Motor Accident Claim – Motor Accident – Involvement of Car – Appeal against the dismissal of a claim for compensation – Appellants, the widow, minor child, and parents of the deceased, sought compensation after Ikhbal died in a road accident – Accident allegedly caused by the respondent's car when the deceased was overtaking a bus on his motorcycle – Trial court and High Court dismissed the claim on grounds that the car was not involved in the accident – Supreme Court, after examining evidence including witness testimonies and a Mahazar report showing damage to the car, held that the car was involved in the accident based on the preponderance of probability – Held: Appellants entitled to compensation of ₹46,31,496 with 9% interest [Paras 1-17].

Witness Testimony – Credibility of Witnesses – P.W. 2, the driver of the bus, testified that the accident involved the car hitting the motorcycle – P.W. 3, a nearby shopkeeper, also confirmed damage to the car – P.W. 6, an eyewitness, firmly stated the car hit the motorcycle and took the injured to the hospital – Courts below disbelieved P.W. 6 only because his statement was not recorded during the police investigation – Supreme Court found P.W. 6 trustworthy, holding that police oversight does not render credible testimony unreliable in motor accident cases [Paras 10-16].

Circumstantial Evidence – Damage to Car – Mahazar report noted damage to the front bumper, parking light, and grill of the car, indicating its involvement in the accident – Respondent's claim that the motorcycle skid independently was dismissed – The Supreme Court ruled that the damage corroborated the appellants' version of events, overturning the lower courts' findings [Paras 12-17].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Award of ₹46,31,496 with 9% interest granted to the appellants – Payment to be made within three months, failing which interest will increase to 12% – Respondents to bear their own costs [Paras 17-18].

Citizenship Law – Constitutionality of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, which provides for citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam, was challenged for violating various constitutional provisions – It was argued that Parliament lacked legislative competence to modify the citizenship provisions for a specific region like Assam without amending the Constitution – The Supreme Court upheld Parliament’s authority under Article 11 of the Constitution to legislate on matters of citizenship, noting that Articles 6 and 7 govern citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution, while Section 6A addresses later migrants – No conflict was found between Section 6A and Articles 6 and 7 [Paras 29-42].

Citizenship Law – Validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6A, arguing it violated the legislative competence of Parliament under Article 11 of the Constitution, and Articles 14, 29, and 355 – Section 6A provides special provisions for granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam, based on specific cut-off dates – The court upheld the validity of Section 6A, holding that the provision fell within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 11 and did not violate any constitutional provisions, including Article 14, as the classification of Assam and the cut-off date were rational and justified [Paras 12, 42-45, 72-75, 387-391].

Citizenship Law – Validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6A, arguing it violated the legislative competence of Parliament under Article 11 of the Constitution, and Articles 14, 29, and 355 – Section 6A provides special provisions for granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam, based on specific cut-off dates – The majority upheld the validity of Section 6A, holding that the provision fell within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 11 and did not violate any constitutional provisions, including Article 14, as the classification of Assam and the cut-off date were rational and justified – However, Justice J.B. Pardiwala dissented, arguing that Section 6A has become unconstitutional due to its "manifest arbitrariness" and temporal unreasonableness [Paras 12, 42-45, 72-75, 207-219].

Legislative Competence – Article 11 of the Constitution – Parliament's power to legislate on matters related to citizenship – Petitioners argued that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act altered the cut-off dates prescribed by Articles 6 and 7, thus requiring a constitutional amendment rather than parliamentary legislation – The majority held that Section 6A does not amend Articles 6 and 7, as those provisions only pertain to citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution, whereas Section 6A deals with post-Partition migration – Article 11 empowers Parliament to enact laws on citizenship beyond the scope of Articles 6 and 7, as Section 6A addresses a different time frame and context – In dissent, Justice Pardiwala argued that Section 6A's framework is flawed for lacking a clear temporal limit for its application [Paras 13, 29-31, 32-42, 208].

Article 14 – Equality before Law – Petitioners argued that Section 6A violates Article 14 by adopting arbitrary cut-off dates and singling out Assam – The majority held that the classification of Assam as a separate entity is based on the unique impact of migration in the region and the significant cultural, economic, and political challenges faced by the state due to the influx of migrants from Bangladesh – The cut-off date of March 25, 1971, was rational, linked to historical events, and had a reasonable nexus with the objective of regulating migration – However, Justice Pardiwala, in dissent, held that Section 6A has become arbitrary over time, especially due to the burden of detection being placed solely on the state, and the provision has led to continued illegal immigration [Paras 43-75, 207-215].

Cultural Identity – Article 29(1) – Petitioners argued that Section 6A infringes on the cultural identity of Assamese people by granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh – The majority found no violation of Article 29(1), stating that the provision balances the protection of Assamese cultural identity with humanitarian considerations for migrants – Justice Pardiwala also disagreed with the majority's stance, stating that Section 6A, lacking procedural safeguards like those in Articles 6 and 7, undermines Assamese identity through unchecked migration [Paras 387, 212].

External Aggression – Article 355 – Petitioners contended that undocumented immigration constitutes 'external aggression' under Article 355 and that Section 6A fails to curb such immigration – The majority rejected this argument, stating that the provision is in line with the legislative intent to regularize certain classes of migrants and is not in conflict with the State's duty under Article 355 to protect against external aggression – Justice Pardiwala, in dissent, emphasized that Section 6A's failure to stop illegal immigration into Assam is evidence of its ineffectiveness in addressing the concerns of external aggression [Paras 12(c), 387, 211].

Decision: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act upheld by the majority, but declared unconstitutional by dissenting opinion – The majority held that Section 6A is constitutionally valid and does not violate any provisions of the Constitution, including Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, or 355 – However, Justice Pardiwala's dissenting opinion argued that Section 6A suffers from temporal unreasonableness and has become unconstitutional due to its failure to curb illegal immigration effectively – The dissent also emphasized that Section 6A's flawed framework places an undue burden on the state and undermines Assamese cultural identity – Directions were issued for improved enforcement and monitoring of immigration laws post-1971 [Paras 387-393, 217-219].

Criminal Law – Conviction on Circumstantial Evidence – Acquittal – Circumstantial Evidence – Conviction based on the circumstantial evidence – Evidence found inadequate – The prosecution relied on the recovery of the murder weapon, blood-stained clothes, and CCTV footage. However, the Court found that the recovery of the hammer, supposedly used in the crime, was unreliable as it had been submerged in water for three days and yet allegedly retained blood stains. Additionally, the other recoveries were from areas accessible to the public, raising doubts. The appellant was not proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt as required by law for conviction based on circumstantial evidence [Paras 19-27].

Motive – Motive alone insufficient for conviction – The prosecution argued that the appellant had a motive due to a strained relationship with his wife and family, but the Court reiterated that motive alone, without substantive evidence, cannot form the basis of conviction [Para 27].

Recovery of Hammer – Lack of Corroboration – The prosecution presented the recovery of the hammer, allegedly used in the murders, based on the appellant’s statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act – The hammer was recovered from a canal, but its blood-stains were found improbable given the hammer had been submerged for three days – The recovery was also made in a public area accessible to many, further undermining its evidentiary value – Held: The recovery could not conclusively establish guilt [Paras 24-25].

Testimony of Sole Witness – Testimony of the injured witness, Madhusudhan Kulkarni, lacked credibility – His statement was recorded six days after the incident, despite being conscious and oriented at the time, and no corroboration from neighbors was presented. The Court ruled that his testimony could not be relied upon solely for conviction [Paras 17-18].

Acquittal – Appeal allowed – The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and set aside the convictions and death sentence, ordering the appellant's release [Paras 27-28].

Criminal Law – Discharge of Appellants – Abuse of Process of Law – Jurisdictional Court’s Decision – The jurisdictional Court exercised discretion under Section 245(2) Cr.P.C. to discharge the appellants, finding no grounds to proceed, given the concluded disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, which were carried out by appellants as officers of the Airports Authority of India under the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 – The Criminal Revision Application filed by the respondent challenging this Order was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge – However, the High Court, based solely on the charges of forgery and fabrication of documents, set aside both Orders and directed the complaint to proceed.

Departmental Proceedings – Tribunal and Writ Petition Outcome – The respondent, an employee of the appellants, faced departmental action leading to dismissal following an inquiry – Upon challenging this dismissal before the Industrial Tribunal, the Tribunal dismissed the dispute – The respondent’s subsequent Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court with a cost of Rs.1 lakh, and his Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court was also dismissed – Only after these failed attempts did the respondent initiate a criminal complaint as a counteraction against the disciplinary decisions .

Criminal Complaint and Misuse of Process – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Following the respondent's dismissal and subsequent litigation losses, he sought redress under Section 482 Cr.P.C., leading the High Court to permit approaching the jurisdictional Magistrate – The Magistrate, bypassing Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. requirements, directed police to register an FIR – Later, the Magistrate issued summons under Section 200 Cr.P.C. but ultimately chose not to proceed, an order subsequently set aside by the High Court – The appellants argued that the complaint constituted a misuse of legal processes, filed as retaliation for disciplinary actions taken in official capacity.

Protection Under Section 33 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 – Official Capacity – The appellants claimed protection under Section 33 of the Airports Authority of India Act, as the disciplinary actions were undertaken in their official capacity, with no personal stake in the property related to the respondent's employment – The disciplinary actions' conclusions should have influenced the criminal proceedings, as they directly pertain to the same issues – The Supreme Court observed that the appellants were merely performing their statutory duties.

High Court’s Hyper-Technical Approach – Appeal Allowed – The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's focus on the technicalities of the alleged forgery instead of assessing the substantive merits – The trial court's exercise of discretion under Section 245(2) Cr.P.C. was appropriate given the appellants’ official roles and lack of sufficient grounds to proceed with the complaint – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order, and quashed the proceedings against the appellants.

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – The appeal was allowed, and the impugned High Court judgment was set aside – All pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

Civil Law - Execution Proceedings – Maintainability of Objections – Code of Civil Procedure, Order XXI, Section 47 – The appellants contested the execution of a final decree in a partition suit, asserting co-sharer rights in the disputed property – Held: Under Section 47, objections to execution by co-sharers with existing possessory rights are maintainable; however, objections challenging a final decree without prior appeal are generally barred – Objections of the appellant were dismissed due to lack of grounds for modification of the decree [Paras 18-22, 40-42].

Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Applicability to Successor-in-Interest – Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Appellants, as successors to Mukand Singh, were bound by lis pendens under which transferees of property during pending litigation are subject to the court's final decision – Held: Objector’s ownership claim arising post-decree did not entitle him to obstruct execution; compliance with the final decree was required [Paras 28-30].

Executing Court’s Powers – Restraint on Modifying Decrees – Consistent with the well-established principle, the executing court is bound to enforce decrees as passed, without alteration – Held: No modification to the partition decree could be entertained by the executing court; appeals for modification were required to be made at the preliminary or final decree stages [Paras 31-35].

Decision: Appeal dismissed, upholding the executing court's directive to enforce the decree without modification.

Criminal Law – Murder – Death Sentence Commuted to Life Imprisonment Without Remission – The appellant was convicted of strangling his pregnant daughter due to her inter-caste marriage, a crime for which both the Trial Court and High Court imposed the death penalty – The Supreme Court, while affirming the conviction under Sections 302, 316, and 364 IPC, commuted the death sentence to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment without remission – The Court considered mitigating factors, including the appellant’s poor socio-economic background, absence of criminal antecedents, satisfactory prison conduct, and medical conditions, including cognitive impairment due to a stroke suffered in prison [Paras 29-33].

Rarest of Rare Doctrine – Mitigating Circumstances Considered – The Court reiterated the principle that death penalty should be reserved for the “rarest of rare” cases, where the possibility of reformation is absent – In the present case, the Court found that despite the gravity of the crime, there was a potential for reformation, especially given the appellant’s personal circumstances and health conditions, and thus opted for a "middle path" approach, converting the death sentence to a fixed term of 20 years without remission [Paras 24-31].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – The conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC and related charges under Sections 316 and 364 IPC was upheld, but the death penalty was commuted to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment without eligibility for remission [Para 33].

Taxation Law - Royalty vs. Tax – Distinction between Royalty and Tax – The appellants argued that the demand was not a tax but a royalty agreed to between the parties for the right to display advertisements. The Supreme Court held that royalty and tax are distinct concepts; royalty is a payment for the privilege to use land or property, whereas a tax is a sovereign imposition. The court reiterated that the demand by the Patna Municipal Corporation was not a tax but royalty agreed upon for advertising rights [Paras 34-42].

Legislative Authority – Absence of Regulations – The respondents challenged the imposition of fees, arguing that no regulations were framed under the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007, to authorize the levy of taxes or fees on advertisements. The court ruled that while regulations under Section 147 are required for the imposition of taxes, the royalty charged in this case was pursuant to an agreement between the parties, not under statutory provisions. Therefore, the absence of regulations did not invalidate the demand [Paras 48-56].

Penalty for Non-Payment – Absence of Statutory Backing – The court found that while the corporation could charge interest on delayed payments as compensation, the imposition of a penalty for non-payment had no statutory backing. The penalty imposed by the corporation was thus quashed, but interest could be charged for late payments [Paras 65-69].

Decision:

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s judgment of the Patna High Court and upheld the imposition of royalty by the Patna Municipal Corporation. However, the penalty for non-payment was quashed, and the corporation was allowed to charge simple interest at 6% per annum on delayed payments.

E-Auction Sale – Issuance of Sale Certificate – Readiness to pay balance auction amount – Respondents were highest bidders in an e-auction and had deposited 25% of the sale price, but the bank refused to accept the balance amount or issue a sale certificate, citing various reasons, including an advisory by the Enforcement Directorate (ED). The High Court held that the refusal was unjustified as there was no directive from CBI or ED against the auction. Held: The bank's refusal to accept the balance amount and issue the sale certificate was unwarranted, and the sale certificate must be issued after receiving the balance auction amount [Paras 4-10].

Rule 9(4), Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 – Extension of Time – The period for depositing the balance auction amount, while prescribed under Rule 9(4), is not sacrosanct and can be extended by mutual agreement in writing. The bank’s refusal and delay in accepting the balance amount implied consent for an extension, and hence no default could be attributed to the respondents under Rule 9(4) [Paras 13-16].

Natural Justice – Unilateral Cancellation – The bank’s cancellation of the auction sale without notice or an opportunity for the respondents to be heard was held to be a violation of natural justice principles. Such unilateral cancellation was deemed illegal [Para 20].

Article 142 – Supreme Court’s Power – Extension of statutory time – The Court clarified that while Article 142 does not override statutory provisions, Rule 9(4) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules permits an extension of time with mutual consent in writing, and hence the bank’s reliance on statutory timelines was misplaced [Paras 21-22].

Auction Sale Validity – High Court’s Order Affirmed – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision directing IDBI Bank to issue the sale certificate and accept the balance sale consideration within four weeks, as no fault was found with the respondents' conduct [Paras 22-23].

Auction Sale – Cancellation by Bank – Non-Issuance of Sale Certificate – The appellant bank conducted an auction where the respondents were the highest bidders. After the auction was confirmed, the bank failed to issue the sale certificate, citing the respondents’ delay in paying the balance sale consideration. The respondents challenged the cancellation, asserting they were willing to pay the amount but were obstructed by the appellant's actions. The court held that the bank’s unilateral cancellation was not justified, particularly since the bank had delayed accepting the balance amount due to internal reasons, including a complaint to the CBI and an advisory from the ED – Auction upheld, cancellation set aside [Paras 5-12].

Interpretation of Rule 9(4) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 – Time for Payment Not Sacrosanct – The court clarified that Rule 9(4), which provides 15 days to pay the balance sale consideration, is not absolute. The time can be extended by agreement between the parties. In this case, the delay in payment was not the respondents’ fault but due to the bank's failure to accept the balance within the stipulated time. Therefore, Rule 9(4) did not apply to declare the respondents as defaulters [Paras 15-18].

Principles of Natural Justice – Unilateral Cancellation Without Hearing – The cancellation of the auction by the bank was made without notice or an opportunity of hearing, violating the principles of natural justice. Such cancellation was held to be illegal [Para 23].

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court's decision, directing the bank to issue the sale certificate and execute the sale deed in favor of the respondents upon payment of the balance sale amount within four weeks. The cancellation of the auction was declared illegal, and the respondents were entitled to the property.