Criminal Law – Murder – Common Intention: The Supreme Court held that once the presence of the accused and his role of exhortation were established and proved, the High Court erred in acquitting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC. The High Court committed a grave error by doubting the involvement of the accused despite the consistent and trustworthy testimony of the eye-witnesses and the established motive​​.

Judicial Review – Acquittal – Evidence Evaluation: The High Court's acquittal was found to be based on conjectures and surmises, contrary to the evidence on record. The Supreme Court emphasized that the prosecution's case was supported by three eye-witnesses whose evidence was found reliable and consistent by both the Trial Court and the High Court, which upheld the conviction of the co-accused​​.

Common Intention – Section 34 IPC: The court reiterated that for the application of Section 34 IPC, the prosecution must prove that the criminal act was done in furtherance of the common intention of all accused. In this case, the common intention to murder was evident from the exhortation by the accused and the subsequent killing by his son, justifying the conviction under Section 302/34 IPC​​.

Decision: Appeal allowed – The judgment and order of the High Court acquitting the respondent No. 1 (original accused No. 2) were quashed and set aside. The conviction and life imprisonment sentence imposed by the Trial Court were restored. Respondent No. 1 was directed to surrender within four weeks to undergo life imprisonment​​

Civil Procedure Code – Order 7 Rule 11(d) – Rejection of Plaint: A party to a consent decree based on a compromise must challenge the compromise decree in the same court that recorded the compromise. A separate suit challenging the consent decree is not maintainable under Order 23 Rule 3A CPC. The Trial Court was justified in rejecting the plaint on the ground that the suit for the reliefs sought challenging the Compromise Decree would not be maintainable​​.

Clever Drafting – Avoidance of Legal Bar: The court reiterated that a party cannot circumvent a legal bar through clever drafting. If the clever drafting of the plaint creates the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest. The suit for reliefs that effectively challenge the Compromise Decree must be dismissed under Order 23 Rule 3A CPC​​.

Remand for Reconsideration: The High Court erred in not considering the maintainability of the suit and instead delved into the merits of the validity of the Compromise Decree. The proper course is to address the maintainability of the suit first, as the Trial Court correctly did by rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC​​.

Decision: Appeals allowed – The judgment and order passed by the High Court were quashed and set aside. The Trial Court's order rejecting the plaint was restored. The matter regarding the validity of the Compromise Decree is to be decided by the Court which passed the decree in an application under Order 23 Rule 3A CPC​​.

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – General and Omnibus Allegations: The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any specific role attributed to the accused-appellants, it would be unjust to subject them to trial. General and omnibus allegations without specificity do not warrant prosecution. The FIR was quashed, and the appeal allowed.

Misuse of Section 498A IPC – Matrimonial Disputes: The court highlighted concerns over the misuse of Section 498A IPC, noting the increased tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes without proper deliberation. False implication by general allegations must be discouraged to prevent abuse of legal process.

Judicial Precedents – Protection Against Vexatious Litigation: The decision references previous judgments emphasizing the need for caution in proceeding against distant relatives in matrimonial disputes. Prosecution based on non-specific and general allegations can lead to abuse of process and should be avoided.

Decision: Appeal allowed – The FIR No. 248/2019 dated 01.04.2019 against the appellants under Sections 341, 323, 379, 354, 498A read with Section 34 IPC was quashed. The judgment and order dated 13.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Patna were set aside.

Criminal Law – Penetrative Sexual Assault – Conviction of a 65-year-old accused for committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a four-year-old girl – Trial Court's judgment affirmed by High Court – Supreme Court rejects the appeal, upholding the application of Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act – Reducing the life sentence to fifteen years of rigorous imprisonment (RI) due to the accused's age and health condition [Paras 1-88].

Evidence Act – Testimony of Medical Expert – Reliance on deposition of PW-10, Dr. Vandana Sundriyal, who corroborated the victim’s account of the assault – Testimony deemed credible and substantial, supporting the conviction despite other witnesses turning hostile [Paras 57-61].

Legal Interpretation – Section 5(m) of POCSO Act – The act of inserting a finger into the victim’s vagina classified as penetrative sexual assault – The Court elaborated on the stringent application of the POCSO Act to protect children from sexual offences, emphasizing the seriousness of such crimes against minors [Paras 75-82].

Sentencing – Consideration of Mitigating Factors – Accused’s advanced age (70-75 years) and health issues (Tuberculosis) considered for reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to fifteen years RI – Court maintained that even in cases of severe crimes, mitigating factors must be taken into account for proportional sentencing [Paras 9.1-10.1].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Conviction under Sections 376(2)(i) IPC and 5/6 POCSO Act upheld – Sentence modified to fifteen years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50,000, of which Rs. 30,000 to be paid to the victim as compensation.

Insolvency Law – Admission of CIRP Application – NCLAT admitted the application under Section 9 of the IBC, based on additional documents taken on record during the final decision – Supreme Court held that admitting additional documents without providing adequate opportunity for the corporate debtor to respond was procedurally improper – The case was remanded to NCLT for reconsideration with directions to include the additional documents and provide adequate hearing opportunity [Paras 7-10].

Limitation – Acknowledgment of Debt – NCLT initially rejected the application as time-barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – NCLAT, considering new email exchanges as acknowledgments of debt, found the application to be within the limitation period – Supreme Court directed NCLT to reconsider the application in light of the new documents while ensuring procedural fairness [Paras 4-6, 8-9].

Procedural Fairness – Right to Respond – Emphasized the importance of providing a fair opportunity to respond to new evidence introduced at the appellate stage – Reinforced the need for due process in insolvency proceedings to ensure justice [Paras 7-8].

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – NCLAT’s order admitting the application under Section 9 of the IBC set aside – Case remanded to NCLT for reconsideration including new documents and providing adequate opportunity for response.

Constitutional Law – Article 14 – Negative Equality – Supreme Court reiterates that Article 14 does not envisage negative equality but only a positive aspect – Relief granted to a few individuals inadvertently or by mistake does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief – The principle of parity cannot be relied upon to perpetuate illegality or irregularity [Paras 24-25].

Service Law – Recruitment and Appointment – Appointment of ITI Helpers in TANGEDCO based on compromise terms – Supreme Court held that the compromise order was not based on merits and could not be treated as a binding precedent – Reiterated that appointments should be made based on legal provisions and not on concessions or compromises – Candidates who approached the court belatedly and sought parity based on the compromise order were not entitled to relief [Paras 20-21].

Judicial Precedent – Compromise Orders – The compromise order directed by the Division Bench of the High Court was binding only on the parties and did not have precedential value – Public employer's concession in a compromise cannot be the basis for extending similar benefits to others not party to the compromise [Paras 22-23].

Decision: Appeals by aggrieved candidates dismissed – Appeals by TANGEDCO allowed – Compromise order could not be treated as a precedent to grant relief to other candidates – No order as to costs.

Criminal Law – Default Bail – Right to Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC arises only if the charge-sheet has not been filed before the expiry of the statutory period – Supreme Court held that the filing of the charge-sheet within the stipulated period is sufficient compliance with Section 167(2) CrPC, and taking of cognizance is not material for this purpose – The High Court's decision to grant default bail based on non-taking of cognizance before the expiry of the statutory period was incorrect [Paras 9-10, 15].

Criminal Procedure Code – Indefeasible Right – The accused’s right to statutory bail under Section 167(2) CrPC ceases once the charge-sheet is filed within the statutory period – The custody of the accused continues with the Magistrate until cognizance is taken by the relevant court [Para 8].

Judicial Interpretation – Cognizance and Filing of Charge-Sheet – Clarified that the two stages (filing of charge-sheet and taking of cognizance) are distinct – Emphasized the continuity of custody from the Magistrate to the trial court upon filing of the charge-sheet [Paras 9-10].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court's order granting default bail set aside – The filing of the charge-sheet within the statutory period complied with the provisions of Section 167(2) CrPC, and the respondents were not entitled to default bail on the ground of non-taking of cognizance.

Banking Law – Liability for Fraud – The Post Office, like a bank, can be held liable for fraud or wrongs committed by its employees – Such acts of fraud by employees during their course of employment are binding on the bank/post office at the instance of the person damnified by the fraud – Acts of bank/post office employees being within their course of employment give a right to the appellants to legally proceed against the post office for injury caused [Paras 37-38].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Payment in Due Course – KVPs being bearer instruments require that payment must be made in 'due course' as defined under Section 10 of the NI Act – Payment to an agent without proper verification and identity proof does not satisfy 'payment in due course' – The Post Office's failure to follow procedural rules and instructions issued for the encashment of KVPs amounts to negligence, thus not constituting 'payment in due course' under Section 82(c) of the NI Act [Paras 16-17, 32-33].

Negligence – Contributory Negligence – The court found that the appellants were not guilty of contributory negligence – They acted under the belief that the Post Office would safeguard their interests and follow proper procedures – The Post Office's failure to adhere to established rules and procedures was the primary cause of the loss [Paras 34-35].

Decision: Appeals allowed – The respondents held jointly and severally liable to pay the maturity value of the KVPs as on the date of presentation for encashment, along with 7% simple interest per annum from the date of encashment until payment – Compensation of Rs. 1,00,000 and litigation costs of Rs. 10,000 awarded to the appellants – Payment to be made within eight weeks, failing which additional simple interest of 7% per annum will accrue on the compensation amount [Para 41].

Land Acquisition – Compensation for Injurious Affection and Severance – Supreme Court examined the legality of the award concerning the acquisition of a trolley line and related infrastructure – Held that the High Court erroneously denied compensation for rails and sleepers in the unacquired portion of land, affirming the Reference Court’s award under this head – Clarified that severance and injurious affection claims should be assessed based on the impact on the entire property, not just the acquired part [Paras 16, 45-47, 56-57].

Land Acquisition Act – Section 23 – Determining Compensation – Applied principles under Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, including market value, severance damage, and injurious affection – Emphasized the distinct evaluation of injurious affection to property (rails and sleepers) versus earnings (increased transportation costs) – Found sufficient evidence supporting the obsolescence of the trolley line and related infrastructure due to acquisition [Paras 30-36, 78-79].

Severance and Injurious Affection – Distinct Heads of Claim – Differentiated between severance (damage due to dividing land) and injurious affection (impact on remaining property and earnings) – Supreme Court upheld the Reference Court’s compensation for severance and injurious affection while rejecting claims not sufficiently evidenced or overlapping, such as increased transportation costs [Paras 42-46, 65-67, 76].

Decision: Appeals partly allowed – High Court’s judgment set aside regarding compensation for rails and sleepers in the unacquired portion – Reference Court’s award of Rs. 3,121,860/- towards compensation for rails and sleepers restored – Other claims, including increased transportation costs and rolling stock compensation, dismissed as unsupported by evidence or due to no actionable loss [Paras 79-80].