Section 19(b) Specific Relief Act Must Yield To Doctrine Of Lis Pendens; Pendente Lite Purchaser Cannot Claim Bona Fide Status: Allahabad High Court

"Subsequent purchaser's plea of bona fide purchaser with valuable consideration and without notice as enunciated in Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 has to yield to the doctrine of lis pendens." Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling , held that a subsequent purchaser of a disputed property cannot claim the defense of being a bona fide purchaser under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act if the purchase was made during the pendency of a specific performance suit.

A single-judge bench of Justice Sandeep Jain observed that the equitable defense under the Specific Relief Act is entirely overridden by the absolute public policy mandate of the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The plaintiff filed a civil suit seeking specific performance of a registered agreement to sell executed in his favour in September 1981 by the primary defendant. During the pendency of this suit, the primary defendant sold the disputed agricultural land to third-party purchasers. The trial court dismissed the plea for specific performance and merely directed the refund of earnest money, reasoning that the subsequent purchasers had bought the land in good faith without notice of the prior agreement, prompting the plaintiff's first appeal before the High Court.

The primary question before the court was whether the defendants, who purchased the property during the pendency of the suit, could claim protection as bona fide purchasers for value without notice under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The court was also called upon to determine whether the plaintiff could enforce the agreement under Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, given that the vendor had an imperfect title at the time the initial agreement was executed.

The Court thoroughly examined the interplay between Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Evaluating Supreme Court precedents including Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal and Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, the High Court emphasized that the protection offered to a subsequent purchaser acting in good faith without notice is only available if the transfer occurs prior to the institution of the lawsuit. Once litigation commences, the property is locked by the doctrine of lis pendens to ensure disputes eventually reach finality. "Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act operates at a stage prior to institution of the suit or proceeding. It is further evident that section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith of bona fides arises."

Consequently, the High Court held that the trial court committed a grave error in shielding the subsequent purchasers under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. Since the subsequent registered sale deed was executed in October 1982, well after the suit was instituted in March 1982, the purchasers were bound by the final outcome of the pending litigation regardless of whether they had actual knowledge of the prior agreement. "The subsequent purchaser's plea of bona fide purchaser with valuable consideration and without notice as enunciated in Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 has to yield to the doctrine of lis pendens, and as such, with or without notice of the earlier agreement to sell executed by defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh in favour of plaintiff, they are bound by the decree passed in the suit."

"Even if the vendor was not having any or imperfect title to the disputed property, but if subsequently he acquires any interest in the disputed property and the agreement still subsists, then the purchaser can compel the vendor to make good the contract."

The bench then addressed a secondary complication regarding the vendor's title. At the time the agreement to sell was executed on September 3, 1981, the vendor did not possess perfect title due to an earlier conveyance to another party. However, he subsequently acquired clear title just days later on September 7, 1981, following a compromise decree that cancelled the earlier transfer. Applying the doctrine of "feeding the grant by estoppel" embodied in Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act, the Court held that a vendor cannot use their own initial defective title as an excuse to avoid an agreement if they later acquire the requisite interest to fulfill it. "In accordance with the provisions of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the plaintiff is entitled to demand the specific performance of agreement and it cannot be opposed by the subsequent purchasers on the ground that defendant no.1 Tejvir Singh had no title to the disputed property."

Finally, the Court noted that the plaintiff had convincingly proved his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The default lay entirely with the vendor who failed to obtain necessary income tax permissions and execute the deed. Thus, denying the primary relief of specific performance and merely granting a refund of the earnest money with interest was legally unsustainable. "The trial court has certainly erred in concluding that the subsequent purchasers i.e. defendants no. 2 to 7 are bonafide purchaser of the disputed property without notice of the agreement to sell, who are entitled to the benefit of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963."

The High Court allowed the first appeal with costs throughout and set aside the trial court's judgment. Decreeing the suit for specific performance against all the defendants, the Court directed the original vendor and the subsequent purchasers to execute the sale deed and hand over vacant possession of the property to the plaintiff within two months.

Date of Decision: 25 March 2026