Village Common Lands – Eviction Petition – Ownership and Control – Writ petition against eviction orders under Sections 4 and 5 of the Punjab Public Premises Act, 1973. The Gram Panchayat sought eviction of the petitioners from the land described as "Gair Mumkin Abadi." The petitioners contended that the land, recorded as "JumlaMushtarka Malkan" in ownership and "Maqbuja Malkan" in possession, did not vest in the Gram Panchayat but in the village proprietary body, hence the Panchayat could not initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1961. Held, the Gram Panchayat has management and control over such lands, not ownership, making the eviction petition under the Act of 1973 valid. Petition dismissed. [Paras 1-14]

Revenue Records – Land Classification – Abadi Deh vs. Gair Mumkin Abadi – The petitioners argued the land fell under "abadi deh" and thus outside "shamlat deh." Held, the land was recorded as "Gair Mumkin Abadi," not "abadi deh," and the Gram Panchayat did not hold absolute ownership. Therefore, proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1973 were appropriate. [Paras 6-10]

Estoppel – Challenge to Consolidation Scheme – Petitioners are estopped from challenging the designations made in the consolidation scheme since they challenged the orders only on maintainability grounds. Held, any dispute regarding land designated during consolidation should have been raised at that stage, not through the current proceedings. [Para 12]

Decision:

Petition dismissed. The institution of the eviction petition under Sections 4 and 5 of the Punjab Public Premises Act, 1973, is valid as the Gram Panchayat has management and control rights over the land, though not ownership. The land's classification as "Gair Mumkin Abadi" stands, and the petitioners are estopped from challenging the consolidation designations. [Para 14]

Criminal Law – Circumstantial Evidence – Acquittal – Appeal by the State against the acquittal of the respondent for murder charges under IPC. The prosecution’s case was based on weak circumstantial evidence, unsubstantiated recovery claims, and inconsistencies in witness testimonies. Held, the circumstantial evidence presented failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyonda reasonable doubt. No valid recovery was made pursuant to disclosure statements barred by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Contradictions in witness testimonies and lack of forensic links between the accused and the crime scene led to the acquittal being upheld. [Paras 1-47]

Evidence Law – Disclosure Statements – Recovery – The disclosure statements made by the accused did not result in any valid recovery and were thus inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Held, without corroborative evidence or valid recoveries, the statements cannot be relied upon for conviction. [Para 22]

Last Seen Evidence – Contradictions – The prosecution’s theory of last seen was contradicted by the FIR and appeared to involve a witness introduced later in the investigation. Held, the last seen evidence was unreliable and insufficient to establish the accused’s presence with the deceased at the time of the crime. [Paras 23-26]

Decision:

Appeal dismissed. The acquittal of Vinod was upheld due to the prosecution’s failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through credible circumstantial evidence. [Para 47]

Doctrine of lis pendens – Collusive decree – Validity – Land dispute – Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaration that order passed by High Court was collusive and not binding on their ownership rights – Plaintiffs claimed to have purchased the land in question through sale deeds – Defendants denied allegations and raised legal objections – Trial court decreed suit in favor of plaintiffs – Defendants appealed – District Judge upheld trial court’s decision – Regular Second Appeal filed before High Court – Concurrent findings in favor of plaintiffs – Held, no reason to overturn lower court’s judgments – Doctrine of lis pendens not applicable as proceedings were collusive – Appeal dismissed.

Relevant Paragraphs: 11, 12, 13, 14.

Service Law – Assured Career Progression (ACP) – Regular Satisfactory Service – Writ petition seeking modification of the date of grant of first ACP from March 1, 2019, to June 25, 2016. The petitioner contended that he completed eight years of regular satisfactory service in 2016 and was entitled to the ACP from that date. Held, imposition of fines as punishments does not constitute a blot on the petitioner’s career that would deny him the ACP. Furthermore, most of the penalties were imposed after the petitioner completed the requisite eight years of service. The petitioner is entitled to the ACP from June 25, 2016. [Paras 1-9]

Interpretation – Regular Satisfactory Service – The term "regular satisfactory service" means continuous service counting towards seniority, commencing from the date of joining after regular recruitment. Punishments imposed by fines should not deny eligibility for ACP if they do not significantly impact the service record. Held, fines imposed on the petitioner do not justify denial of ACP. [Paras 5-8]

Decision: Writ petition disposed of. Respondents are directed to consider the petitioner's case for the first ACP grade from June 25, 2016, subject to fulfilling other conditions laid down in the 2008 Rules. The consideration should be completed within four months, and consequential benefits should be paid within two months thereafter, with interest at 6% per annum for any delay. [Paras 9-10]

Administrative Law – Recruitment Process – Cut-off Dates – Writ petition filed by the petitioner to allow submission of an application form under the BC-B Ex-servicemen (ESM) category after the cut-off date for submission had passed. The petitioner acquired the required certificate after the cut-off date. Held, cut-off dates in the recruitment process are sacrosanct and must be followed without exception. The certificate obtained after the cut-off date cannot be considered. Petition dismissed. [Paras 1-9]

Recruitment – Eligibility Certificate – Timeliness – The petitioner, though qualified in the written examination, sought to submit an eligibility certificate acquired after the declared cut-off date. Held, the petitioner failed to provide evidence of possessing the eligibility certificate by the specified cut-off date. The Supreme Court’s judgment in Dolly Chhanda’s case underscores that eligibility must be met by the last date specified, barring any explicit provisions to the contrary. [Para 8]

Decision:

Petition dismissed. The Court found no merit in the petitioner’s case, emphasizing the adherence to the fixed cut-off date for submission of required documents. [Para 9]

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.Civil Procedure –Interim Injunction - Revision Petition – Challenge to orders dismissing application for interim injunction – Plaintiffs filed a suit seeking permanent injunction against defendants from interfering with their possession of a residential house – Application for interim injunction filed – Trial Court dismissed the application – First Appellate Court upheld the decision – Revision petition filed challenging the orders – Prima facie evidence of possession not established – Reliance on photographs as proof of possession deemed misplaced – Plaintiffs admitted to occupying another house in the village – Vacant land encroached upon, action taken by Gram Panchayat – Plaintiffs failed to establish prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss – Revision petition dismissed. (Para No. 5-7)

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.Civil Procedure –Interim Injunction - Revision Petition – Challenge to orders dismissing application for interim injunction – Plaintiffs filed a suit seeking permanent injunction against defendants from interfering with their possession of a residential house – Application for interim injunction filed – Trial Court dismissed the application – First Appellate Court upheld the decision – Revision petition filed challenging the orders – Prima facie evidence of possession not established – Reliance on photographs as proof of possession deemed misplaced – Plaintiffs admitted to occupying another house in the village – Vacant land encroached upon, action taken by Gram Panchayat – Plaintiffs failed to establish prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss – Revision petition dismissed. (Para No. 5-7)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 319 - Summoning of Additional Accused - Prima facie evidence - Invocation of jurisdiction - Test to be applied - Parameters laid down by Supreme Court - Whether evidence, if un-rebutted, would lead to conviction - Held, the application of Section 319 Cr.P.C. requires evidence that, if un-rebutted, would lead to conviction - A mere prima facie case, as exercised at the time of framing of charges, is insufficient - Specific role or attribution must be disclosed - Allegations of lalkara alone do not suffice - Failure to consider legal specifications while passing order - Error of law - Order summoning petitioner as additional accused set aside.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 363 - Kidnapping - POCSO Act, 2012 - Section 6 - Aggravated penetrative sexual assault - Prosecution failed to prove that the age of the victim was less than 18 years when the alleged offence was committed - Margin of error has to be reckoned with in case of ascertainment of age by radiological examination - Benefit of doubt should always go to the accused - Relationship between the appellant and the victim was consensual - Accused entitled to get the benefit of doubt - Conviction and sentence of the present appellant under section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and under section 363 of the Indian Penal Code set aside - Order to set the accused appellant at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained in connection with some other case. Para Number: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31