High Court Can't Invoke Inherent Powers To Allow 'Backdoor Entry' For Second Revision Unless Gross Injustice Is Established: Delhi High Court

"It is trite that what is explicitly prohibited by law cannot be given backdoor entry by invoking inherent powers." Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling dated May 19, 2026, held that the statutory bar against a second revision petition under Section 397(3) of the CrPC [now Section 438(3) of the BNSS] cannot be bypassed by invoking the inherent powers of the High Court unless a case of "gross injustice" is clearly established.

A bench of Justice Girish Kathpalia observed that while inherent jurisdiction exists, it cannot be used as a "backdoor entry" to circumvent explicit legal prohibitions.

The case originated from a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act involving a dishonoured cheque of Rs. 5,00,000/-. The Trial Magistrate had directed the petitioner and a co-accused to pay 20% interim compensation under Section 143A of the NI Act. This order was subsequently modified by the Court of Sessions in its revisional jurisdiction, holding that only the petitioner, as the drawer of the cheque, was liable to pay the interim compensation.

Primary Legal Issues Before The Court

The primary question before the court was whether the present petition, filed after the petitioner had already exhausted his revisional remedy, was hit by the bar under Section 397(3) CrPC. The court was also called upon to determine whether the petitioner’s claim of receiving only a fraction of the loan amount constituted "gross injustice" sufficient to warrant the invocation of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

Statutory Bar On Second Revision Under Section 397(3) CrPC

The court began by examining the maintainability of the petition in light of Section 397(3) CrPC, which prohibits the institution of a second revision petition by the same party. Justice Kathpalia noted that the impugned order had been passed by the Court of Sessions while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, the High Court observed that the present proceedings appeared to be an attempt to secure a second revision under the garb of a different nomenclature.

Inherent Powers Cannot Be Used To Circumvent Explicit Legal Prohibitions

The court emphasized that while the High Court possesses inherent powers, these cannot be used to undermine the legislative intent behind statutory bars. The bench noted that what the law explicitly prohibits cannot be allowed through indirect means. The court held that judicial discipline requires respecting the finality of revisional orders unless the circumstances are extraordinary.

"It is trite that what is explicitly prohibited by law cannot be given backdoor entry by invoking inherent powers."

The Exception Of Gross Injustice In Invoking Section 482 CrPC

The court agreed with the legal proposition that the bar under Section 397(3) CrPC does not operate as an absolute wall if a case of "gross injustice" is set up. Justice Kathpalia observed that where a petitioner is able to establish that the lower court's order results in a manifest miscarriage of justice, the High Court would be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction. However, this power must be exercised sparingly and not as a matter of routine.

Court Rejects Frivolous Argument Regarding Loan Amount

The petitioner argued that he had received only Rs. 50,000/- out of the total Rs. 5,00,000/- loan and therefore should not be held liable for the entire interim compensation. The court found this argument entirely unconvincing, noting that if the petitioner had received such a small amount, there was no logical reason for him to draw and sign a cheque for the full amount of five lakhs.

"I am not at all convinced with this argument, because if he received only Rs.50,000/-, there was no reason for him to draw cheque of Rs.5,00,000/-... It is certainly not a case of gross injustice for which this court would invoke inherent powers."

Liability Of The Drawer Under Section 143A NI Act

The court noted that the Sessions Court had correctly modified the trial court's order based on the Supreme Court's precedent in Mrs. Aparna A. Shah vs M/s Sheth Developers P. Ltd.. The revisional court had rightly concluded that only the signatory/drawer of the cheque can be held liable for interim compensation under Section 143A of the NI Act. Since the petitioner admitted to signing the cheque, the court held that his liability was clear.

In conclusion, the High Court dismissed the petition, describing it as "completely frivolous." The bench upheld the order of the Sessions Court and imposed costs of Rs. 10,000/- on the petitioner for abusing the process of the court. The costs are to be deposited with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee (DHCLSC) within one week, and the trial court has been directed to ensure compliance.

Date of Decision: 19 May 2026