Taxation Law - Faceless Scheme of Assessment – Legislative Intent and Evolution – With the advent of technological advancements, the Revenue aimed to modernize the tax assessment process by reducing direct taxpayer-officer interaction to prevent undesirable practices – Budget Speech 2019 underscored these issues, advocating for the faceless scheme to enhance transparency and efficiency – The scheme was formalized with the E-assessment Scheme, 2019 and expanded through amendments in 2020 and the Finance Act 2022, which included reassessment and recomputation under Sections 143(3), 144, and 147 [Paras 46-54].

Technological Infrastructure – RMS, CASS, and Insight Portal – The Revenue implemented sophisticated data tools like RMS, CASS, AIR, and Insight Portal to aggregate, cross-check, and analyze taxpayer information – RMS used for automated case selection based on risk parameters to minimize human bias – Insight Portal provided JAOs with comprehensive data for informed preliminary evaluations [Paras 57-64].

JAO's Concurrent Jurisdiction and Role – Despite the faceless assessment framework, the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) retains concurrent jurisdiction – This allows the JAO to verify data and initiate reassessment based on gathered information – Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Trust case reinforced that the JAO's powers coexist with NFAC’s automated system, ensuring comprehensive assessments [Paras 82-85].

Reassessment Procedure – Beyond Faceless Allocation – The reassessment process under Sections 147, 148, and 148A involves JAO's discretion to act on data from RMS, audit reports, or court directives – The Gujarat High Court in Talati and Talati LLP confirmed that the JAO’s role in initiating reassessment is essential and distinct from the automated allocation for final assessments under Section 144B [Paras 86-103].

Conclusion – Complementary Framework – The faceless scheme does not eliminate JAO’s role but supplements it, providing a dual-layered system ensuring transparency and efficiency – Petitions challenging reassessment by JAOs were dismissed, affirming that JAOs maintain lawful authority for initial reassessment actions [Paras 104-105].
 

Criminal Law - Criminal Conspiracy – Standard of Proof – Acquittal of Accused – The prosecution’s case alleged a conspiracy to facilitate a jailbreak by smuggling explosive materials into Burail Jail. Witnesses turned hostile, key incriminatory evidence such as communication devices were unrecovered, and contradictions in arrest dates created doubt. Held: Prosecution failed to establish the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, warranting acquittal for multiple co-accused [Paras 16-20, 47].

Section 27, Indian Evidence Act – Disclosure Statements and Recoveries – Legal Standards for Credibility – The court assessed the evidentiary value of disclosure statements and recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. It held that while disclosure statements led to explosive material recovery, inconsistencies regarding arrest timing discredited the prosecution’s evidence. Held: Disclosure statement's evidentiary value was diminished, leading to acquittal [Paras 42-43].

Explosive Substances Act, Sections 4, 5, and 6 – Applicability of Charges – Conspiracy and Incrimination – Without credible witness corroboration or recovery of alleged conspiratorial devices, charges under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Act were unsubstantiated. Held: Accusations of explosive-related offenses under the Act remained unproven, justifying acquittal on these grounds [Para 22].

Forgery – Handwriting Evidence – Conviction Upheld – Accused Balwinder Singh was charged with forgery (Section 468, IPC) for using a false identity in prison registers. A handwriting expert’s report confirmed matching signatures, and no contrary evidence was presented by the defense. Held: Conviction under Section 468 was upheld based on credible handwriting evidence [Para 49].

Decision  – Acquittal and Dismissal of Appeal – The court dismissed the appeal filed by U.T. Chandigarh seeking the conviction of all accused and upheld the acquittal of various respondents. It also dismissed the appeal of Balwinder Singh, affirming his conviction under Sections 419, 468, and 471 IPC [Paras 50-51].

Banking Law - Fraud Classification - Principles of Natural Justice – The petitioner, Ratul Puri, sought quashing of the Bank of Baroda's decision to classify him as a "fraud" under the RBI's Master Directions on Frauds. The Court found that the classification without prior notice or opportunity for the petitioner to be heard was in violation of principles of natural justice. Held: Actions lacking in procedural fairness and natural justice are unsustainable [Paras 12-14, 20-22].

Legal Obligations of Banks under RBI Fraud Directions – Audi Alteram Partem – The Court reaffirmed that the doctrine of audi alteram partem applies even under RBI's Master Directions on Frauds. Serious consequences of fraud classification, such as credit denial and business restrictions, necessitate a fair hearing. Banks must provide borrowers with notice, an opportunity to respond to forensic audit findings, and reasoned decisions before classifying accounts as fraudulent [Paras 49, 62].

Reliance on Rajesh Aggarwal Case - Classification as Fraud and Civil Consequences – The Court referenced State Bank of India v. Rajesh Aggarwal and highlighted that the RBI’s Master Directions entail significant civil repercussions on individuals classified as "fraud," equating it to "civil death" in credit terms. Consequently, natural justice mandates procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary exclusions from institutional finance [Paras 14, 49, 57, 62].

Decision – Petition Allowed – The impugned classification of the petitioner as “fraud” by Bank of Baroda was set aside due to procedural lapses in the application of natural justice. The Court directed Bank of Baroda to remove the petitioner’s “fraud” status from the Central Fraud Registry within 15 days, underscoring that no factual grounds warranted such classification [Para 14, 57, 62].
 

Defamation Law - Locus Standi of Complainant - "Person Aggrieved" Requirement under Section 199 of Cr.P.C. – The petitioner, the current Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, challenged a defamation complaint filed by a member of the AIADMK party. The Court emphasized that defamation complaints under Section 199 require that the complainant be the "person aggrieved" or explicitly authorized to act on behalf of an aggrieved party. Here, the Court held that the respondent lacked standing, as he neither suffered personal injury from the alleged defamatory statements nor acted with formal authorization from AIADMK [Paras 2, 8, 19, 24].

Interpretation of "Some Person Aggrieved" in Defamation Cases - AIADMK Membership Not Sufficient for Filing Complaint – Referring to Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, the Court stated that "some person aggrieved" under Section 199(2) Cr.P.C. must directly connect to the defamatory remark or suffer tangible harm. Mere political affiliation with AIADMK did not confer the respondent with adequate standing to claim injury. Consequently, the complaint was quashed as the respondent failed to demonstrate any direct defamation against himself or hold authorization for representation [Paras 23, 25].

Impact of BNSS, 2023 on Proceedings Initiated Post-Enactment – The petitioner argued that the complaint was procedurally invalid under the repealed Cr.P.C., 1973. However, the Court clarified that, per Section 531(2)(a) of BNSS, 2023 and Section 4 of BNSS, actions for offenses occurring prior to 01/07/2024 are governed by the old Cr.P.C., ensuring continuity in legal remedies for rights or liabilities acquired under the previous code [Paras 14, 17].

Decision – Petition Allowed, Complaint Quashed – The Court quashed the defamation complaint, ruling that the respondent lacked standing, and reaffirmed the procedural validity of filing under the repealed Cr.P.C. for offenses committed before BNSS enactment. The Miscellaneous Petitions were also dismissed [Para 26].
 

Grounds for Divorce – Desertion – Long-Term Separation Constituting Desertion - The appellant argued that the trial court erred in granting a divorce on grounds of desertion without specifically establishing intent (animus deserendi) as required under Section 13(1)(ib) of the H.M. Act – Held: The Court confirmed that the prolonged separation of over 27 years without reasonable cause, along with the wife's unwillingness to reconcile, constituted desertion. The absence of cohabitation and mutual intent to reunite justified the finding of desertion even in the absence of a detailed trial court finding on animus deserendi [Paras 1-2, 18-19].

Essence of Desertion in Matrimonial Matters – Continuing Conduct and Failure of Reconciliation Efforts - Emphasized that desertion requires continuous conduct evidencing permanent separation and a lack of intent to resume marital life – Court observed that lengthy separation and absence of attempts at reconciliation during court proceedings underscored the permanency of desertion, satisfying the statutory requirement for divorce under Section 13(1)(ib) [Paras 12-16].

Judicial Precedents – Constructive Desertion and Prolonged Separation as Basis for Divorce - Citing Bipin Chander v. Prabhavati and Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, the Court reaffirmed that desertion includes long-term separation when it is shown to have no reasonable justification or attempts at reconciliation – Held: The grant of divorce by the trial court was appropriate given the unbroken separation and irreconcilable state of the marriage [Paras 15-16].

Decision - The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial court’s decree of divorce on the ground of desertion due to prolonged and unresolved separation, which constituted permanent abandonment by the wife [Para 25].
 

Desertion and Cruelty – Prolonged Separation as Grounds for Divorce – Appeal Allowed - The appellant claimed that the respondent deserted him without cause, and long-term separation amounted to cruelty – Held: Continuous separation for over two decades with no genuine reconciliation efforts demonstrates desertion and mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the H.M. Act – Citing Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, the Court held that continued separation inflicts mental cruelty on both spouses, justifying divorce [Paras 1, 16-18].

Standard for Establishing Mental Cruelty – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage - The Court emphasized that the prolonged inability to reconcile and lack of cohabitation between spouses leads to an irreparable breakdown of the marital relationship, satisfying grounds for mental cruelty – Reinforced by Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, the Court found that the nature and extent of separation constitute cruelty in cases with substantial estrangement [Paras 19-22].

Decision - The appeal was allowed, reversing the trial court’s order and granting a decree of divorce on the grounds of desertion and mental cruelty, formally dissolving the marriage [Para 25].

Cheque Bounce - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interim Moratorium under Section 96 – Applicability to Criminal Proceedings – Stay on Proceedings under Negotiable Instruments Act – The petitioner, a director in a company, faced proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, which he sought to stay, citing an interim moratorium declared by the NCLT under Section 96 of the IBC in a creditor-initiated insolvency action. The petitioner argued that proceedings related to any "debt" as referenced in the IBC should be stayed. The court, relying on P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd., found that proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act are quasi-criminal but relate indirectly to debt recovery, thus falling within the moratorium's scope [Paras 1-3, 19-21].

IBC and Criminal Proceedings – Interpretation of "Debt" and Legal Proceedings – Section 96 of the IBC – The court examined whether Section 96’s interim moratorium on "all debts" covered quasi-criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The judgment referenced P. Mohanraj to clarify that Section 96, unlike Section 14 (applicable to corporate debtors), extends to all proceedings connected to personal debt resolution, including those under Section 138 of the N.I. Act [Paras 4-7, 16-18].

Distinction between Corporate and Individual Moratoriums in IBC – Applicability of Section 96 Moratorium – Citing Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd., the court acknowledged the distinct applicability of moratoriums under Section 96 (personal insolvency) and Section 14 (corporate insolvency). The court clarified that while Section 14 protects corporate debtors, Section 96 covers proceedings against individuals or personal guarantors, staying both civil and quasi-criminal proceedings [Paras 8-12, 20].

Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Proceedings Stayed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act – The court found that the revisional court had misinterpreted the law by disregarding the moratorium imposed by the NCLT. The order was set aside, and the Section 138 proceedings against the petitioner were stayed as long as the moratorium remained in effect, upholding the primacy of the NCLT's order under the IBC [Paras 21-22].

Child Sexual Abuse – Reliability of Victim's Testimony – Conviction Sustained - The appellants, convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a minor, challenged the victim's testimony and the reliability of investigative procedures. The Court affirmed that a victim’s testimony alone, when credible and consistent, suffices to uphold conviction in cases of sexual abuse. Held: Despite certain lapses in the investigation, the victim’s account was of sterling quality, and her consistent testimony warranted reliance. The convictions under Sections 376(1) and 109 IPC and Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice Act were sustained [Paras 25-28, 42-45].

Abetment in Sexual Offenses – Intentional Facilitation of Crime by Parent - The second accused, mother of the victim, argued that passive presence did not constitute abetment. However, the Court found that actively facilitating and ensuring her son did not interrupt during the crimes constituted abetment under Section 109 IPC. Held: Active facilitation qualifies as intentional aid, meeting abetment criteria in cases of grave offenses against children [Paras 65-69].

Reduction of Sentence – Age and Background as Mitigating Factors - Acknowledging the pre-2013 amendment provisions allowing reduced sentences, the Court considered the accused’s socioeconomic context and reduced the sentence from life to seven years for certain offenses. Held: Minimum sentencing provisions apply, but excessive sentencing was found disproportionate to the case circumstances [Paras 85-90].

Decision - Appeals partially allowed, with sentences reduced to seven years for certain appellants while upholding convictions. Crl. Appeal No. 967 of 2017 was dismissed.
 

Partition of Self-Acquired Property – Applicability of Rule Against Partial Partition – Partition Suit – Will of Late Smt. Abnash Kaur – Plaintiff sought partition based on the registered Will of late Smt. Abnash Kaur dated 06.02.1973, dividing her estate among six beneficiaries, each receiving a 1/6th share – Suit contested by Defendant No.1, who argued it constituted partial partition, contrary to law, citing Kenchegowda judgment – Held: Rule against partial partition applies primarily to joint family or coparcenary properties – As the suit property was self-acquired by Smt. Abnash Kaur and held by the parties as tenants-in-common, the rule of bar against partial partition was deemed inapplicable – Partition granted with conditions [Paras 69-82, 85-86, 161].

Will Execution – Validity and Proof Requirements – Plaintiff failed to prove the genuineness of Will of late Sh. Ajit Singh dated 21.07.1997 under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, as no issue was framed regarding the genuineness – No evidence led by the plaintiff despite the Court allowing defendants to dispute the will’s validity if evidence arose – Will deemed unproven in suit proceedings [Paras 89-92].

Necessary Parties – Non-impleadment Objections – Defendant Nos.1 and 2 raised objections concerning non-impleadment of other beneficiaries under the Will of late Sh. Ajit Singh – Supreme Court precedent in Shivshankara held that suits do not abate for non-impleadment if estate is substantially represented by other parties – Plaintiff adequately represented deceased Ajit Singh’s interest; objection of non-impleadment overruled [Paras 94-96].

Subrogation Rights – Mortgage Redemption – Defendant No.1 argued possession retention rights due to mortgage redemption as per Compromise Decree dated 20.02.1978 – Plaintiff countered this by claiming redemption was from the estate’s rental income – Held: Defendant No.1 entitled to retain possession until co-sharers pay contribution towards redemption amount; however, mortgage status does not entitle Defendant No.1 to exclusive ownership – Redemption deemed validly done by Defendant No.1 per compromise, with partition rights to plaintiff upon paying share of redemption [Paras 106-111, 121-122].

Termination of Lease – Sham Transaction Allegation – Plaintiff argued that the lease between late Smt. Abnash Kaur and Defendant No.1 was a sham, created to avoid tax liabilities and shield property from claims – Will and subsequent documents acknowledged lease as genuine, binding plaintiff – Plaintiff’s argument of termination based on lease amount was dismissed due to lack of supporting evidence and contradictory pleadings [Paras 144-155].

Limitation for Partition Suit – Plaintiff claimed partition of the suit property not barred by limitation – Citing Supreme Court precedents, Court reiterated that no limitation applies to partition suits, as partition is an incident attached to joint property rights – Plaintiff’s claim for partition sustained [Paras 135-140].

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Plaintiff sought declarations regarding ownership and an injunction against Defendant No.1 – Court held plaintiff entitled to permanent injunction as a co-sharer but denied declaratory reliefs, finding plaintiff’s claims unsubstantiated and contrary to pleadings on record [Paras 171, 173].

Decision: Partition granted with preliminary decree determining shares of parties in the suit property – Defendant No.1’s possession as subrogated mortgagee upheld pending payment by co-sharers of their redemption contributions – Declaratory reliefs denied; plaintiff entitled to injunctive relief as co-sharer – Suit disposed of accordingly [Paras 175-179].