Tenant's "Deemed Purchaser" Right Defeated By Retrospective Notification Under Section 88(1)(b) Of Tenancy Act: Bombay High Court

"Purchase created under Section 32 was never intended by the Legislature to operate independent from the remaining provisions of the Act. Rather, the Legislature made the operation of Section 32 subject to the later provisions contained in the statute," Bombay High Court

Bombay High Court, in a significant ruling, held that a tenant's right as a "deemed purchaser" under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (BTAL Act), is not an absolute vested right.

A single-judge bench of Justice Amit Borkar observed that the statutory purchase on Tiller's Day remains subject to subsequent provisions of the Act, and any later notification issued under Section 88(1)(b) excluding the land from the Act's purview operates retrospectively, thereby extinguishing the tenant's acquired rights.

The petitioners' ancestor was cultivating agricultural land in Pune as a tenant before April 1, 1957, thereby becoming a deemed purchaser on Tiller's Day under the BTAL Act. However, in 1962, the limits of the Pune Municipal Corporation were extended, bringing the suit property within municipal limits. Consequently, in 1964, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal dropped the tenancy proceedings on the ground that the Act no longer applied to the land. Decades later, the petitioners challenged the 1964 order, claiming their vested rights could not be taken away retrospectively and arguing that the 1964 order was a nullity as it was passed against a deceased tenant.

The primary question before the court was the true nature of the statutory purchase under Section 32 of the Act and whether it grants indefeasible rights. The court was also called upon to determine whether Section 88(1)(b) operates to exclude the application of Chapter III retrospectively, and whether the 1964 tribunal order could be ignored as a nullity for want of jurisdiction.

Deemed Purchase Is Not An Unconditional Right

The petitioners strongly contended that once a tenant became a deemed purchaser on Tiller's Day, ownership vested by operation of law and could not be defeated by subsequent municipal inclusion. However, the High Court rejected this absolute interpretation, noting the express statutory language of the enactment.

Statutory Qualifiers Cannot Be Ignored

Justice Borkar pointed out that Section 32(1) explicitly states that the deemed purchase is "subject to the other provisions of this section and the provisions of the next succeeding sections." The court observed that these qualifying words form a crucial part of the enactment and cannot be ignored while interpreting the scope of the tenant's rights. The bench noted that the Act itself recognises multiple situations where a statutory purchase may later become ineffective.

Section 88(1)(b) Operates Retrospectively

Addressing the impact of Section 88(1)(b), the court clarified that the provision begins with the sweeping phrase "nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply." Relying on the Supreme Court's ratio decidendi in Parvati v. Fatehsinhrao Pratapsinhrao Gaekwad, the High Court reiterated that such notifications operate retrospectively to extinguish previously acquired tenancy rights.

Rights Claimed Under Act Become Non Est

Quoting the apex court's precedent, the bench observed that once a valid notification is issued reserving the area for non-agricultural or industrial development, "the consequence that falls is that the provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 are not applicable to the land in question... and as a result these rights acquired under the said Act automatically becomes non est."

Distinction In Supreme Court Precedents

The petitioners attempted to rely on the Supreme Court judgment in Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli, which held that deemed purchaser rights cannot be taken away retrospectively. However, Justice Borkar skillfully distinguished this precedent, noting that Tribhovandas was decided on the basis of two specific provisos introduced by the Gujarat Amendment Act, 1965. The court observed that those statutory amendments do not exist in the Maharashtra legislation, and therefore, the strict interpretation laid down in Parvati continues to govern disputes in Maharashtra.

"A decision, simply because it may be wrong, would not thereupon become a nullity. It would continue to bind the parties unless set aside."

Erroneous Order Does Not Equate To Nullity

The court then turned to the petitioners' argument that the 1964 order dropping the proceedings was a complete nullity because the original tenant had died in 1960. The court noted that the petitioners failed to produce the complete 1964 order with its cause title, making it impossible to verify if legal representatives were brought on record. The bench emphasized that the burden to establish a plea of nullity rests entirely upon the party making the assertion.

Competent Authority Orders Bind Until Set Aside

Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's judgment in V.S. Charati, the High Court drew a sharp doctrinal distinction between an order that is legally erroneous and an order passed without jurisdiction. The court observed that an order passed by a competent authority does not become non est merely because another legal interpretation was possible or because it is alleged to be incorrect.

Inordinate Delay Justifies Dismissal

Because the 1964 order was not a nullity, the normal rules of limitation squarely applied to the case. The court observed that the petitioners challenged the tribunal's order by filing an appeal under Section 74 of the BTAL Act only in 2007/2008, after a lapse of several decades. The bench held that the petitioners failed to offer any convincing or satisfactory explanation for this enormous delay.

No Interference In Writ Jurisdiction

Finding no fault with the approach of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, which had earlier refused to condone the delay, the High Court stated that it would not substitute its own view merely because another conclusion was possible. The bench affirmed that the tribunal's decision was neither arbitrary nor contrary to law.

Ultimately, the High Court held that the statutory purchase under the BTAL Act does not survive a subsequent Section 88(1)(b) notification. Validating the findings of the revisional authorities regarding the unexplained and inordinate delay, the court dismissed the writ petitions as being entirely devoid of merit.

Date of Decision: 20 July 2026