) is a proviso, specifically excluding cooperative banks that function akin to commercial banks [Paras 1-27, 31-36].

Jurisdiction of Assessing Officer – The Court held that assessing officers could examine the factual activities of a cooperative society to determine if it is indeed providing credit facilities to its members. Such an inquiry does not go behind the registration but ensures compliance with the principal object of the society [Paras 28-30, 32].

Eligibility vs. Attributability – The Court differentiated between eligibility for deduction and attributability of profits. While a society may be eligible for deduction if it provides credit facilities to its members, the profits attributable to loans given to non-members cannot be deducted under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) [Paras 33-34].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Held – The Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court was set aside. The Court affirmed that cooperative societies registered under the relevant state act are entitled to deductions under Section 80P(2)(a)(i), provided they are engaged in the specified activities. The exclusion under Section 80P(4) applies only to cooperative banks with RBI licenses [Paras 35-36].

Judicial Service – Appointment beyond Advertised Vacancies – The Supreme Court considered whether appointments to the post of Munsiff-Magistrate can be made beyond the number of probable vacancies advertised, as per Rule 7(2) of the Kerala Judicial Service Rules, 1991. The High Court had held that vacancies arising within a year of the approval of the select list by the Governor should be filled from the list, even if this exceeds the number of advertised vacancies. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, emphasizing that such appointments would contravene Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by denying equal opportunity to candidates eligible in subsequent recruitment years [Paras 1-9, 28-46].

Judicial Service Rules – Interpretation – The Court harmonized the amended Rule 7(2) with the directives in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3), stressing that while the Rule permits filling vacancies arising within one year from the approval of the select list, it should not violate the principle of equal opportunity. The Court noted that the recruitment process must adhere to a strict timeline and the number of vacancies notified [Paras 10-27, 30-31].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Held – The judgment of the High Court was set aside. The Court ruled that appointments beyond the advertised number of vacancies for the year 2019 cannot encroach upon vacancies arising in the year 2020. The High Court was directed to conduct a fresh selection process for vacancies arising in 2020 in accordance with the relevant rules and judicial directives [Paras 47-49].

Consumer Law – Unfair Trade Practices – The Supreme Court examined whether the terms of the Apartment Buyer's Agreement, particularly those concerning penalties for delay and obligations of the buyers, constituted unfair trade practices under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Court found that the agreement was heavily one-sided, in favor of the developer, and against the buyers, thereby constituting unfair trade practices. The Court emphasized that consumers should not be bound by such one-sided and oppressive terms [Paras 19.1-19.7].

Consumer Protection vs. Real Estate Regulation – The Court clarified that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, are concurrent remedies available to the consumers. The RERA Act does not bar the jurisdiction of the consumer fora to entertain complaints about real estate projects. Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act makes its provisions additional to any other law for the time being in force [Paras 20.1-20.4].

Delay in Possession – The Court addressed whether the 42-month period for handing over possession should be calculated from the date of the building plan approval or from the date of the Fire NOC. It concluded that the period should be calculated from the date of the Fire NOC, which is mandatory under the Haryana Fire Safety Act, 2009, and other related statutes [Paras 18.1-18.11].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Held – The judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was set aside. The Court directed that the possession period should be calculated from the date of the Fire NOC. The Apartment Buyer's Agreement terms found to be one-sided were declared void as they constituted unfair trade practices under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 [Paras 21-22].

Arbitration Law – Enforceability of Arbitration Agreement in Unstamped Contracts – The Supreme Court examined whether an arbitration agreement within an unstamped commercial contract is valid and enforceable. The Court held that the arbitration agreement is an independent agreement, not chargeable to stamp duty, and thus, the non-payment of stamp duty on the commercial contract does not invalidate the arbitration clause. The doctrine of separability was upheld, ensuring that arbitration agreements remain valid irrespective of the stamping status of the underlying contract. The matter was referred to a Constitution Bench for authoritative settlement due to the significant implications [Paras 1-11].

Arbitrability of Fraud – The Court reiterated that allegations of fraud in the performance of the underlying contract do not impede the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. Such allegations should be adjudicated through arbitration unless the arbitration agreement itself is directly impeached on the grounds of fraud [Paras 12-18].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Held – The arbitration agreement in the unstamped Work Order is valid and enforceable. The Court overruled the decision in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Chandmari Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 14 SCC 66 to the extent that it held that an arbitration agreement in an unstamped commercial contract cannot be acted upon. The case was referred to a Constitution Bench for an authoritative ruling on the applicability of Section 35 of the Stamp Act to arbitration agreements [Paras 19-24].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Review of Speaker's Certification – The Supreme Court addressed whether the decision of the Speaker of the House of People under Article 110(3) of the Constitution to certify a bill as a 'Money Bill' under Article 110(1) is subject to judicial review. The Court held that while the certification by the Speaker is generally conclusive, it is subject to judicial review in cases of substantive illegality or constitutional infirmity [Paras 1-4].

Constitutional Law – Certification of Aadhaar Act as Money Bill – The Court reviewed the majority opinion in Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.), which held that the Aadhaar Act was correctly certified as a 'Money Bill.' The dissenting opinion by Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud disagreed, emphasizing that the certification had significant constitutional implications and should be re-examined by a larger bench. The matter was referred to a larger bench in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. for a definitive determination [Paras 5-14].

Decision – Review Petitions Dismissed – Held – The majority dismissed the review petitions, affirming the certification of the Aadhaar Act as a 'Money Bill.' Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, dissenting, opined that the review petitions should be kept pending until the larger bench's decision in Rojer Mathew, as the outcome would significantly impact the constitutional validity of the certification [Paras 10-14].

Arbitration Law – Jurisdiction and Framework – The Supreme Court discussed the jurisdiction of arbitrators and the procedural framework under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court held that the Act itself provides comprehensive procedures for challenging the appointment of arbitrators and that parties must adhere to these statutory provisions without resorting to extrastatutory mechanisms. The Court emphasized that arbitration agreements must fulfill the requirements of Section 7 of the Act and that the arbitral process is intended to be efficient and minimally judicially interfered [Paras 1-13].

Article 226/227 and Arbitral Process – The Court considered the circumstances under which the arbitral process could be interfered with under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It held that judicial interference is warranted only in exceptional cases where a party is left remediless or in cases of bad faith. The Court stressed the importance of upholding the integrity and efficiency of the arbitral process, as outlined in the legislative intent of the Arbitration Act [Paras 10-19].

Applicability of Gujarat Act – The Supreme Court examined the applicability of the Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992, to the contract in question. The Court observed that the contract involved manufacturing and supply of bricks and thus, fell within the definition of a "works contract" under Section 2(k) of the Gujarat Act. However, it noted that issues requiring contractual interpretation should not be adjudicated under writ jurisdiction [Paras 20-24].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Held – The High Court's interference under Articles 226 and 227 was unwarranted, and the arbitral process should be respected. The Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the appellant to raise jurisdictional objections in the pending Section 34 proceedings. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs [Paras 25-26].

Penal Code – Voluntarily Causing Hurt with a Dangerous Weapon – Attempt to Murder – The Supreme Court considered whether a compromise between parties could justify the reduction of sentences in cases involving serious non-compoundable offences under Sections 307 and 324 of the IPC. Despite Section 320 CrPC not listing these sections as compoundable, the Court acknowledged that an amicable settlement could be a relevant factor for reducing the quantum of sentence [Paras 1-13].

Criminal Procedure – Compromise and Reduction of Sentence – The Court highlighted that while compounding of offences not listed under Section 320 CrPC is not permissible, the fact of a mutual compromise can influence the determination of sentence. The Court drew on precedents where the reduction of sentences was allowed in light of a compromise between the parties [Paras 10-12].

Reduction of Sentence – Factors Considered – The Court outlined several factors warranting a reduction of sentence: (1) the mutual compromise and the victim's voluntary acceptance of the apology, (2) the young age of the appellants and the passage of time, (3) the lack of previous criminal antecedents, and (4) the significant portion of the sentence already served by the appellants. These factors collectively justified a lenient approach [Paras 13-16].

Decision – Appeals partly allowed – Held – The sentence of the appellants was reduced to the period already undergone. The Court ordered their release and discharged any bail bonds, recognizing the amicable settlement and the changed circumstances since the incident [Para 17].