Criminal Law – Receiving Stolen Property – Section 411 IPC – Possession of 26 stolen motorcycles including 3 in subject case – Independent mediator (PW4) deposed regarding apprehension of accused and recovery – No explanation offered by accused for possession – Presumption under Section 114 Illustration (a) Evidence Act attracted – Conviction upheld [Paras 11, 18, 22–24].

Evidence – Section 27 Evidence Act – Custody and Arrest – Accused apprehended while attempting to flee and physically restrained by police – Held: Arrest complete upon apprehension as per Section 46 CrPC – Requirement of custody satisfied – However, conviction not based on confessional statement but on independent evidence and seizure – Rajesh v. State of M.P. distinguished on facts [Paras 15–19].

Confession – Police Statement – Section 161 CrPC – Confessional statement not marked as exhibit – Trial Court did not rely upon inadmissible confession – Conviction recorded on basis of direct evidence of prosecution witnesses and seizure of material objects – Challenge to admissibility held inconsequential [Paras 18–19].

Examination of Accused – Section 313 CrPC – Right to Silence – Material incriminating circumstances regarding possession of stolen motorcycles specifically put to accused – Accused remained silent – Held: Silence permissible only where material circumstances not put – When specific questions framed, failure to offer explanation permits adverse inference – Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P. distinguished [Paras 20–23].

Revisional Jurisdiction – Scope of Interference – Concurrent findings of Trial Court and Appellate Court – No perversity or legal infirmity found – Revisional Court not to re-appreciate evidence unless glaring illegality shown – Revision dismissed [Paras 7, 24].

Sentence – Modification by Appellate Court – Trial Court imposed three years RI – Appellate Court reduced to one year RI – High Court found no ground for further interference – Suspension of sentence vacated – Petitioner directed to surrender within four weeks [Paras 1, 25].

Decision: Criminal Revision Case dismissed – Conviction under Section 411 IPC and sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment affirmed – Petitioner directed to surrender within four weeks – Interim suspension vacated.

Real Estate – Enforcement of RERA Order – Recovery as Arrears of Land Revenue – Petitioner allotted housing unit and paid substantial consideration – RERA allowed complaint and directed refund with 9.3% interest – Recovery certificate issued under Section 40(1) RERA – District Collector declared amount recoverable as arrears of land revenue under Section 103 H.P. Land Revenue Act – Recovery proceedings stalled on ground that project land vested in State under Section 118 H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act – Held: Vesting of subject land does not defeat enforceability of monetary recovery order – Authorities bound to proceed in accordance with statutory modes of recovery – Recovery to be taken to logical conclusion expeditiously [Paras 3-4].

RERA – Section 40 – Scope and Effect – Where promoter fails to comply with refund order, amount recoverable as arrears of land revenue – Recovery certificate validly issued – Finality of RERA order not disputed – Enforcement cannot be frustrated by subsequent change in asset profile of debtor – Statutory mechanism under Land Revenue Act must be invoked in entirety [Para 4].

Land Revenue Recovery – Statutory Procedure – Sections 74 to 83 H.P. Land Revenue Act provide multiple modes including writ of demand, arrest and detention, distress and sale of movable property, attachment and sale of immovable property and proceedings against other properties of defaulter – Authorities cannot halt proceedings merely because one property has vested in State – Statute mandates strict adherence to prescribed recovery mechanism – No deviation permissible [Para 4].

Administrative Inaction – Impermissibility – Tehsildar (Recovery) failed to proceed with recovery since 15.09.2023 – Such inaction contrary to statutory duty – Legislative intent of RERA and Land Revenue Act would be frustrated if recovery is stalled – Direction issued to District Collector to ensure expeditious completion of recovery proceedings [Para 4].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – District Collector, Solan directed to ensure that recovery proceedings pursuant to RERA order dated 26.02.2021, recovery certificate dated 17.10.2022 and Demand Order dated 14.11.2022 are taken to their logical conclusion expeditiously in accordance with law – Pending applications, if any, disposed of.

Education – PG-NEET In-Service Quota – Delay in Issuance of Form-H – Petitioners, in-service GDMOs, applied for PG-NEET 2025 – Unable to claim OBC benefit due to non-issuance of Form-H by Tahsildar despite Government Circular dated 08.05.2025 – Cut-off percentile subsequently reduced making them eligible – Held: Delay in issuance of Form-H not attributable to petitioners – They cannot be deprived of in-service reservation benefits on account of administrative lapse [Paras 6-8, 17].

Reservation – Decategorisation of In-Service Seats – Large number of in-service seats decategorised and merged with general pool due to absence of eligible candidates in earlier rounds – Petitioners subsequently became eligible after reduction of percentile – Held: Though decategorisation per rules not disputed, petitioners entitled to equitable consideration consistent with earlier order of co-ordinate Bench in W.P. No.110014/2025 [Paras 16-19].

Parity – Similarly Situated Candidates – Co-ordinate Bench (Dharwad) had directed that petitioner therein be treated as in-service candidate and offered first preference in Mop-up round along with similarly situated candidates – No challenge shown to said order – Held: Present petitioners, being similarly situated, also entitled to same treatment and first preference in order of merit in Mop-up round [Paras 19-20].

Mop-Up Round – Allotment of Seats – Petitioners to be treated as in-service candidates and offered first preference in order of merit along with petitioner in W.P. No.110014/2025 to choose from available regular PG seats and DNB seats reserved for Health and Family Welfare in-service candidates – Remaining seats thereafter to be offered to other candidates – Timelines fixed for completion of Mop-up and stray vacancy rounds [Paras 20-22, Post-order directions].

Administrative Directions – Timeline – Court directed Mop-up round to be held before 05.03.2026 and stray vacancy round before 12.03.2026 – Entire process to be completed on or before 18.03.2026 – KEA permitted to coordinate with MCC for portal access [Post-order directions].

Decision: Writ Petition disposed of – Petitioners to be treated as in-service candidates and granted first preference in Mop-up round along with similarly situated candidate in W.P. No.110014/2025 – Directions issued regarding completion of counselling process within stipulated timeline.

Education Law – CBSE Examination – Additional Subject – Student Changes – Student studied Mathematics throughout Class XI and part of Class XII but switched to Physical Education before board registration due to external pressure to pursue NEET – After failing NEET examination, student sought to write Mathematics as additional subject for engineering admission – CBSE rejected application citing bye-law requiring two-year study of additional subject – Court found extraordinary circumstances warranted relief where student actually studied Mathematics and incorrect information was fed to CBSE – Held: Law should lean towards correcting procedural errors in favor of truth – Student permitted to take supplementary examination in Mathematics subject upon satisfying Regional Director with proof of actual study [Paras 2-10].

CBSE Bye-Law 43 – Additional Subject Scheme – Eligibility Criteria – CBSE policy requires candidate to study additional subject for two academic years comprising Class XI and XII – Regular student can appear as private candidate only if additional subject was offered in previous years and student placed in Compartment or Essential Repeat category – Student not meeting conditions ineligible for examination in additional subjects as private candidate – However, rigid application of rules may be relaxed in extraordinary circumstances where student has genuinely studied the subject [Paras 6-7].

Educational Policy – Parental Pressure – Rat Race for Medical and Engineering Seats – Court observed that education equals admission to medical or engineering seats in India – Parents make children run terrible rat race causing all kinds of subject changes and strategic choices of lighter subjects – Even mother tongue sacrificed for easier subjects in high school – When such strategies fail, students find themselves at crossroads – Courts should consider such realities while deciding cases involving student welfare [Para 8].

Procedure – Verification and Compliance – Court directed petitioner to appear before third respondent by 03.03.2026 with proof of studying Mathematics in Class XI and part of Class XII – Notebooks, homework, evaluations, school certificates and all other proof to be presented – If satisfied that student genuinely studied Mathematics for considerable period, opportunity to be granted to take Mathematics as additional subject in supplementary examination – Directions issued in peculiar facts of instant case [Para 10].

Decision: Writ Petition disposed of – Impugned order dated 08.01.2026 not quashed but modified – Petitioner directed to appear before third respondent with documentary proof of studying Mathematics – If third respondent satisfied with proof, student to be permitted to write supplementary examination for Mathematics as additional subject on 09.03.2026 – Result to be declared and mark sheet issued accordingly – No order as to costs.

Criminal Law – Recall of Witness – Section 348 BNSS (Section 311 Cr.P.C.) – Investigating Officer recalled to prove disclosure statements and connected documents – Trial Court found that certain material documents relating to ownership of vehicle, lease deed of hospital and inspection report were not put to PW-4 during examination-in-chief – Held: Power under Section 348 BNSS can be exercised at any stage if evidence appears essential to just decision of case – Recall not to fill lacuna but to place complete link evidence on record – No illegality in order permitting recall [Paras 19-21, 24].

Scope of Section 348 BNSS – “Essential to the Just Decision of the Case” – Expression covers holistic adjudication and not confined only to prejudice or benefit of accused before Court – Court empowered to summon or recall witness to ascertain truth even if documents are already on record but not duly proved through concerned witness – Power to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily [Paras 21-23].

NDPS Act – Disclosure Statements under Section 27 Evidence Act – Disclosure statements of accused recorded by Investigating Officer referred to involvement of hospital owner and use of vehicle registered in name of hospital – Though other witnesses proved disclosure memos, IO failed to depose about relevant facts during examination – Recall justified to complete chain of evidence – Objection that prosecution seeks to implicate discharged person held speculative [Paras 16-20].

Filling Lacuna – Distinction – Mere recall of witness to formally prove documents or clarify omissions does not ipso facto amount to filling lacuna – Unless serious prejudice is demonstrated, recall permissible – Reliance placed on principles laid down in Rajaram Prasad Yadav and Mannan Sk. [Paras 23-24].

Fair Trial – Balancing Interests – Section 348 BNSS serves object of discovery of truth – Fair trial entails rights of accused, victim and society – Court must ensure evidence essential for just decision is not shut out on technicalities [Para 23].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Order dated 21.05.2025 allowing recall of PW-4 (Investigating Officer) upheld – No illegality or infirmity found.

Employees’ Compensation – Disability Certificate – Issuance by Non-Treating Doctor – Commissioner rejected compensation claim solely on ground that disability certificate was issued by doctor who had not attended the injured – Act requires certificate by “qualified medical practitioner” under Section 4(1)(c)(ii) read with Section 2(1)(i) – No provision mandates that certificate must be issued only by treating doctor – Qualified medical practitioner can assess disability on basis of medical records and is subject to cross-examination – Rejection of entire claim including findings on employer-employee relationship and accident in course of employment solely on this ground held erroneous – Matter remanded for limited purpose of determining percentage of loss of earning capacity – Other issues held concluded and not open for reconsideration [Paras 9-14, 16].

Substantial Question of Law – Framing at Appellate Stage – Whether Commissioner was justified in rejecting application solely because disability certificate was issued by doctor who did not treat injured – Question answered in negative in favour of appellant – Impugned order set aside – Commissioner directed to assess disability and compute compensation on basis of evidence already on record within stipulated time [Paras 2, 16-18].

Precedent – Reliance on Karnataka High Court Decision – Held that there is no statutory bar to consideration of deposition of qualified medical practitioner who examined claimant though not treating doctor – Decision in Mukesh Kumar v. Kulhari Tours and Travels Prof. Mahipal Singh & Anr. followed [Para 15].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order dated 19 June 2012 set aside – Matter remanded to Commissioner for limited purpose of determining loss of earning capacity and calculating compensation – Other findings not to be reopened – Commissioner directed to dispose of application by 30 June 2026.

Employees’ State Insurance – Damages under Section 85-B – Limitation – No express limitation prescribed for passing order under Section 85-B – Contribution for period 1972–1989 paid on 07.09.2000 – Damages imposed on 16.04.2014 – Delay of 14 years – Held: Even in absence of express statutory limitation, power must be exercised within reasonable period – Five years considered reasonable based on scheme of Act – Order passed beyond reasonable period unsustainable [Paras 21–26, 33].

Reasonable Period – Determination – Penal civil liability – Where statute confers power without prescribing limitation, such power must be exercised within reasonable time – Second proviso to Section 45-A (five-year limit), Regulation 32 (five-year record retention) and proviso to Explanation (b) to Section 77(1A) provide legislative guidance – Five years treated as reasonable benchmark for Section 85-B proceedings [Paras 23–25].

Interest Proceedings – Distinction from Damages – Pendency of interest proceedings and litigation regarding rate of interest does not justify delay in initiating damages – Damages levied for delayed contribution, not for interest – Hence, independent cause – Fourteen-year delay unexplained and unreasonable [Paras 27–28].

Welfare Legislation – Penal Provisions – Deterrence – Though ESI Act is beneficial social legislation, penalty provisions cannot be invoked after inordinate delay – Certainty in litigation required – Deterrent effect diluted if invoked after long lapse of time [Para 30].

Scope of Judgment – Court proceeded on assumption that no express limitation exists for Section 85-B – Question whether express limitation is otherwise provided kept open for adjudication in appropriate case [Para 32].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Substantial question of law answered against the appellant-Corporation and in favour of respondent-Gymkhana – Order of ESI Court quashing damages upheld – Statutory authorities expected to act within reasonable time henceforth.

Family Courts Act — Section 7 — Code of Civil Procedure — Section 24 — Power of Transfer — Family Court — Whether Vested — Family Court No. 1, Bharatpur transferred four pending matrimonial cases to Family Court No. 2 relying on general view expressed by learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in order dated 24.04.2017 — Family Court No. 2 expressed doubt as to whether such power vested in the Family Court and referred the matter to the High Court — Held: Section 7 of the Family Courts Act governs the jurisdiction of Family Courts and does not envisage or confer any power upon the Family Court to transfer cases from one Family Court to another, even within the same city or district — Power of transfer under Section 24 CPC is distinct, exclusive, and independent and vests only in the High Court or the District Court — Such power is exerciseable only in respect of proceedings pending before a Court subordinate to it — One Family Court is not subordinate to another Family Court in the same district — Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, being a special statute, prevails over the general provision of Section 24 CPC — Question No. 1 answered in the negative: Family Court lacks jurisdiction to transfer cases from one Family Court to another under Section 24 CPC [Paras 15–24].

Family Courts — Transfer of Cases — Which Court Competent — High Court or District Court — Whether Family Court Is Subordinate to District Court — Family Court established under Section 3 of the Family Courts Act exercises jurisdiction equivalent to that of the District Court or subordinate civil court in respect of matters under Section 7(1)(a) — By virtue of Section 7(1)(b), Family Court is deemed to be a District Court for purposes of exercising such jurisdiction — However, a Family Court cannot be considered subordinate to the Principal District Court for purposes of Section 24 CPC — Held: Transfer of cases from one Family Court to another, whether within the same district or between two districts within the same State, can be exercised by the High Court alone under Sections 22, 23 and 24 CPC — Power of transfer under Section 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act also exerciseable only by a Court empowered under Section 24 CPC, not by the Family Court — Administrative allocation of work among Judges of the same Family Court is distinct from judicial power of transfer [Paras 19–22].

Single Judge's General View — Per Incuriam — Binding Precedent — Whether Single Judge Can Vest Transfer Power in Family Court by Judicial Order — Learned Single Judge, while deciding a transfer application in 2017, expressed a general view that Family Courts situated in the same city may exercise power of transfer suo motu or on an application by parties — Held: Such view cannot be held to be in conformity with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act or Section 24 CPC — The Single Judge's view was expressed without considering that Section 7 of the Family Courts Act does not confer transfer power on Family Courts and without appreciating that transfer under Section 24 CPC is exerciseable only in respect of subordinate courts — The general view expressed in para Nos. 4, 6 and 9 of the order dated 24.04.2017 is held to be per incuriam and does not constitute a binding judicial precedent — No judicial order of a Single Judge of the High Court can vest in the Family Court a power of transfer not conferred by its special statute — Questions Nos. 2 and 3 answered accordingly [Paras 25–26].

Decision: Civil Reference disposed of — Order dated 06.12.2025 passed by Family Court No. 1, Bharatpur transferring cases without jurisdiction declared non-est — Parties at liberty to invoke jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 24 CPC — General view expressed in para Nos. 4, 6 and 9 of order dated 24.04.2017 of learned Single Judge declared per incuriam and not binding on Family Courts — Copy of order directed to be sent to Family Court Nos. 1 and 2, Bharatpur and circulated to all Family Courts in the State of Rajasthan where more than one Family Court has been established [Paras 27–29].

Service Law – Suspension on Arrest – Acquittal in Criminal Case – Claim for Full Pay and Allowances – Petitioner ANM placed under suspension from 1/9/1999 after arrest in criminal case under Sections 307, 294, 341 & 34 IPC – Convicted by Trial Court and later acquitted by High Court in appeal – Suspension period treated as on duty for all purposes except pay and allowances – Held: Suspension was under deeming provision of Rule 9(2)(a) of Rules, 1966 on account of custody beyond 48 hours – Such suspension cannot be termed wholly unjustified merely because of subsequent acquittal – Full pay and allowances admissible only when competent authority records finding that suspension was wholly unjustified under FR 54-B(3) – No such finding recorded – Petition dismissed [Paras 8-11, 19].

Fundamental Rule 54-B – Scope and Interpretation – Payment of Back Wages – FR 54-B(3) mandates payment of full pay and allowances only if suspension is found wholly unjustified – Discretion lies with competent authority – Where suspension is statutory consequence of arrest and prosecution not initiated at instance of department, denial of full back wages justified – Employer cannot be burdened for period services were not rendered due to employee’s involvement in criminal case [Paras 9-11, 15-16].

Back Wages after Acquittal – Criminal Prosecution not at Department’s Instance – Supreme Court Precedents – Relied on Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity Board and Union of India v. Jaipal Singh – Held: If employee involved in criminal case in personal capacity and department not responsible for prosecution, reinstatement on acquittal does not automatically entitle employee to back wages – Each case to be considered on its own facts – Suspension during pendency of trial and appeal not wholly unjustified [Paras 12-16].

Long Suspension – Stages of Proceedings – Gurpal Singh Case Distinguished – Apex Court held that suspension during trial and pendency of appeal cannot be termed wholly unjustified – Only suspension beyond reasonable stage without justification may attract full pay – In present case, suspension continued till retirement due to criminal proceedings – No stage shown where suspension became wholly unjustified [Para 17].

Decision: Writ Petition dismissed – Impugned order dated 25/1/2019 treating suspension period as on duty except for full pay and allowances upheld – Petitioner not entitled to full pay and allowances for suspension period.