Civil Appeal – Suit for Specific Performance – Limitation – Agreement to sell land – Payment of advance amount – Refusal by the seller to perform the contract – Notice of refusal – Commencement of limitation period – Second part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Whether notice of refusal given – Suit filed beyond limitation period – Suit for specific performance barred by limitation – Decree set aside. [Para 20-27]

Civil Procedure – Constructive Res Judicata – Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Whether principles of constructive res judicata or Order II Rule 2 applicable – Not decided – Suit barred by limitation – Decision based on limitation – Setting aside of decree for specific performance. [Para 19]

Contract Act – Promise to extend time for performance – Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Refusal and forbearance – Opposites – Refusal to perform contract – Notice of refusal – Commencement of limitation period – Suit filed beyond limitation period – Suit for specific performance barred by limitation – Decree set aside. [Para 24]

Civil Procedure – Specific Performance – Allotment of Trust property eastwards – Bearing on performance of contract – No bearing – Suit for specific performance not conditional on disposal of partition suit – Suit for specific performance not barred. [Para 25-26]

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Exercise of powers to do substantial justice – Settlement between parties – Direction for payment of Rs. 50,00,000 as settlement amount – Directions for payment of interest in case of non-compliance – Exercise of power under Article 142. Appeal Allowed.  [Para 29]

Conviction and Appeal – Original Conviction and Subsequent Appeals

The appellants were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under Sections 341, 302 read with 34 of IPC for the murder of Smt. Keshari Mahato. The High Court affirmed the decision. Special Leave Petition was filed, and leave was granted for A-1 (Bhaktu Gorain) and A-3 (Bandhu Gorain). [Para 2-3]

Circumstances of Offense – Factual Background and Witnesses

On the morning of September 27, 1993, five accused persons allegedly surrounded and assaulted the deceased, Smt. Keshari Mahato, resulting in her death. Multiple family members witnessed the event and subsequently testified. [Para 4-5]

Eyewitness Testimony – Credibility and Consistency

The testimonies of Lakshmi Mahato (PW-1), Sudhir Mahato (PW-2), Rampada Mahato (PW-3), and Bijali Mahato (PW-4) were deemed credible, consistent, and corroborative of each other. All these witnesses survived cross-examination without significant discredit. [Para 6-11]

Additional Witnesses – Post-Occurrence and Chance Witnesses

Raghu Mahato (PW-6) as a post-occurrence witness, and Dr. A.K. Hazari (PW-9) as the medical examiner, provided additional corroborative evidence that supported the case of the prosecution. [Para 12, 13]

Forensic Evidence – Post-mortem Examination and Injuries

Dr. A.K. Hazari (PW-9) detailed the severe injuries on the deceased, confirming they were consistent with the weapons described and were sufficient to cause death. [Para 14]

Common Intention – Appellants’ Pre-planned Act

The accused had a common intention to commit the crime, rejecting the submission that they simply wanted to 'teach a lesson' to the deceased for her alleged witchcraft activities. The presence of deadly weapons and the nature of the injuries caused confirmed this common intention. [Para 16-18]

Decision – The argument that the appellants lacked a common intention to kill the deceased was rejected. Their prior altercation and the severe nature of the inflicted injuries showed premeditation and common intent. The convictions were thus upheld. [Para 17-18]

Territorial Jurisdiction Dispute – Section 138, 142(2)(a)N.I. Act -  The case involves a jurisdictional dispute regarding dishonoured cheques. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, erroneously held no territorial jurisdiction, denying the appellant a chance to remedy the situation. Procedural defects should not obstruct substantial justice.

Exercise of Constitutional Powers – The Supreme Court exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India read with Section 406 of the Code to rectify the jurisdictional error. The Court recognized the lapse in providing proper legal guidance to the appellant and ordered the trial to continue in Jamshedpur, Jharkhand.

Non-Precedential Nature – The order was passed in consideration of the unique circumstances of the case and is not to be treated as a precedent.

Limitation Period – Controversy arises concerning the effective date of service of summons for computing the limitation period for filing a written statement in the Delhi High Court’s Commercial Division. Examination of two different modes of service. [Para 1-5]

Service of Summons – Code of Civil Procedure, Order V Rule 2 – Service of summons should include a copy of the plaint, as contended by the petitioner. The Court agrees with this legal interpretation. [Para 6-9]

Fact and Law – The High Court’s disbelief in incomplete service of the plaint is maintained by the Supreme Court, stating it is a question of fact that they do not wish to reappreciate at this stage. [Para 10-12]

Decision – The petition is dismissed, and pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of. [Para 13]

Mining Lease - Dispute over the grant of mining lease for Dolomite - Multiple applications filed by different parties - Various orders issued by state authorities - Confusion over the status of the land and the mining lease - Appellants challenging the grant of mining lease to Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih. [Para 1-2]

Background - A detailed account of the historical applications, orders, and disputes related to the mining lease for Dolomite in the specified area - Repeated applications, rejections, and recalls of orders - Legal proceedings initiated by Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih to obtain the mining lease. [Para 2.1-2.14]

Mining Lease - Eligibility under Concession Rules and MMDR Act, 1957 - Interpretation of Rule 61 of the Concession Rules, 2016 and Section 10-A of the MMDR Act, 1957 - Rule 61 of Concession Rules, 2016 makes applications for mining lease of minor minerals ineligible if received prior to the rules' effect, with an exception if a Grant Order or Letter of Intent had been issued - Analysis of whether the respondents' case falls under the proviso to Rule 61 - High Court's findings that the proviso does not apply to the facts of the case. [Para 5-8]

Policy Change and Revocation of Orders - Impact on eligibility - Reference to a policy specifying the mandatory requirement of a Conversion Certificate for mining lease - Dismissal and revocation of earlier orders - Irrelevance of earlier orders after revocation - Disposition of Writ Petition No. 7505 (W) of 2003 exparte - Claim that the application dated 06.03.1998 should be considered in accordance with the law. [Para 9-10]

Amendment Act, 2015 - Object and purpose - Shift towards auctioning mineral resources - Section 10-A of the MMDR Act, 1957 mandates ineligibility of applications received before 12.01.2015 - Exceptions for specific situations - Protection for applications under Section 11-A, reconnaissance permit or prospecting license holders, and those with previous approvals or Letters of Intent issued before the Amendment Act. [Para 14]

Mining Lease – Interpretation of the State Government's letter of approval – Whether the letter constitutes a Letter of Intent – Examination of legal definitions and relevant cases – Rejecting the contention that the letter is a Letter of Intent due to the lack of previous Central Government approval – Clarification that the letter was recommendatory and not a commitment to enter into a future contract – Not covered by clause (c) of Section 10-A of the Act. [Para 15-16]

Raiyat Land – Restrictions on the use of Raiyat land for mining – Provisions of the WBLR Act, 1955, regarding Raiyat land and its usage – The contradiction in classifying land as 'Dungri' and granting it as Raiyat land for cultivation – Legal issues surrounding the consent letters of landowners (Raiyats) and changes in ownership – Uncertainty regarding the Respondent's eligibility for Rule 61 benefits – Non-impleadment of WBMDTCL – The remand order is not appropriate at this stage. [Para 17-19]

Ownership of Land – The appellants' claim of ownership of 20.87 acres of the land in question – No obstacle to granting a mining lease for this portion to Respondent No. 1 – The remainder of the claim is rejected – No costs awarded. [Para 20-22]

Appeal is partly allowed, and the impugned judgment is set aside, with directions for the execution of a mining lease for 20.87 acres of land in favor of Respondent No. 1. The rest of the claim by Respondent No. 1 is dismissed. No costs are awarded. [Para 22]

Civil Appeal – Rejection of Plaint Under Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC – Appellant sought rejection of the plaint based on bar of res judicata – Learned Single Judge rejected the plaint, while the Division Bench of High Court reversed the decision – Supreme Court held that the issue of res judicata could not be decided under Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC at this stage. [Para 2-6]

Scope of Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC: The Court clarified that Rule 11 allows it to only look into the averments made in the plaint and, at most, documents produced along with the plaint. Defense and documents relied upon by the defendant cannot be considered while deciding an application under Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC. [Para 5]

Res Judicata: The Supreme Court clarifies that the plea of res judicata could not be decided at this stage. The issue involves consideration of pleadings in the earlier suit, the judgment of the Trial Court, and the judgment of the Appellate Courts. The issue will be framed for future proceedings. [Para 4,6]

Final Conclusion and Disposition: The Supreme Court agrees with the Division Bench's final conclusion that the suit needs to be decided on merits, with a modification that the issue of res judicata remains open for future proceedings. The appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs. [Para 7-8]

Criminal Appeal – Constitutionality of Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – Whether retrospective or prospective application of the declaration of unconstitutionality – Reference to a larger bench for determination – Arguments regarding the applicability of Article 20 of the Constitution – Section 6A as a procedural provision – Nature of Section 6A – Protection provided under Article 20 – Declaration of unconstitutionality renders the law unenforceable and relates back – Judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy considered applicable to all cases irrespective of their stage of pendency unless explicitly stated otherwise. [Para 1-11]

Constitutional Validity – Section 6A of the DSPE Act – Questions requiring consideration - (i) Whether Section 6A of the DSPE Act is part of procedure or it introduces a conviction or sentence? (ii) Whether Article 20(1) of the Constitution will have any bearing or relevance in the context of declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional? (iii) The declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution would have a retrospective effect or would apply prospectively from the date of its declaration as unconstitutional? [Para 14]

Scope of Reference – Limitations on the scope of reference – Bench clarifies that it would only answer the specific questions referred and not enlarge the scope of the reference – Emphasis on not dealing with the merits of individual cases – Matters to be reverted to regular Bench for hearing and disposal after answering the questions. [Para 15]

History of Sanction Requirement – Evolution of the requirement for sanction before launching prosecution – Single Directive issued in 1969 – Striking down of the directive in Vineet Narain case – Introduction of Section 6A in DSPE Act in 2003 – Continuation of the protection regarding sanction before prosecution. [Para 16-19]

Applicability of Article 20(1) of the Constitution – Analysis of Article 20(1) in the context of Section 6A of the DSPE Act – Article 20(1) prohibits conviction or sentence under an ex post facto law – Trial under a different procedure or court not unconstitutional unless it violates other fundamental rights – Section 6A of DSPE Act held to be a part of procedure and not introducing conviction or sentence. [Para 20-32]

Constitutional Law – Interpretation of Article 20(1) of the Constitution – Protection against self-incrimination – Scope of Article 20(1) limited to conviction and sentence, not procedural aspects of investigation or trial – Marginal note and Article 20(1) cannot be stretched to cover procedural matters – Settled law since 1953 affirms that Article 20(1) pertains solely to conviction and sentence – Article 20(1) not applicable to the validity or invalidity of Section 6A of the DSPE Act. [Para 34-36]

Application of General Clauses Act – Inapplicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 in the present case – Declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional by a court, not a situation of repeal or revival by the Parliament. [Para 32]

Constitutional Law – Retrospective or Prospective Application of Judgment – Declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional – Whether such declaration has retrospective effect – Interpretation of Article 13(1) and 13(2) of the Constitution – Clear distinction between pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws – Pre-Constitution laws declared void under Article 13(1) only from the date of the Constitution's commencement – Post-Constitution laws declared void ab initio under Article 13(2) if they contravene constitutional prohibitions – The doctrine of eclipse does not apply to post-Constitution laws – A statute declared unconstitutional by a court of law is non est for all purposes – Declaration in Subramanian Swamy case has retrospective operation – Section 6A of the DSPE Act held to be not in force from the date of its insertion on 11.09.2003. [Para 37-45]

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Belated inclusion of claim – Appellant’s claim related to an arbitral award dated 01.08.2016, which was in appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act – An agreement entered into on 02.08.2006 for the development of land into a residential group housing complex – Alleged misconduct by the Corporate Debtor in advertising the project under its own name led to arbitration proceedings initiated on 02.05.2011 – Award in favor of the appellant on 01.08.2016, directing the Corporate Debtor to apply for the transfer of licenses – Corporate Debtor filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act on 26.09.2016 – Concurrent execution proceedings initiated by the appellant adjourned sine die due to the pendency of the Section 34 proceedings – Section 34 proceedings culminated in the award being upheld with modifications on 25.04.2019 – CIRP initiated against the Corporate Debtor in respect of three real estate projects on 27.03.2019 – Resolution plan approved by the COC on 11.07.2020 – Appellant’s claim of Rs.35,67,05,337 against the Corporate Debtor rejected as belated by respondent no.1 – Appellant filed an application under Section 60(5) of the IBC – Adjudicating Authority granted relief to the appellant, allowing consideration of their claim – NCLAT disagreed with the Adjudicating Authority’s view – Appellant’s contentions regarding the claim’s contingent nature, timeline under Section 12 of the IBC, and lack of awareness about the CIRP – Respondent No.1’s efforts to collate claims and the potential consequences of reopening claims after plan approval – Appeal dismissed. [Para 1-23]

Unconstitutionality of Legislative Provisions – Retrospective Application of Judicial Decisions: The Supreme Court declared Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 unconstitutional for violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The decision, made in the context of Article 20, applies retrospectively, rendering the provision non-existent from its inception in 2003. [Para 43]

Article 20 of the Constitution – Scope and Application: Article 20(1) of the Constitution, safeguarding against retrospective penal legislation, does not extend to procedural aspects leading to conviction or acquittal. The Supreme Court clarified that Article 20(1) solely concerns conviction and sentence, not encompassing procedural changes or pre-requisites like investigation or trial. [Para 35]

Distinction in Constitutional Interpretation – Pre- and Post-Constitution Laws: Distinguishing between pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws, the Supreme Court elucidated that while pre-Constitution laws inconsistent with fundamental rights are rendered ineffectual, post-Constitution laws contravening constitutional prohibitions are void ab initio. The distinction is crucial for understanding the applicability of constitutional amendments and the doctrine of eclipse in different contexts. [Para 42]

Doctrine of Eclipse – Inapplicability to Unconstitutional Laws: The doctrine of eclipse, which allows for the revival of pre-Constitution laws upon removal of constitutional inconsistencies, does not apply to laws declared unconstitutional post-Constitution. Such laws are considered "still-born" and cannot be revived by subsequent constitutional amendments. [Para 42]

Judicial Decisions on Constitutional Invalidity – Impact and Enforcement: When a law is declared unconstitutional, it is treated as non-existent from its inception. This principle applies regardless of whether the unconstitutionality arises from legislative incompetence or violation of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court emphasized that unconstitutional laws are void ab initio and non-enforceable for all intents and purposes. [Para 43]

Decision – The Supreme Court's declaration of Section 6A of the DSPE Act as unconstitutional applies retrospectively, invalidating the provision from its introduction in 2003. The cases are to be returned to the appropriate bench for merits consideration. [Para 45]