Limitation Act – Applicability to Carriage by Air Act – Rule 30 – Section 3 of the Limitation Act bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right unless expressly provided. Rule 30 of the Carriage by Air Act specifies a two-year limitation for bringing an action for damages, which the appellant argued should include exclusions under the Limitation Act. The court held that Rule 30 expressly excludes the Limitation Act’s provisions as per Section 29, confirming that the two-year period is absolute and not subject to suspension, interruption, or extension [Paras 2.2-2.4, 10-13].

Extinguishment of Right – Discusses how the Limitation Act provisions apply when the right itself is extinguished, referencing Sections 11 and 27 of the Limitation Act. This principle was upheld, ensuring that the right to claim damages under the Carriage by Air Act is extinguished after two years, emphasizing uniform interpretation in line with international conventions [Paras 12-13, 29-31].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Held that the suit filed by the appellant was barred by limitation under Rule 30 of the Second Schedule of the Carriage by Air Act 1972, as it was filed after the two-year period had expired. The High Court's judgment was upheld [Paras 7.1, 7.2, 9, 20-21].

Land Acquisition – Initiation of Proceedings – Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act – Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, the land acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act shall be deemed to have been initiated with the issuance and publication of the Section 4(1) notification in the official gazette – The Court emphasized that this interpretation aligns with the legislative intention of providing fair compensation while ensuring the continuation of public purpose projects [Paras 1-25].

Effect of Repeal – Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 – The Court reiterated that the repeal of the L.A. Act by the 2013 Act does not affect the initiation of land acquisition proceedings under the former Act as long as they are consistent with Section 24 of the 2013 Act – The combined effect of Section 24(1) and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act ensures that ongoing acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act continue under its provisions but with compensation determined according to the 2013 Act [Paras 3-6, 8].

Public Purpose and Compensation – Legislative Intention – The Court underscored the legislative intent behind the 2013 Act to ensure humane, participative, informed, and transparent land acquisition processes that provide just and fair compensation to affected families – The Court highlighted that the interpretation of 'initiation' under Section 24(1) should subserve these objectives [Paras 22-25].

Decision: Appeals allowed – The interpretation of 'initiated' for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act clarified as beginning with the issuance and publication of Section 4(1) notification under the L.A. Act – The Court set aside contrary views and aligned the interpretation with the legislative intent to balance public purpose with fair compensation to affected landowners [Paras 27-31].

Delhi School Education Rules 1973 - Rule 121 - Disciplinary Proceedings - The Tribunal's power to award back wages upon reinstatement of an employee was contested - High Court held that Rule 121 does not confer express power on the Tribunal to award back wages, limiting such power to the managing committee - Supreme Court analyzed the statutory provisions and concluded that the Tribunal does not have express power under Sections 8 and 11 of the Act to award back wages, which is within the purview of the managing committee under Rule 121 [Paras 1-34].

Express Power - Interpretation - Section 11(6) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, was scrutinized to determine if it confers express power on the Tribunal to decide on back wages - The Supreme Court found that while the Tribunal has the power to stay operation of the order appealed against, it lacks express authority to grant back wages, which is explicitly conferred on the managing committee under Rule 121 [Paras 10-24].

Judicial Review - Ultra Vires - The argument that Rule 121 is ultra vires Section 11 of the Act was examined - Supreme Court held that Rule 121 is not ultra vires, as it aligns with the legislative scheme and provides a coherent framework for addressing reinstatement and back wages, requiring the managing committee to decide on these matters post-reinstatement [Paras 25-36].

Decision: Appeal dismissed - High Court's interpretation upheld - Rule 121 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, was found to be intra vires, and the authority to award back wages remains with the managing committee, not the Tribunal - Tribunal's role limited to adjudicating the legality of termination orders, not deciding on pay and allowances during the period of absence [Paras 37-40].

Land Acquisition – Requirement of Scheme Sanction – Appellants challenged the acquisition of land by KHB without prior sanction of housing schemes under Section 24(2) of the KHB Act – High Court held that sanction of a housing scheme by the State Government is a condition precedent to land acquisition – Supreme Court examined the provisions of the KHB Act and L.A. Act to determine if acquisition could precede scheme sanction [Paras 1-50].

Public Purpose – Acquisition for Housing Board – Acquisition for KHB deemed to be for a public purpose under Section 33(2) of KHB Act – The term "public purpose" in the context of acquisition by KHB does not necessitate prior scheme sanction – Emphasis on the statutory mandate that execution of the scheme requires prior sanction but initiation of acquisition proceedings does not [Paras 30-41].

Procedural Validity – Acquisition Notification – Notification under Section 4 of L.A. Act – High Court’s decision based on procedural deficiencies in acquisition notification overturned – Supreme Court highlighted that prior sanction is required only for scheme execution, not for acquisition initiation – Acquisition for housing schemes by KHB can be initiated under L.A. Act provisions as modified by KHB Act [Paras 42-50].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court's orders set aside – Validity of land acquisition proceedings upheld – No requirement for prior sanction of housing schemes for initiating acquisition under Section 33(2) of KHB Act.

Criminal Law – Common Intention – Section 34 IPC – Appellants Sanjay Puran Bagde and Rajratna @ Nandu Bagde were convicted for holding the deceased while co-accused Manoj Puran Bagde and Puran Sakharam Bagde assaulted the deceased with axes – High Court reversed the trial court's acquittal, finding common intention based on their participation and presence at the crime scene with the intention to assist in the murder [Paras 1-6, 12-13].

Evidence – Eyewitness Testimony – Reliability – The testimony of PW-6, the wife of the deceased and an eyewitness, was found reliable by both the trial court and the High Court – Statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC were consistent – The appellants’ presence and participation in holding the deceased facilitated the fatal assault, indicating shared common intention [Paras 2-4, 9-11].

Judicial Review – Concurrent Findings – The Supreme Court emphasized the limited scope of interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless shown to be perverse or erroneous – The appellants' role in the crime supported the conclusion of shared common intention, justifying the High Court’s reversal of the acquittal [Paras 10-13].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court's judgment convicting the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC upheld – Appellants' role in facilitating the murder established shared common intention [Paras 13-14].

Corruption and Falsification of Accounts – Insufficient Evidence – Appellant, a public servant, was convicted for offences under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) read with Section 15 of the PC Act and Section 477A of IPC – Alleged manipulation of records and wrongful gain not supported by material evidence – Investigation revealed no criminal charges against the appellant – Conviction based on ignoring vital admissions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses [Paras 6-19].

Appreciation of Evidence – Perversity in Findings – Both Trial Court and High Court failed to appreciate relevant and vital admissions in the evidence – Findings recorded without considering material evidence amount to perversity – Scope of interference in concurrent findings of fact is limited but warranted in cases of manifest error or perverse findings [Paras 10-25].

Judicial Review – Concurrent Findings – Supreme Court’s authority to interfere in concurrent findings of fact when found to be perverse, based on no evidence, or leading to miscarriage of justice – Reappraisal of evidence justified when lower courts ignore material admissions affecting the outcome [Paras 20-24].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court's judgment and conviction set aside – Appellant acquitted of all charges – Bail bonds discharged [Paras 26-27].

Family Law – Right of Natural Guardian – Mother, as the only natural guardian after the father's death, has the right to decide the surname of her child and give the child in adoption – High Court's direction to restore the child's original surname was overturned – Mother's decision to change the surname to that of her new husband is valid and aligns with the child's best interests and social identity [Paras 6-11, 19].

Adoption and Surname – Legal Implications – Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, stipulates that an adopted child assumes the surname of the adoptive family – Adoption legally severs ties with the biological family, making the adoptive family the child's new family for all purposes – Judicial intervention in changing the surname without a specific prayer is improper [Paras 12-14].

Judicial Propriety – Relief Beyond Pleadings – Relief not sought in the pleadings should not be granted – High Court's direction to change the child's surname without a specific plea from the respondents is contrary to established legal principles and constitutes a miscarriage of justice [Paras 15-18].

Decision: Appeals allowed in part – High Court's directions to change the surname of the child set aside – Mother recognized as the sole natural guardian with the right to decide the surname and adoption of the child – Parties to bear their own costs [Paras 20-21].

Constitutional Law – Article 31C Protection – The State of Karnataka contended that Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, enjoys immunity under Article 31C of the Constitution – The High Court ruled that Article 31C protection was unavailable as the Act was enacted before the 44th Amendment – The Supreme Court emphasized the need to consider whether the Act’s provisions align with the objectives in Article 39(b) and are therefore protected by Article 31C [Paras 7-16].

Compensation – Determination Method – The method of calculating compensation as 300 times the property tax under Section 20 of the Act was challenged as being arbitrary and providing illusory compensation – The High Court declared Section 20 unconstitutional, requiring a market value-based compensation approach similar to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Supreme Court remanded the case to the High Court for detailed consideration of the constitutionality of Section 20 and the compensation method [Paras 7-25].

Procedural Aspects – Lapsing of Acquisition – Respondents argued the acquisition under the Act had lapsed due to the time elapsed since the initial notification – High Court ruled there was no provision for lapsing under the Act unlike the L.A. Act – Supreme Court directed the High Court to examine the procedural adequacy of the acquisition under Section 17 [Paras 2-6, 20-21].

Decision: Appeals disposed of – High Court's judgments set aside – Cases remanded to the High Court for reconsideration of constitutional validity of Section 20 and procedural compliance under Section 17 – Liberty granted to parties to amend pleadings and file further affidavits – High Court directed to expedite the hearing and decide expeditiously [Paras 21-25].

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – Section 14 – Possession of Secured Asset – Supreme Court held that the District Magistrate and Chief Metropolitan Magistrate as mentioned in Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act include Additional District Magistrate and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate – This interpretation ensures the timely disposal of applications under Section 14, fulfilling the Act's objective of expeditious recovery of secured assets [Paras 1-14].

Persona Designata – Section 14 of SARFAESI Act – The Court clarified that the District Magistrate and Chief Metropolitan Magistrate are not persona designata under Section 14 – The Additional District Magistrate and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate can exercise powers under this Section [Paras 3-6, 8].

Ministerial Functions – Nature of Powers – The powers exercised by the Magistrates under Section 14 are ministerial and do not involve any quasi-judicial functions – These powers can thus be exercised by the Additional Magistrates to facilitate the SARFAESI Act’s purpose [Paras 8-10].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – High Court's interpretation upheld that the terms "District Magistrate" and "Chief Metropolitan Magistrate" under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act include their respective Additional Magistrates – Ensures the objectives of the SARFAESI Act for expeditious possession and disposal of secured assets [Paras 12-14].