Protection of Life and Liberty – Live-In Relationship – Articles 226, 227, and 21 of the Constitution – Held, protection of life and liberty is a basic feature of the Constitution – Every person, including those in a live-in relationship, is entitled to protection – Court directs necessary steps to ensure petitioners’ safety from those unhappy with their relationship [Paras 11, 13].

Pending Divorce Proceedings – Impact on Protection – The fact that one petitioner’s divorce is still pending does not negate their right to protection – Legal disputes regarding the relationship do not diminish the need to safeguard life and liberty [Para 10].

Court’s Approach – Threat Perception – The Court focuses on the threat to petitioners’ life and liberty rather than the legality of their relationship – Authorities are directed to assess threat perception and act accordingly – Protection does not preclude legal action if a criminal case is registered against the petitioners [Paras 12-14].

Decision: Petition Disposed – Respondent No.3 is directed to consider the petitioners’ representation regarding threat perception and take appropriate action – Clarification that this order does not prevent the State from proceeding against the petitioners in other cases.

Doctrine of Estoppel – Acquiescence – Section 33 of the Trade Marks Act – Requirements for Acquiescence – Held, Section 33 of the 1999 Act is based on the doctrine of estoppel – To apply, the subsequent user must be a proprietor of the same registered trade mark, acquiescence by the previous proprietor must be for a continuous period of 5 years, and the earlier proprietor must be aware of its use – These conditions were not fulfilled in the present case [Paras 4.3, 4.5].

Passing Off – Likelihood of Confusion – No Requirement to Prove Financial Loss – In a suit for passing off, the primary concern is the likelihood of confusion and possible injury to the public due to misrepresentation – Financial loss need not be proved – The defendant’s use of the trademark "KRANTI" creates an impression that their products are those of the plaintiff, which is factually incorrect [Para 4.7].

Prior Use and Proprietorship – Plaintiff’s Superior Rights – Section 27 of the Trade Marks Act – The plaintiff, being the proprietor of a registered trademark and a prior user, has superior rights – Prior user rights are recognized by Section 27 of the 1999 Act and are superior to those conferred by registration [Paras 3, 4.6].

Misrepresentation and Trademark Use – Distinction between Product Types Not a Valid Ground – The trial court erred in declining injunction based on the size and price differences of water flow meters – Both parties manufacture water flow meters, and the plaintiff's products are not limited to domestic use [Para 4.7].

Decision:

Appeal Allowed – The defendant is restrained from using the trademark "KRANTI" in any form, including marketing, advertising, and embossing on products – The trial court’s order refusing to grant an injunction is set aside.

Quashing of Orders – Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – Deposit of Compensation – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Petition to quash orders directing deposit of 20% compensation during the pendency of appeal – Held, Section 148 empowers the appellate court to order deposit at any stage during appeal – The provision starts with a non-obstante clause, overriding conflicting provisions in Cr.P.C. – The appellate court's direction for deposit is valid and does not amount to a review of earlier orders [Paras 18, 22].

Multiple Accused – Separate Deposits – Section 148 – Both accused signed the cheque – Each accused directed to deposit 20% of the compensation – Provision applies independently to each drawer – The argument that only one deposit should be required is rejected as it would create confusion and lead to unfair burden distribution among co-accused [Paras 21-22].

Principles of Appeal – Statutory Requirements – Section 148 – Appellate court must enforce the mandatory minimum deposit of 20% compensation – Special reasons required to deviate from this rule – Compliance with Section 148 does not infringe on the substantive rights of the accused – Ensures fair conduct of appeal and safeguards complainant’s interest [Paras 12-15].

Decision:

Petition Dismissed – Orders dated 17.03.2021 and 22.07.2021 upheld – Directions for the petitioner to deposit 20% of the compensation amount are legal and valid.

Correction of Date of Birth – Delay in Claim – Held, correction of date of birth cannot be claimed as a matter of right at the fag end of service – Such claims should be made without unreasonable delay – In this case, the petitioner sought correction after nearly two decades of service, which is unjustified [Paras 17-18].

Judicial Precedents – Consistent with Supreme Court Rulings – Several judgments reiterate that requests for date of birth corrections made towards the end of service careers are generally not entertained due to potential adverse impacts on service records and promotional opportunities for other employees – High Courts are advised against granting such petitions in exercise of their discretionary jurisdiction [Paras 8, 9, 17].

Service Records – Validity of Existing Entries – The petitioner’s date of birth was consistently recorded as 08.05.1963 based on his matriculation certificate since his joining in 2002 – The new birth certificate obtained in 2020 is insufficient to alter long-established records at this late stage [Para 2].

Legal Principles – Acquiescence and Delay – Legal precedents affirm that employees are bound by the date of birth accepted by their employers unless a genuine clerical error is evident – Courts discourage belated claims aiming to extend service tenure [Paras 8, 17].

Decision:  Writ Petition Dismissed – The petition for correcting the date of birth and extending service tenure is rejected due to unjustifiable delay and lack of compelling evidence of error in the original records.

Automatic Stay – Pendency of Appeal – Section 13 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act – Held, mere pendency of an appeal or application for stay does not render the impugned judgment inoperative – Statute does not provide for an automatic stay on filing of an appeal – Petitioners’ plea for automatic stay rejected [Para 11].

Sanctioning of Mutation – Pending Declaration Suits – Section 11(1) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act – Petitioners’ contention that mutation could not be sanctioned during the pendency of their suits for declaration is misplaced – Decision on the pending suits will determine the title and necessary corrections can be made in mutation entries thereafter [Para 12].

Alternative Remedy – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Statutory Appeal – Held, writ petition is not maintainable when an effective statutory remedy is available and has been invoked – Appeal under Section 13 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act is pending, making the writ petition unsustainable [Para 13].

Mutation Entry – No Right, Title, or Interest – Legal Position – Mutation entries do not confer any right, title, or interest – They are meant for fiscal purposes only – Title can only be decided by a competent civil court [Paras 14-15].

Decision:

Writ Petition Dismissed – The mutation sanctioned in favor of the Gram Panchayat upheld – Petitioners advised to pursue the statutory appeal pending before the District Collector.

Trademark and Surname – Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 – Bona Fide Use – Surnames – Held, the usage of one’s surname in trade cannot be restricted even by a registered proprietor if the use is bona fide – Surname forms an essential part of a person’s name – Honest use of a person’s surname, without intent to harm or exploit another's goodwill, is protected under Section 35 of the 1999 Act [Paras 10, 15, 16].

Prior Use and Honest Intent – Business Names – Section 35 – In India, conducting business using personal or family names is a common practice – Use of surname "Virdi" by appellants, being part of their family name and used bona fide, cannot be restrained – Plaintiffs’ failure to disclose material facts and lack of proof of dishonesty in defendants’ intent led to the setting aside of the injunction [Paras 9, 11, 13-15].

Injunction Requirements – Prima Facie Case, Balance of Convenience, Irreparable Loss – Requirements for granting an injunction not satisfied by the plaintiffs – The trial court failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm favoring the plaintiffs [Para 19].

Decision:

Appeal Allowed – Injunction order by Additional District Judge set aside – Application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC dismissed – Trial court directed to conclude the trial within 18 months.

Priority of Secured Creditors – Section 26(E) of SARFAESI Act – Section 48 of Transfer of Property Act – Held, rights created prior in time, such as a mortgage, have priority over subsequent attachments – Auction purchasers’ rights protected – SARFAESI Act provides secured creditors with priority over other debts and government dues [Paras 14-16].

Transfer of Property – Attachment Order – Section 83 Cr.P.C. – Attachment of property under Section 83 Cr.P.C. does not create a charge for debt recovery – Prior mortgage rights of the bank take precedence – Auction purchasers entitled to property free from encumbrances [Paras 17-18].

Judicial Intervention – Writ Jurisdiction – Article 226 – High Court can intervene to prevent injustice despite alternative remedies – Attachment orders subsequent to mortgage do not affect auction purchasers’ rights under SARFAESI Act [Para 20].

Decision:

Writ Petition Allowed – Quashing of order dated 16.05.2019 – Directions issued to transfer the secured asset in favor of the petitioners/auction purchasers.

Quashing of FIR – Compromise – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – FIR registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B IPC – Dispute amicably settled between parties – Complainant appeared through Power of Attorney – Held, inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash criminal proceedings if the offence is overwhelmingly and predominantly of a civil nature – FIR quashed in the interest of justice to prevent abuse of process of law [Paras 17-19].

Power of Attorney – Validity in Criminal Proceedings – Section 2 of Power of Attorney Act – Complainant can appear through Power of Attorney holder – Court accepted the appearance and statements of the complainant’s Power of Attorney holder in support of the compromise – Recognized as a valid representation for the purpose of quashing the FIR [Paras 8, 12-14].

Genuine Compromise – Judicial Scrutiny – Judicial Magistrate's report confirmed the authenticity and voluntariness of the compromise – Court emphasized that the compromise was genuine and bona fide, and quashing the FIR would serve the interest of justice [Paras 7, 16].

Decision:

Petition Allowed – FIR No. 86 dated 22.05.2009 registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B of the IPC at Police Station City Kotkapura, District Faridkot, and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed.

Specific Performance – Agreement to Sell – Readiness and Willingness – Sections 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act – Plaintiff must not only aver but also prove readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract – Plaintiff’s failure to disclose financial capacity and readiness in cross-examination leads to adverse inference – Refund of earnest money with interest directed [Paras 21-22].

Delay and Laches – Specific Performance – Discretionary Relief – Agreement to Sell – Plaintiff delayed filing the suit for specific performance by 2 years and 9 months after knowing about the cancellation of the agreement – Relief of specific performance is discretionary and equitable – Delay and laches sufficient to disentitle the plaintiff from specific performance [Paras 23, 25-28].

Bona Fide Purchaser – Knowledge of Prior Agreement – Defendants failed to prove they were bona fide purchasers without knowledge of the prior agreement to sell – Defendants and plaintiff were residents of the same village, indicating knowledge [Para 24].

Decision:

Appeals Partly Allowed – Decree for specific performance substituted with a decree to refund Rs. 1,00,000/- with interest at 12% per annum – Refund amount to remain the first charge on the property agreed to be sold.