Section 482 CrPC Petition Not Maintainable Against Special NIA Court's Refusal To Discharge, Remedy Lies In Statutory Appeal: Allahabad High Court

"Since the order of refusal to discharge has been passed by the Special Judge NIA, an appeal lies under Section 21(1) of the NIA Act, 2008." Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), in a significant ruling dated March 20, 2026, held that an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) is not maintainable against an order passed by a Special NIA Court refusing discharge.

A single-judge bench of Justice Brij Raj Singh observed that since the National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008 provides a specific statutory remedy under Section 21(1) for appealing any order of a Special Court that is not interlocutory, the inherent powers of the High Court cannot be invoked to bypass this mandate. The Court emphasized that a refusal to discharge affects substantial rights and thus qualifies for a statutory appeal rather than a petition under Section 482 CrPC.

The case originated from an FIR registered at Police Station Bakshi Ka Talab, District Lucknow, involving offences under Sections 121-A, 153-A, and 295-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The investigation was conducted by the Uttar Pradesh Police, and a charge sheet was filed before the Magistrate, following which the Special Judge NIA/Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow, took cognizance. The applicants, Mohd. Faizan and others, sought discharge from the proceedings, which was refused by the Special NIA Court on July 1, 2025. They subsequently approached the High Court seeking the quashing of the cognizance order and the entire proceedings.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether an application under Section 482 CrPC is maintainable against a refusal of discharge by a Special NIA Court in light of the appellate provisions under Section 21 of the NIA Act, 2008. The court was also called upon to determine if the NIA Act applies to a case where the investigation was conducted by the State Police without being formally entrusted to the National Investigation Agency under Sections 6 or 7 of the Act.

Examining the statutory framework, the Court noted that Section 21(1) of the NIA Act contains a non-obstante clause, stipulating that an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence, or order—provided it is not an interlocutory order—of a Special Court to the High Court on both facts and law. The bench referred to the precedent in Ravindra Kumar vs. State of U.P., which clarified that orders substantially affecting the rights of the parties, such as the refusal of bail or discharge, cannot be categorized as purely interlocutory. The Court highlighted that the legislative intent was to provide a specific appellate route for orders passed by Special Courts constituted under the NIA Act. "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law."

The applicants had contended that the NIA Act was inapplicable because the investigation was handled by the UP Police rather than the NIA, arguing that the twin conditions of "investigation and prosecution by the agency" were not met. However, Justice Brij Raj Singh pointed out that Section 121-A IPC is a Scheduled Offence under the NIA Act. The Court observed that Section 10 of the Act expressly saves the power of the State Government to investigate and prosecute Scheduled Offences. Therefore, the character of the investigating agency does not strip the Special Court of its status or the proceedings of their statutory character under the NIA Act. "Reading of Section 10 of the Act, 2008 clearly reveals that the State Government has independent power to investigate the Scheduled Offence."

Addressing the maintainability of the petition, the Court held that it could not adjudicate on the merits of the NIA Act’s applicability while sitting in a jurisdiction that is itself barred by the existence of a statutory appeal. The bench noted that once an order is passed by a Special Judge designated under the NIA Act, the procedural remedy must follow the special statute. The Court cited various decisions, including Sallahuddin vs. State of U.P. and Sumit Kumar vs. State of U.P., to reinforce that where a special statute like the NIA Act or the SC/ST Act provides an appellate remedy, a petition under Section 482 CrPC is not the appropriate recourse. "The applicability of the NIA Act, 2008 to the applicants can be seen only when the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS is maintainable."

The High Court ultimately concluded that the preliminary objection raised by the State regarding maintainability was well-founded. Since the impugned order of the Special NIA Court was appealable under Section 21(1), the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC could not be exercised. The Court dismissed the application but granted the applicants the liberty to challenge the refusal of discharge through a statutory appeal as prescribed by the NIA Act. "Since the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS is not maintainable against the summoning order and refusal order of discharge, this Court would not dwell upon the submission made by the counsel for the applicant that the Act, 2008 is not applicable."

In summary, the Court reaffirmed that the NIA Act's appellate mechanism is exhaustive for orders passed by Special Courts concerning Scheduled Offences, regardless of whether the investigation was conducted by the central agency or the state police. The petition was rejected as not maintainable, leaving the applicants to pursue their remedy before a Division Bench of the High Court as required under Section 21(2) of the NIA Act.

Date of Decision: 20 March 2026