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by sayum
26 October 2026 12:05 PM
"The ingredients of the offences enumerated under Section 3 of the SC/ ST Act are not uniform. A perusal of Section 3(1)(e) and Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ ST Act reflect that the provisions therein are different from the provisions contained in Section 3(1)(w) thereof as mere knowledge of the fact that the victim is a member of a schedule caste or tribe would be sufficient to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(w) of the SC/ ST Act, and does not require the prosecution to establish as an additional ingredient that the sexual act was committed solely or exclusively on account of the victim’s caste/ tribe," Delhi High Court.
Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling dated September 17, 2026, clarified that for the purpose of framing charges under Section 3(1)(w) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the prosecution is not required to establish that the offence was committed exclusively on the ground of the victim’s caste.
A bench led by Justice Saurabh Banerjee held that the threshold for such an offence is met if the perpetrator commits a sexual act with the knowledge that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
The petitioner, a victim of gang rape, challenged a 2017 trial court order that declined to frame charges under the SC/ST Act, Section 328 of the IPC, and Section 14(3) of the POCSO Act against the accused persons. The trial court had discharged the accused of these specific offences, citing the absence of initial allegations in the FIR and insufficient evidence. The victim approached the High Court seeking an amendment to the charges, arguing that the legislative intent of the special enactment was being defeated.
The primary legal question was whether the failure of a victim to mention caste-related allegations in an initial FIR or statement under Section 164 CrPC precludes the framing of charges under the SC/ST Act. Furthermore, the court examined whether the prosecution must prove that an offence under Section 3(1)(w) of the SC/ST Act was committed "solely" because of the victim’s caste identity, and whether the trial court correctly evaluated the statutory presumption under Section 8(c) of the Act.
The court observed that the SC/ST Act is a legislative manifestation of Articles 14, 15, 17, and 21 of the Constitution of India, designed to protect marginalized communities from historical humiliation. The court emphasized that the trauma of sexual violence, particularly for a minor, often hampers the ability of the victim to articulate every detail of the incident immediately.
Delay in Allegations Not Fatal
The court held that a delay in reporting caste-based insults or knowledge of identity cannot be a ground to discard the applicability of the SC/ST Act. The bench noted that such amendments or improvements by a traumatized minor victim must be given due weightage rather than being brushed aside as mere "afterthoughts" without evidence of contradiction.
Knowledge is the Key Ingredient
The court drew a sharp distinction between different provisions of Section 3. While some offences require proof that the act was committed "on the ground" of the victim's caste, Section 3(1)(w) focuses on the perpetrator's knowledge. The bench held that if the accused possesses personal knowledge of the victim’s caste identity, the statutory presumption under Section 8(c) of the SC/ST Act is triggered, mandating the court to presume such knowledge at the stage of framing charges.
Prima Facie Evidence of Knowledge
In the present case, the court found sufficient prima facie material against the primary respondent, who was acquainted with the victim and had allegedly taunted her regarding her caste identity. This, the court ruled, was sufficient to invoke Section 3(1)(w). However, the court maintained the trial court's order regarding the co-accused, for whom there was no material on record indicating prior acquaintance or knowledge of the victim's caste.
No Error in Discharging Other Offences
Regarding the charges under Section 328 of the IPC (causing hurt by means of stupefying substances) and Section 14(3) of the POCSO Act (pornographic purposes), the court found no interference warranted. The absence of medical evidence in the MLC, failure to recover any stupefying substance, and the lack of electronic evidence regarding the alleged recording of a video justified the trial court's decision to discharge the accused under those specific provisions.
The High Court partially allowed the petition, directing the trial court to frame an additional charge under Section 3(1)(w) of the SC/ST Act against the primary respondent. The remaining portions of the trial court’s impugned order were upheld, with the court clarifying that these observations are limited to the stage of framing charges and shall not prejudice the parties during the full trial.
Date of Decision: 17 September 2026