Right to Information – Article 19(1)(a) – Fundamental right recognised – subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) – Court affirms that the right to information is a facet of freedom of speech and expression – international instruments (UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR) noted – but the right is not absolute and yields to security and public interest exceptions – Held: Right to information fundamental but circumscribed by Article 19(2) [Paras 45–48, 55–57, 59–62].

Atomic Energy Act, 1962 – Section 18 – Restriction on disclosure – Validity – Intra vires – Provision contains intelligible criteria specifying the class of information and fields (plants, processes, methods) where disclosure may be restricted – sufficient guidance gleaned from the statute’s preamble, scheme and Sections 3, 16, 17, 23, 27 – presumption of constitutionality applies – Held: Section 18 neither unguided nor overbroad – a reasonable restriction in the interest of national security and public safety [Paras 35–44].

AERB Report – Plea for disclosure – National security sensitivity – Court notes report classified ‘Secret’ under Order dated 04/02/1975 issued under Section 18(1) – affidavits show the 130 “issues” are technical safety items across four categories with agreed action plans and ongoing oversight – disclosure risks reverse engineering of strategic capability and sabotage – existing public domain disclosures via AERB newsletters/annual reports considered adequate – Held: No direction to disclose – classification and non-disclosure sustained [Paras 2–12, 34, 64–66, 80–81].

Evidence Act – Sections 123 and 162 – Privilege for affairs of State – Balancing test – Court reiterates two-step inquiry: whether the unpublished document relates to affairs of State and whether disclosure would injure public interest – court—not the executive—ultimately balances competing aspects of public interest in justice and secrecy – class claims possible but never absolute – Applied to facts, privilege upheld over AERB report [Paras 67–79].

Judicial Review – Scope under Article 136 – Limited in matters of State security and privilege – absent mala fides, extraneous considerations, or irrationality, courts defer to statutory classification and privilege claims – Offer to produce report in sealed cover noted but perusal found unnecessary – Held: No ground to interfere with High Court’s refusal [Paras 66, 80].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – Section 18 of the Atomic Energy Act upheld – claim of privilege sustained – no disclosure directed – no order as to costs [Para 81].

Insurance and Motor Accident Claims – Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Liability of insurer towards third parties clarified – Supreme Court held that Chapter XI is social welfare legislation – Mere absence, expiry, fake or learner’s licence cannot by itself absolve insurer from liability – Insurer must first satisfy third-party award and can recover from the insured only upon proving wilful breach of policy condition – Special Leave Petitions dismissed – Principle reaffirmed that statutory liability to third parties is paramount [Paras 14-21, 44-47, 69-73, 100-107].

Driving Licence – “Duly Licensed” vs. “Effective Licence” – Sections 3 and 149 – Distinction recognized – A licence under renewal grace period remains valid – Learner’s licence is also a licence under the Act – Driving under learner’s licence does not absolve insurer from liability [Paras 38-43, 89-90].

Fake Licence – Burden of Proof – Section 149(2)(a)(ii) – Fake licence amounts to no licence – However, insurer must prove insured’s knowledge or wilful breach – Where insured appointed a driver bona fide, insurer liable to third party – Defence under Section 149(2) strictly limited [Paras 47-49, 65-67, 88, 95-97].

Fundamental Breach – Policy Conditions – Rule of Main Purpose – Minor technical breaches (e.g., medical certificate, driver’s age) not directly causing accident cannot defeat third-party claim – Only fundamental breaches contributing to the accident allow recovery by insurer from insured [Paras 85-86].

Jurisdiction of Tribunal – Sections 165 & 168 – Claims Tribunal competent to decide inter se disputes between insurer and insured while adjudicating claims – Tribunal may direct insurer to satisfy award first and then recover from owner or driver – Recovery enforceable under Section 174 as arrears of land revenue [Paras 87, 103, 106(ix)-(x)].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – Insurer directed to satisfy all awards in favour of third-party claimants with liberty to recover from owners/drivers on proof of breach – Consistent line of authority maintained under doctrine of stare decisis [Paras 100-107].

Judicial Service Law – Pay Revision – Assistant Registrars – Writ of Mandamus – Jurisdiction of Chief Justice of High Court – Scope of Article 229 of Constitution – Approval Requirement – Judicial Review

Mandamus – Issuance Against Union of India – High Court directed Union of India to revise pay scale of Assistant Registrars from Rs. 2000-3500 to Rs. 3000-4500 – Held: Mandamus can be issued only when there is a legal duty – Chief Justice of High Court under Article 229(2) has authority to recommend pay revisions, subject to Presidential approval – However, approval is not a mere formality but a constitutional requirement [Paras 1, 6, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 29, 30].

Service Conditions – Fixation of Pay – High Court relied on report of Committee appointed by Chief Justice and equated Assistant Registrars with Private Secretaries and Court Masters – Pay revision proposed to maintain promotional hierarchy – Court held that disparity in pay structure affects morale and efficiency – Chief Justice rightly exercised power under Article 229(2) – Recommendation ought to have been treated with due respect and prompt consideration [Paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 40, 41, 42].

Merger of Posts – Argument by Union that posts of Assistant Registrar and feeder cadre were merged post-IV Pay Commission rejected – Court held that promotion rules remained unchanged – Thus, posts cannot be deemed to have merged solely based on similar pay scales [Paras 3, 4, 38].

Judicial Review – Scope – Court reiterated that judicial review extends to ensure performance of statutory and constitutional duties – Recommendations of Chief Justice not to be arbitrarily denied – Court emphasized that High Court should ordinarily not issue writ of mandamus directly fixing pay scale – Should instead direct reconsideration by authorities with proper guidance [Paras 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 25, 35, 55, 56].

Judicial Restraint – High Court should exercise caution before issuing writ interfering with executive domain of pay fixation – Intervention justified only in exceptional circumstances – Primary role lies with executive subject to constitutional boundaries [Paras 26, 27, 34, 36, 37, 55, 56].

Chief Justice's Powers – Chief Justice of High Court has constitutional authority to recommend and frame rules for pay scales of High Court staff – Approval of President/Governor necessary but should not be denied arbitrarily – Merger or alteration of promotional hierarchy cannot be unilaterally determined by executive [Paras 10, 38, 39, 43, 44, 45].

Delay and Administrative Apathy – Union failed in its constitutional obligation to respond to recommendations of Chief Justice – Court criticized inaction and apathy in addressing the legitimate pay revision issue – Held such neglect defeats the purpose of Article 229 and affects institutional independence [Paras 47, 48, 49, 50, 54].

Conclusion – Despite procedural infirmity in direct issuance of mandamus by High Court, Supreme Court declined to interfere due to prolonged pendency and factual background – Pay parity already extended to Private Secretaries – Held not a fit case to exercise discretionary jurisdiction – Appeal dismissed [Paras 52, 53, 54, 57, 58].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – No order as to costs – Supreme Court refrained from interfering due to long-standing implementation and equity considerations – Reiterated proper process under Article 229 and judicial restraint in mandamus issuance.

Criminal Law – Rape – Acquittal reversed – Sensitivity in adjudication – Delay explained – Medical opinion not decisive – Prior sexual history irrelevant – Section 228A anonymity – The High Court acquitted the accused of rape (Section 376 IPC) citing delay, alleged contradictions, “habituation,” and lack of maid-servant proof – Held: Delay was satisfactorily explained; medical observations on “habituation” or absence of injuries weeks later cannot discredit a cogent victim’s account; victim’s prior sexual history is immaterial; courts must protect victim identity (Section 228A) and approach sexual crimes with sensitivity under Article 21 – Appeal allowed; trial court conviction and sentence restored; accused to surrender [Paras 1–3, 9–13, 15–17].

Delay in FIR – Not fatal when satisfactorily explained – Delay places court on guard but is not a ritual basis to discard prosecution – Explanation (illness of father; social stigma in rural setting) accepted – High Court erred in treating non-reporting to “respectables/police” as suspicious [Paras 9–10].

Medical evidence vs. ocular testimony – Hypothetical/“opinionative” remarks (two-finger test; possible prior intercourse) do not negate a specific incident of rape – Examination after ~3 weeks explains absence of injuries – Courts must not over-privilege speculative medical opinion over credible victim testimony [Paras 11–12, 15].

Prior sexual history – Legally irrelevant – Even if previously sexually active, the prosecutrix retains autonomy; the issue is whether the accused committed rape on the occasion – Victim is not on trial; the accused is [Para 13].

Victim’s testimony – No accomplice rule – Prosecutrix stands higher than an injured witness (harm is physical and psychological) – Corroboration not a rule of law; at most, courts may look for assurance if they find difficulty accepting the account at face value [Para 14].

Victim anonymity – Section 228A IPC – Even though judgments can be reported, courts should avoid disclosing identity to prevent social victimization; neutral descriptors preferred (e.g., “victim”) [Para 3; see also Puttaraja].

Appellate standards – Acquittal based on irrelevant/insignificant circumstances or conjectural doubts cannot stand – Unmerited acquittals harm societal interests; reasonable doubt must be truly reasonable, not speculative [Para 16].

Decision – Appeal allowed – High Court acquittal set aside – Trial court conviction and sentence restored – Accused to surrender to serve remainder of sentence [Para 17].

Rape – Reversal of Acquittal – Section 376 IPC – Conviction Restored – The State of Punjab filed an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution challenging the High Court’s acquittal of the respondent who had been convicted by the trial court under Section 376 IPC – Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in discarding the prosecution’s case based on delay in lodging the FIR and irrelevant interpretation of medical opinion – Victim’s testimony was found credible and delay justified – Conviction and sentence of 7 years RI restored – Respondent directed to surrender – Held: Acquittal was unjustified and contrary to settled legal principles and social realities [Paras 4-5, 9-10, 13, 16-17].

Delay in Lodging FIR – Justified by Circumstances – High Court Erred - FIR lodged after 17–18 days was properly explained by victim’s family due to father’s illness and societal concerns – High Court’s view that such delay created suspicion was held to be unjustified and irrational – Held: In cases of sexual assault, delay must be viewed with sensitivity and contextually, not mechanically [Paras 4-5, 9-10].

Medical Evidence – Prior Sexual History Irrelevant – Victim’s Testimony Credible - High Court’s reliance on doctor’s observation of victim’s habituation to sexual activity was erroneous – Supreme Court held prior sexual experience does not negate lack of consent in present incident – Victim’s testimony need not be corroborated if found trustworthy – Held: Court must focus on the act complained of, not victim’s character [Paras 11-13].

Identity of Victim – Section 228A IPC – Judicial Sensitivity Required - Though disclosure ban under Section 228A IPC does not apply to Supreme Court or High Court judgments, the Court emphasized the need to avoid naming victims to prevent social victimization – Victim referred to anonymously in the judgment – Held: Courts must lead by example in maintaining victim dignity [Para 3].

Role of Courts – Unmerited Acquittals Harm Society – Sensitivity in Rape Cases Essential - Supreme Court observed that courts must not lean towards acquittal on minor technicalities or unwarranted doubts in rape cases – Emphasized duty to protect rights and dignity of women and minors – Held: A socially sensitized judge is better than layers of penal clauses – Conviction by trial court rightly upheld [Paras 14, 16-17].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s judgment of acquittal set aside – Conviction under Section 376 IPC and sentence of 7 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,000/- imposed by the Trial Court restored – Respondent directed to surrender forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence, if any.

Criminal Law – Murder – Sections 302, 460, and 380 IPC - Circumstantial Evidence – Standard of Proof – Conviction Set Aside – Appellants were convicted of murder, house trespass, and theft based solely on circumstantial evidence—Supreme Court found key links in the prosecution chain—such as re-employment and recovery—either not proved or unreliable—Held: Circumstances relied upon by prosecution not proved beyond reasonable doubt—Conviction set aside. Acquittal [Paras 1, 13].

Evidence – Recovery of Stolen Property – Serious Procedural Contradictions – Recovery Disbelieved – Prosecution claimed jewellery stolen from deceased's home was recovered from appellants’ jhuggis—However, inconsistencies in witness testimonies, hostile panch witness, and conflict in timing of recovery and deposit at Malkhana created serious doubt—Held: Recovery not proved credibly—Cannot form basis for conviction under Section 302 or even 380 IPC [Paras 12–13].

Criminal Procedure – Examination under Section 313 CrPC – Failure to Put Incriminating Circumstance – Material Prejudice – Prosecution relied on appellant’s alleged re-employment as servant to establish access and motive—Supreme Court held this was a crucial circumstance but was never put to the accused during Section 313 examination—Held: Failure to do so caused prejudice—Circumstance excluded from consideration [Paras 8–9].

Evidence – Fingerprints Found on Article – Not Incriminating – Appellant Previously Employed in Victim’s House – Prosecution relied on fingerprints found on toffee tin in deceased's house—Supreme Court held that as accused had earlier worked in the house, this evidence was neutral and not incriminating—Held: Fingerprint evidence does not support conviction [Para 8].

Criminal Law – Sole Reliance on Recovery – Whether Sufficient for Conviction for Murder – Doubt Expressed – Court considered previous judgments on whether conviction for murder can rest solely on recovery—Held: Though some precedents allow it, where recovery itself is doubtful or uncorroborated, such conviction cannot be sustained—Prosecution failed to prove chain of circumstances [Paras 10–11].

Final Decision – Appeals Allowed – Conviction and Sentences Set Aside – Accused Acquitted – Supreme Court allowed the appeals and acquitted all accused persons—Held: Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt—Appellants directed to be released forthwith unless required in any other case [Para 13].

Criminal Law - Preventive Detention – Scope of Judicial Review – Article 226 and 32 of the Constitution – Interference Refused – The appellant challenged the detention order dated 14.09.1995 under Section 12 of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act on the ground that the District Magistrate lacked authority and the detention was politically motivated – Held: Scope of interference with detention orders at pre-execution stage is extremely limited – The five exceptions laid down in Alka Subhash Gadia do not apply – The appellant failed to show mala fide, want of jurisdiction, or vagueness in grounds – Court declined to interfere prior to execution of detention order [Paras 1, 5, 7, 9, 10].

Delegation of Authority – Validity of Detention Order – Section 12(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act – Delegation Upheld – The appellant contended that the detention order was invalid as the notification cited in the order was not in force – Held: The District Magistrate was duly empowered under a valid notification operative at the time of passing the detention order – Mere incorrect reference to an earlier notification does not vitiate the order when power in fact existed – Challenge to authority rejected [Paras 2, 8].

Delay in Execution – Absconding Detenu – Effect on Detention Order – Order Remains Valid – Appellant’s plea that delay rendered the detention order stale was rejected – Court observed that the appellant had evaded service of the order and employed dilatory tactics, including filing and withdrawing multiple petitions – Detention order does not lapse merely because of non-execution due to evasion – Absconding detenu cannot benefit from his own wrong [Paras 4, 12].

Preventive Detention – Principles and Rationale – Judicial Discretion – Preventive Nature Highlighted – The Court elaborated on the distinction between preventive and punitive detention – Reaffirmed that preventive detention is anticipatory and discretionary, aimed at preventing prejudicial acts rather than punishing past conduct – The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, unless shown to be malafide or ultra vires, is not open to review [Paras 6, 7].

Precedent – Alka Subhash Gadia – Application Reaffirmed – Exceptions Limited – The Court reaffirmed that Alka Subhash Gadia outlines exhaustive grounds for pre-execution challenge to detention – Plea that exceptions are illustrative was rejected – Current case did not fall under any permissible category – No material to support allegations of mala fide or irrelevant grounds [Paras 7, 10].

Final Decision – Appeal Dismissed – No Ground for Pre-Execution Interference – The Court held that appellant must surrender to have his representation considered – No exceptional circumstances warranting interference before detention order is executed – Appeal found to be meritless and dismissed [Paras 13-14].

NDPS Act – Possession of Acetic Anhydride – Sections 9A/25A, 29 – Respondent found with 880 litres of Acetic Anhydride concealed in Kotha – Convicted and sentenced by Trial Court to 10 years RI with fine of ₹1,00,000/- on each count – High Court upheld conviction but reduced sentence to 6 ½ years (period undergone) and fine to ₹25,000/- on each count – Held: Reduction of sentence unsustainable – NDPS offences have devastating impact on society – Volume of contraband sufficient to yield nearly 300 kg of heroin – Absence of “habitual offender” status irrelevant – Stringent punishment necessary – Trial Court sentence restored [Paras 3-6, 18, 26].

Sentencing – Discretion of Courts – Scope – Discretion in sentencing must be exercised judicially and in accordance with law, not on irrelevant considerations such as family hardship – For NDPS offences, proportionality principle requires punishment commensurate with enormity of crime and its societal impact – Leniency amounts to misplaced sympathy and undermines deterrence – High Court misdirected itself in exercising discretion [Paras 9-15, 19-24].

Criminal Law – Proportionality – Offence under NDPS Act more heinous than culpable homicide – While homicide affects individual, drug trafficking corrodes society and economy – Exemplary punishment required to reflect public abhorrence and societal interests – Courts must respond to society’s cry for justice and avoid undermining faith in rule of law [Paras 16-18].

Decision – Appeal allowed – High Court order reducing sentence set aside – Sentence awarded by Trial Court (10 years RI with fine of ₹1,00,000/- on each count and default stipulation) restored – Respondent directed to surrender to custody – No order as to costs [Para 26].

Liquor Trade – Constitutional Validity Of “Import Fee” - Exclusive Privilege – Res Extra Commercium – Article 301 Inapplicable – State Monopoly Upheld – Liquor is res extra commercium and no fundamental right to trade in it – State has absolute privilege to regulate, prohibit or permit trade – Import fee imposed as part of exclusive privilege is valid – Article 301 has no application to liquor trade – Majority view [Paras 104, 208, 241–243, 256–257, 368].

Import Fee – Nature of Levy – Licence Fee versus Tax – Distinction Recognised – Import fee is not excise duty but a regulatory/privilege fee under Entries 8 and 66 of List II – Consideration for parting with State’s exclusive right – Held not to offend Article 304(a) – Majority view [Paras 238–243, 256–257].

Equality Clause – Article 14 – Applicability in Liquor Licensing – Article 14 applies to State action in granting liquor privileges – State must act fairly and reasonably – But equality cannot convert privilege fee into a tax – Majority view [Paras 240–241].

Res Extra Commercium – Minority/Dissent View – Justice S.B. Sinha dissenting – Res extra commercium doctrine has no role in judging constitutionality – Once trade is permitted, Articles 14, 19 and 301–304 apply – Import fee is in substance a tax and not a privilege fee – Levy beyond countervailing duty violates Article 304(a) and Article 265 – Dissent [Paras 119–127, 146–153, 286–294, 366].

Countervailing Duty – Compensatory Tax – Validity of Import Fee – Dissenting view: Only excise duty or countervailing duty can be levied under Entry 51 – Import fee has no statutory sanction – Unless compensatory, levy is unconstitutional – Refund with 15% interest directed – Dissent [Paras 118–127, 151–153, 286–294].

Precedent – Kalyani Stores Binding – No Per Incuriam Disregard – Constitution Bench in Kalyani Stores applied Article 301 to liquor trade – Binding on coordinate benches – Cannot be disregarded as per incuriam or sub silentio – Dissent emphasised judicial discipline [Paras 359–365].

Decision – By majority (Chief Justice, R.C. Lahoti, Dr. A.R. Lakshmanan, B.N. Agrawal, JJ.): Civil Appeal No. 3017 of 1997 (Punjab) allowed; Civil Appeal Nos. 2696–2697 of 2003 (Kerala) dismissed; no order as to costs – By dissent (S.B. Sinha, J.): Punjab appeal dismissed; Kerala appeals allowed with direction to refund imposts with 15% interest within three months [Paras 153–155, 368].