Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - The Appellant challenged the order of the Calcutta High Court which upheld the decision of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal directing reinstatement of the Respondent after his acquittal in a criminal case. The Supreme Court held that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle reinstatement in service if the charges in disciplinary proceedings are substantiated. The Court emphasized the distinction between criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings, noting that the standards of proof differ. [Paras 14-16]

Honourable Acquittal - Meaning and Scope - The Supreme Court clarified that an honourable acquittal is different from an acquittal based on benefit of doubt. In this case, the Respondent was acquitted due to the inability to establish identity during the Test Identification Parade (TI Parade), not because he was proven innocent beyond doubt. Therefore, the acquittal was not considered honourable, and the disciplinary action was upheld. [Paras 13-14]

Police Regulations - Effect of Acquittal on Departmental Punishment - The Supreme Court referred to Regulation 4 of the Police Regulations of Calcutta 1968, which states that acquittal or discharge in a criminal proceeding shall not bar departmental punishment for the same cause. This regulation supports the continuation of disciplinary action despite the acquittal in criminal proceedings. [Para 17]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Reinstatement Not Automatic - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Tribunal and the High Court. The Court held that reinstatement is not automatic upon acquittal in a criminal case and must be considered in light of the findings of disciplinary proceedings. The Respondent's dismissal from service was upheld. [Paras 17-18]

Criminal Law - Compounding of Offences - Scope and Limits - The Appellant challenged the High Court’s order acquitting the Respondents by accepting a compromise in a case involving non-compoundable offences under Section 307 IPC. The Supreme Court held that Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable, and the High Court erred in acquitting the Respondents based on a compromise between the parties. The Court emphasized that offences under Section 307 IPC are crimes against society, not just individuals, and cannot be compounded. [Paras 8-12, 14]

Judicial Review - High Court's Powers under Section 482 CrPC - The Supreme Court clarified that the High Court's power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings based on a compromise is distinct from compounding offences under Section 320 CrPC. The inherent power of the High Court must be exercised with due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its impact on society. The High Court's decision was found to be an erroneous exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC. [Paras 8-9, 14-15]

Nature of Offences - Public Interest and Societal Impact - The Court reiterated that serious offences, especially those under Section 307 IPC, affect the societal order and public interest. Such offences cannot be settled privately between the parties, as they have broader implications for society. The Court highlighted the necessity of upholding the integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring that serious crimes are appropriately punished. [Paras 10, 15]

Decision - Appeal Allowed - High Court’s Order Set Aside - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court. The case was remanded to the High Court with directions to decide the appeal on merits within six months. The Court stressed the importance of addressing the merits of the case rather than relying on a compromise for offences that are non-compoundable by law. [Paras 16]

Criminal Law - Circumstantial Evidence - Standards of Proof - The Appellants challenged the affirmation of their death sentence and convictions based on circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court held that for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of evidence must be complete and point unequivocally to the guilt of the accused, excluding any hypothesis of innocence. The facts must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. [Paras 6-7]

Discrepancies in Evidence - Assessment - The Appellants contended discrepancies in witness testimonies. The Supreme Court reiterated that minor discrepancies which do not affect the core of the prosecution's case should not lead to outright rejection of evidence. The evidence must be read in totality to assess its reliability. [Paras 8-9]

Independent Witnesses - Recovery Witnesses - The Appellants argued that only police personnel were made recovery witnesses. The Supreme Court noted that while independent witnesses are preferred, the evidence of police personnel can be accepted if it inspires confidence and corroborates other evidence. The absence of independent witnesses is not fatal if the evidence is otherwise reliable. [Paras 10-11]

Last Seen Theory - Burden of Explanation - The Supreme Court emphasized that when the accused were last seen with the deceased, it becomes their duty to explain the circumstances under which the death occurred. Failure to provide a plausible explanation can reinforce the prosecution's case. [Paras 15-16]

Death Sentence - 'Rarest of Rare' Doctrine - The Court reviewed the application of the death penalty, affirming that it should only be imposed in the 'rarest of rare' cases where the crime is extremely brutal, diabolical, and shocks the collective conscience of society. The facts of this case did not meet this threshold. [Paras 18-20]

Decision - Appeals Partly Allowed - Death Sentence Commuted - The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment for 30 years without remission. The Court emphasized the need for proportionality and the consideration of mitigating factors alongside the gravity of the crime. [Paras 20-21]

Service Law - Pension Calculation - Inclusion of Non-Practicing Allowance (NPA) - The Appellants, retired doctors, challenged the denial of inclusion of NPA in their pension calculation. The Supreme Court held that NPA should be included in the calculation of pension for doctors who retired before 01.01.1996, aligning with the principle that pensioners form a homogeneous class and should not face arbitrary discrimination based on the date of retirement. [Paras 3, 5-6, 22, 30]

Equal Treatment - Non-Discrimination in Pension Benefits - The Supreme Court observed that denying the inclusion of NPA for pre-1996 retirees while allowing it for post-1996 retirees violates the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that pension schemes should ensure parity among all retirees to prevent discriminatory treatment. [Paras 22-23, 29]

Government Policy - Binding Nature of Decisions and Clarifications - The Court reviewed the various Office Memorandums (O.M.) and found that the exclusion of NPA by the O.M. dated 29.10.1999 was inconsistent with earlier policy decisions which included NPA in pension calculations. The decision to withdraw the appeal against the Delhi High Court's order in Dr. K.C. Garg's case and the implementation of that order further supported the Appellants' claims. [Paras 8-12, 28]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Inclusion of NPA in Pension Calculation - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Delhi High Court. The Court directed the Respondents to re-calculate the pension by including NPA and to complete this process within three months. [Paras 33]

Service Law - Promotion and Re-designation - Recruitment by Transfer - The Appellant, a Junior Engineer (Electrical) in the Tamil Nadu Public Works Department, challenged the practice of re-designated Assistant Engineers being empanelled for promotion to Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical) against the 25% quota reserved for the Subordinate Engineering Service. The Supreme Court held that re-designation of diploma-holder Junior Engineers as Assistant Engineers upon acquiring a degree qualification did not constitute recruitment by transfer within the meaning of the Special Rules applicable to the State Engineering Service. [Paras 6-7, 13]

Equal Treatment - Promotion Quotas and Lien - The Supreme Court observed that an officer cannot hold lien in two different cadres simultaneously and cannot be considered for promotion in both channels. The practice of considering re-designated Assistant Engineers for promotion against both the 25% quota for Subordinate Service and 75% quota for State Service was found to be legally unsustainable. [Paras 12-14, 21]

Judicial Precedent - Principles of Promotion and Upgradation - The Court referred to principles established in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. R. Santhakumari Velusamy and Others and Union of India v. S.S. Ranade, which distinguish between promotion and upgradation. Upgradation or re-designation, merely based on acquiring a higher qualification without a selection process or correlation to vacancies, does not amount to recruitment by transfer. [Paras 15-16]

Decision - Appeals Dismissed - Clarification on Promotion Quotas - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Division Bench's decision. It clarified that degree-holder Junior Engineers, upon re-designation as Assistant Engineers, continue to be members of the Subordinate Engineering Service and can only be considered against the 25% promotion quota reserved for the Subordinate Service. Past promotions of re-designated Assistant Engineers to Assistant Executive Engineers against the 75% quota for State Service members were held legally invalid, but the Court chose not to unsettle settled positions. [Paras 22]

Intellectual Property Law - Rectification Petition - Delay and Limitation - The Appellant, proprietor of Kundan Cables, challenged the dismissal of his rectification petition by IPAB, which was filed to cancel the registered trademark 'KUNDAN' granted to the Respondent. The Supreme Court held that the Appellant had pursued his remedy diligently and that the delay in filing before the IPAB, due to earlier proceedings in the Delhi High Court, should be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. [Paras 11-13]

Jurisdiction - Bona Fide Mistake - Section 14 of Limitation Act - The Supreme Court found that the Appellant initially filed the rectification petition in the Delhi High Court, which was returned due to lack of jurisdiction. The petition was then promptly filed before the IPAB. The Court held that the time spent in the wrong forum should be excluded, as the Appellant had acted in good faith. [Paras 11-12]

Judicial Review - Erroneous Dismissal by IPAB and High Court - The Supreme Court criticized the IPAB and High Court for dismissing the rectification petition on grounds of delay without considering the Appellant's bona fide efforts and the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Court emphasized that technicalities should not impede justice when a party has diligently pursued their legal remedies. [Paras 10-13]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Remand to IPAB - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the IPAB and the High Court, and remitted the matter back to the IPAB for a decision on merits. The Court directed the IPAB to adjudicate the rectification petition afresh, considering the principles of equity and good conscience. [Paras 13-14]

Criminal Law - Domestic Violence Act - Live-in Relationship - The Appellant challenged the High Court's judgment which denied her protection under the Domestic Violence Act, stating that her live-in relationship with the Respondent did not constitute a "relationship in the nature of marriage." The Supreme Court held that a live-in relationship can be considered "in the nature of marriage" under certain conditions and provides protection under the Domestic Violence Act. The Court examined the nature of the relationship and concluded that it did not meet the criteria of "relationship in the nature of marriage." [Paras 3, 6-7, 13]

Legal Principles - Relationship in the Nature of Marriage - The Court laid down several criteria to determine whether a live-in relationship qualifies as a relationship in the nature of marriage, including duration, shared household, pooling of resources, domestic arrangements, sexual relationship, children, socialization in public, and the intention and conduct of the parties. The Court found that the Appellant's relationship did not satisfy these criteria as she knew the Respondent was already married. [Paras 35-36, 55-56]

Domestic Violence - Definition and Scope - The Supreme Court analyzed the definition of domestic violence under Section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act and held that mere non-maintenance by the Respondent does not constitute domestic violence unless the relationship meets the criteria of "relationship in the nature of marriage." The Court emphasized the need for clear evidence of cohabitation and mutual dependency. [Paras 18, 22, 30, 57]

Decision - Appeal Dismissed - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. The relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent was not considered a "relationship in the nature of marriage," and thus the Appellant was not entitled to relief under the Domestic Violence Act. The Court suggested that the Parliament consider amending the Act to protect individuals in similar situations. [Paras 60-62, 68]

Income Tax - Search and Seizure - Interest on Seized Assets - The Appellant's house was searched on 31.1.1990, and a cash amount of Rs. 2,35,000/- was seized. The Assessing Officer passed an order under Section 132(5) on 31.5.1990, appropriating the seized cash against the tax liability. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal set aside the Assessing Officer's order on 20.2.2004, and the revenue accepted this order, refunding the seized amount along with interest from 4.3.1994 (date of the last regular assessment) to the date of refund. The Appellant claimed interest under Section 132B(4)(b) for the period from 1.12.1990 (six months after the Section 132(5) order) to 4.3.1994. [Paras 2-3]

Statutory Interpretation - Sections 132 and 132B of the Income Tax Act - The Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 132B(4)(b), which mandates interest on retained assets from six months after the Section 132(5) order to the date of regular assessment. The Court held that the department's refusal to pay interest for this period was incorrect. Section 132B(4)(b) deals with the pre-assessment period, whereas Sections 240 and 244(A) pertain to the post-assessment period. The Court found no conflict between these provisions. [Paras 6-7]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Award of Interest - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order. The Court held that the Appellant was entitled to simple interest at the rate of fifteen percent per annum under Section 132B(4)(b) from 1.12.1990 to 4.3.1994. The revenue was directed to calculate and pay the interest within two months. [Paras 8-9]

Criminal Law - Limitation for Taking Cognizance - Relevant Date - The Supreme Court addressed the conflict between two lines of judgments regarding the computation of the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC. The Court held that the relevant date for computing the period of limitation is the date of filing the complaint or the institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. The rationale was that taking cognizance is an act of the Magistrate, which can be delayed due to various reasons beyond the control of the complainant. [Paras 1-14]

Legal Maxims - Guiding Principles in Statutory Interpretation - The Court justified the use of legal maxims such as 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' (the act of the court shall prejudice no man) and 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi' (a crime never dies) to support its interpretation that the date of filing the complaint should be considered for the limitation period. The Court emphasized that these maxims aid in ensuring justice and preventing absurdity. [Paras 13-14]

Statutory Provisions - Cumulative Reading - The Supreme Court stressed the need to read Sections 468, 469, and 470 of CrPC cumulatively. The Court noted that Section 468 imposes a bar on taking cognizance after the period of limitation, while Section 469 specifies when the period of limitation commences, and Section 470 provides for the exclusion of time in certain cases. Section 473 allows for the extension of the limitation period in the interest of justice. [Paras 21-22]

Precedent - Conflict Resolution - The Court resolved the conflict between the judgments in Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P. and Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, affirming that the view taken in Bharat Damodar Kale, which considers the date of filing the complaint as the relevant date, lays down the correct law. The Court clarified that Krishna Pillai's interpretation, which focused on the date of taking cognizance, was limited to the context of the Child Marriage Restraint Act and not applicable to the general provisions of CrPC. [Paras 1-14]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Complaint Date as Relevant Date - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments that considered the date of taking cognizance as the relevant date for computing the period of limitation. The Court directed that the period of limitation should be computed from the date of filing the complaint or the institution of prosecution. [Para 27]