Land Acquisition - Quashing of Denotification - Doctrine of Lis Pendens - Appeal against High Court's affirmation of Single Judge's quashing of Revenue Minister's order denotifying land acquisition – Preliminary notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued – Land initially denotified under Section 48(1) without hearing the Society benefiting from the acquisition – Supreme Court quashed initial denotification due to lack of hearing and lack of justification – Petitioners purchased land during pendency of appeal - Petitioners sought re-denotification after purchase - High Court quashed re-denotification by Revenue Minister – Held, doctrine of lis pendens applies; Petitioners bound by pending litigation outcomes - Once possession is taken, land vests irrevocably in State – Re-denotification during litigation or after possession is invalid - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 1-15]

Doctrine of Lis Pendens - Analysis - Applicability - Purchasers of land during pendency of appeal cannot claim rights contrary to final court decisions – Doctrine aims to prevent alienation that circumvents court's jurisdiction – Purchasers pendente lite bound by decree – Alienation after notification under Section 4(1) is void against State. [Paras 6-11]

Effect of Court's Prior Judgment - Quashing of Denotification - Court's prior quashing of initial denotification order upheld due to violation of principles of natural justice and lack of justification – Revival of acquisition proceedings – Possession by State makes re-denotification invalid - Petitioners entitled to compensation as per the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. [Paras 12-15]

Decision - Dismissal of Petitions - Supreme Court dismisses the petitions, holding that petitioners are bound by the doctrine of lis pendens and that the re-denotification order by the Revenue Minister is invalid due to prior possession by the State - Petitioners entitled to compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. [Para 15]

Constitutional Law - Judicial Review - Scope and Powers - The Appellant (APMC) challenged the Division Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court which dismissed their Special Civil Application and vacated interim relief. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its approach by not considering the merits of the petition and the validity of Rule 48(2) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1965, in the context of the amended Section 28 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963. [Paras 1-7]

Agricultural Produce Markets - Levy of Market Fees - Legal Provisions and Validity - The Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 28 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963, and Rule 48(2) of the Rules. The Court held that the power of APMC to levy market fees was justified under the Act. The impugned Rule 48(2) was directed to be examined afresh for its validity concerning the amended provisions of the Act. [Para 3, 5]

Interim Relief - Directions and Compliance - The Supreme Court restored the interim directions given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court directing Biotor Industries Ltd. to deposit 50% of the demanded market fees. The respondents were instructed to comply with the interim order within two weeks from the receipt of the judgment. [Para 7]

Decision - Remand to High Court - Examination of Rule Validity - The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh examination of the validity of Rule 48(2) and the impugned order of the Revisional Authority. The High Court was directed to place the matter before a Single Judge for a detailed examination. The Civil Appeal was allowed, and the interim directions given by the learned Single Judge were restored. [Para 6-7]

Constitutional Law - Judicial Review - Scope and Powers - The Appellant (APMC) challenged the Division Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court which dismissed its Letters Patent Appeal and allowed the appeal of the Respondent-Company (Biotor Industries Ltd.). The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its approach by not properly considering the merits of the petition and the applicability of Rule 48(2) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1965. The Division Bench's judgment was set aside. [Paras 1-19]

Agricultural Produce Markets - Levy of Market Fees - Legal Provisions and Validity - The Supreme Court examined Section 28 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963, and Rule 48(1) and (2) of the Rules. It held that the APMC was justified in levying market fees on castor seeds bought within the market area. The impugned Rule 48(2) was not applicable as argued by the Respondent-Company. [Paras 9-15]

Interim Relief - Directions and Compliance - The Supreme Court restored the interim directions given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court directing Biotor Industries Ltd. to deposit 50% of the demanded market fees. The respondents were instructed to comply with the interim order within two weeks from the receipt of the judgment. [Para 7]

Decision - Remand to High Court - Examination of Rule Validity - The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh examination of the validity of Rule 48(2) and the impugned order of the Revisional Authority. The High Court was directed to place the matter before a Single Judge for a detailed examination. The Civil Appeal No. 3130 of 2008 was allowed, and the interim directions given by the learned Single Judge were restored. The Civil Appeal No. 3131 of 2008 was dismissed, affirming the order of the Division Bench of the High Court on the levy of market fee on de-oiled cake. [Paras 19-21]

Civic Amenity Site - Conversion and Use - Statutory Interpretation - The Appellants challenged the judgment of the Karnataka High Court which set aside the allotment of Civic Amenity (CA) Site No. 2 for a petrol pump. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly interpreted Section 38A of the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) Act, 1976, which mandates that once an area is reserved for a particular civic amenity, it cannot be diverted to another use. The conversion of the site originally earmarked for a park/playground, then bank, and finally a petrol pump was found to be contrary to the legislative intent and statutory provisions. [Paras 1-17]

Civic Amenity - Definition and Legal Constraints - The Supreme Court reaffirmed that any change in the user of a civic amenity site must adhere to the statutory provisions and the intended purpose for which the site was reserved. The Court noted that Section 38A(1) allows transfer only for the same reserved purpose, and any disposition for a different purpose is null and void under Section 38A(2). The High Court's interpretation was consistent with the law laid down in earlier cases, including Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa. [Paras 12-14]

Rule vs. Statute - Hierarchical Supremacy - The Supreme Court clarified that Rule 3 of the Bangalore Development Authority (Civic Amenity Site) Allotment Rules, 1989, cannot override the statutory provisions contained in Section 38A of the BDA Act, 1976. The rule reiterates the statutory provision and does not permit the conversion of civic amenity sites to other uses without proper amendment to the development plan. [Para 14]

Judicial Precedent - Applicability - The Supreme Court distinguished the present case from Aicoboo Nagar Residents Welfare Association v. Bangalore Development Authority, noting that the previous case dealt with the legality of allotment of a civic amenity site without specific reserved purpose. The present case involved a site specifically earmarked for a bank, which was improperly converted to a petrol pump. [Paras 18-19]

Decision - Appeals Dismissed - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Karnataka High Court's decision to set aside the allotment of the CA Site No. 2 for a petrol pump, affirming that the conversion was contrary to the statutory requirements and legislative intent. [Para 19]

Judicial Review - Tender Process - Scope and Limits - The Appellants challenged the decision of the Gauhati High Court that upheld the cancellation of a tender process by the Northeast Frontier Railway. The Supreme Court held that the scope of judicial review in matters relating to the award of contracts by the State and its instrumentalities is limited. It is well-settled that submission of a tender is merely making an offer, and the State is under no obligation to accept it. The State's decision must be fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory, but the State has the discretion to cancel the tender process if it finds deficiencies. [Paras 8-11]

Tender Cancellation - Administrative Reasons - Validity - The Supreme Court examined the reasons provided by the Northeast Frontier Railway for canceling the tender process, including the lack of terms and conditions, absence of a penalty clause, and procedural deficiencies. The Court found these reasons justified the cancellation, noting that awarding a contract under such conditions would result in administrative and legal complications. [Paras 7-8]

Contract Award - No Vested Right for Highest Bidder - The Supreme Court reiterated that the highest bidder does not have a vested right to be awarded the contract. The discretion lies with the tendering authority to ensure that the tender process and the award of the contract are in the best interest of public administration and financial prudence. [Para 9]

Judicial Precedent - Applicability in Tender Matters - The Supreme Court referred to several precedents, including Tata Cellular v. Union of India, Raunaq International Limited v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd., and Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, to affirm the principles governing judicial review of tender processes. The Court emphasized that judicial interference is warranted only in cases of arbitrariness, malafide, or violation of statutory provisions. [Paras 10-11]

Decision - Appeal Dismissed - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the Gauhati High Court. The cancellation of the tender process by the Northeast Frontier Railway was upheld, and the Appellants were ordered to bear the costs assessed at Rs. 25,000/-. [Para 12]

Civil Procedure - Territorial Jurisdiction - Composite Suit - The Appellants challenged the judgment of the Kerala High Court which dealt with the maintainability of a composite suit filed at the District Court, Kottayam, involving claims under the Copyright Act 1957 and the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958. The Supreme Court held that a composite suit would not be maintainable unless the court has jurisdiction over the entire cause of action and relief. [Paras 9-10]

Copyright Act - Jurisdiction - Additional Forum - The Supreme Court examined Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act 1957, which provides an additional forum for filing suits where the plaintiff resides or carries on business. The Court noted that this provision is intended to confer a benefit on plaintiffs who might face difficulty initiating proceedings in multiple jurisdictions. However, this does not extend to claims under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958. [Paras 14-15]

Trade Marks Act 1999 - Applicability - The Court discussed the applicability of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act 1999, which similarly allows suits to be filed where the plaintiff resides or carries on business. Since the Trade Marks Act 1999 came into force after the suit was filed, the provisions of the 1958 Act governed the case. The Court held that the jurisdiction under the 1958 Act cannot be extended by the provisions of the 1999 Act. [Paras 21-22]

Judicial Precedent - Consistency and Clarification - The Supreme Court referred to its previous decisions in Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, and Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, clarifying that for invoking jurisdiction in a composite suit, both causes of action must arise within the court's jurisdiction. The Court found no conflict between these decisions and reiterated that a composite suit is maintainable only when the court has jurisdiction over all claims. [Paras 16-19]

Decision - Appeals Dismissed with Liberty to Amend - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision allowing the plaintiff to amend the plaint to make the suit maintainable before the District Court, Kottayam. The Court emphasized that the High Court exercised its discretionary powers correctly to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Both appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs. [Paras 22-23]

Land Acquisition - Section 5A - Scope and Application - The Appellants challenged the acquisition of their land on the grounds of non-application of mind by the Land Acquisition Collector and the State Government to their objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Supreme Court held that effective hearing and genuine consideration of objections under Section 5A are essential safeguards. The Court found that the Land Acquisition Collector's report was cursory and did not reflect objective consideration, and the State Government's approval was mechanical. [Paras 15-23]

Judicial Review - Procedural Safeguards - Compliance - The Supreme Court emphasized that compliance with Section 5A, which embodies the rule of audi alteram partem, is mandatory. The Land Acquisition Collector must provide a fair opportunity of hearing and make a reasoned report, which the appropriate Government must consider before issuing a declaration under Section 6. Non-compliance with these procedural safeguards vitiates the acquisition process. [Paras 18-22]

Report of Land Acquisition Collector - Legal Requirements - The Supreme Court scrutinized the report prepared by the Land Acquisition Collector and found it lacking in detailed consideration of objections and reasons. The report merely summarized the objections and recommended acquisition without addressing the specific points raised by the Appellants. Such a report does not meet the legal requirements under Section 5A(2). [Paras 16-17]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Acquisition Proceedings Set Aside - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the Calcutta High Court, and quashed the acquisition proceedings for failing to comply with Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court granted time to the management of the school currently occupying the land to vacate and requested the State Government to consider allotting an alternative site. [Paras 24-29]

Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - The Appellant challenged the order of the Calcutta High Court which upheld the decision of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal directing reinstatement of the Respondent after his acquittal in a criminal case. The Supreme Court held that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle reinstatement in service if the charges in disciplinary proceedings are substantiated. The Court emphasized the distinction between criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings, noting that the standards of proof differ. [Paras 14-16]

Honourable Acquittal - Meaning and Scope - The Supreme Court clarified that an honourable acquittal is different from an acquittal based on benefit of doubt. In this case, the Respondent was acquitted due to the inability to establish identity during the Test Identification Parade (TI Parade), not because he was proven innocent beyond doubt. Therefore, the acquittal was not considered honourable, and the disciplinary action was upheld. [Paras 13-14]

Police Regulations - Effect of Acquittal on Departmental Punishment - The Supreme Court referred to Regulation 4 of the Police Regulations of Calcutta 1968, which states that acquittal or discharge in a criminal proceeding shall not bar departmental punishment for the same cause. This regulation supports the continuation of disciplinary action despite the acquittal in criminal proceedings. [Para 17]

Decision - Appeals Allowed - Reinstatement Not Automatic - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Tribunal and the High Court. The Court held that reinstatement is not automatic upon acquittal in a criminal case and must be considered in light of the findings of disciplinary proceedings. The Respondent's dismissal from service was upheld. [Paras 17-18]

Criminal Law - Compounding of Offences - Scope and Limits - The Appellant challenged the High Court’s order acquitting the Respondents by accepting a compromise in a case involving non-compoundable offences under Section 307 IPC. The Supreme Court held that Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable, and the High Court erred in acquitting the Respondents based on a compromise between the parties. The Court emphasized that offences under Section 307 IPC are crimes against society, not just individuals, and cannot be compounded. [Paras 8-12, 14]

Judicial Review - High Court's Powers under Section 482 CrPC - The Supreme Court clarified that the High Court's power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings based on a compromise is distinct from compounding offences under Section 320 CrPC. The inherent power of the High Court must be exercised with due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its impact on society. The High Court's decision was found to be an erroneous exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC. [Paras 8-9, 14-15]

Nature of Offences - Public Interest and Societal Impact - The Court reiterated that serious offences, especially those under Section 307 IPC, affect the societal order and public interest. Such offences cannot be settled privately between the parties, as they have broader implications for society. The Court highlighted the necessity of upholding the integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring that serious crimes are appropriately punished. [Paras 10, 15]

Decision - Appeal Allowed - High Court’s Order Set Aside - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court. The case was remanded to the High Court with directions to decide the appeal on merits within six months. The Court stressed the importance of addressing the merits of the case rather than relying on a compromise for offences that are non-compoundable by law. [Paras 16]