Section 4 Limitation Act Inapplicable To Extendable Discretionary Period Under Section 61(2) IBC; NCLAT Bound To Exercise Rule 11 Recall Powers: Supreme Court

17 November 2026 9:05 PM

By: sayum


"The benefit of exclusion of the period during which a Court or Tribunal is closed shall be available only when the appeal is filed within the ‘prescribed period of limitation’ and shall not be available in respect of the period extendable by the Court in exercise of its discretion."

NEW DELHI — Clarifying the strict parameters of statutory limitation under corporate insolvency law, the Supreme Court held on November 16, 2026, that the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be extended to cover the discretionary 15-day condonable window under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. A Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva ruled that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal erred in rejecting an application to recall its delay condonation order, reaffirming that the appellate tribunal possesses inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 to recall orders passed in violation of settled law.

The corporate insolvency resolution process of Manjeera Retail Holdings Private Limited culminated in the approval of a resolution plan submitted by Lulu International Shopping Malls Private Limited, which invested ₹271.52 crore towards its implementation. Subsequently, aggrieved commercial unit buyers filed appeals before the NCLAT on the 46th day against the approval order, contending that their claims were improperly classified as advances rather than financial debt. Although the prescribed 30-day limitation and the discretionary 15-day period had lapsed, the NCLAT condoned the delay by applying Section 4 of the Limitation Act since the 45th day was a second Saturday, prompting the successful resolution applicant to file recall applications that were dismissed by the appellate tribunal.

Whether the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the discretionary extendable period of 15 days provided under the proviso to Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 when the last day falls on a court holiday?

Whether the NCLAT is vested with inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 to recall an order condoning delay that was passed contrary to binding Supreme Court precedent?

Section 4 of the Limitation Act is confined strictly to the prescribed period of limitation and excludes discretionary extensions

The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 alongside Section 61(2) of the IBC. The Bench reiterated the authoritative principle settled in Tata Steel Ltd. vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee, noting that statutory concessions for court closures cannot be expanded beyond the mandatory period.

The Court emphasized that the expression 'prescribed period' appearing in Section 4 of the Limitation Act cannot be construed to mean anything other than the core period of limitation. Any discretionary period extendable at the hands of the court falls completely outside this ambit.

"This Court categorically held therein that the expression ‘prescribed period’ appearing in Section 4 of the Act of 1963 could not be construed to mean anything other than the ‘period of limitation’ and any period beyond that prescribed period, during which the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be part of the ‘prescribed period’."

NCLAT possesses inherent powers under Rule 11 to recall orders violating binding precedent

Addressing the NCLAT's refusal to recall its earlier order, the Bench observed that while the tribunal does not enjoy substantive review jurisdiction under the IBC, it is fully clothed with procedural recall powers under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 to remedy glaring legal errors.

The Court held that the NCLAT was incorrect in treating the cited precedent as subsequent law, observing that when the Supreme Court clarifies a statutory provision, it operates as the law of the land from inception.

"It is no doubt true that the NCLAT does not have the power of review under the provisions of the IBC but it is vested with the power of recalling its orders by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016."

Failure to establish sufficient cause and availability of e-filing invalidate delay condonation

The Bench took critical note of the fact that the contesting respondents had failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay. The Court pointed out that since the appeals were eventually e-filed on a Sunday, the closure of physical counters on a second Saturday was wholly immaterial.

The Court held that an order condoning delay does not attain finality when timely recall proceedings have kept the dispute alive. Consequently, the Supreme Court exercised its appellate jurisdiction under Section 62 of the IBC to rectify the illegality committed by the tribunal.

Setting aside the NCLAT's orders, the Supreme Court allowed the recall applications and quashed the condonation of delay. Consequently, Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) Nos. 388 and 389 of 2025 before the NCLAT Chennai were dismissed as barred by limitation, solidifying the finality of the approved resolution plan.

Date of Decision: November 16, 2026

 

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