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by sayum
17 November 2026 9:07 PM
"Even a proved contradiction serves only to impeach the credit of the witness under Section 155(3) of the Evidence Act. It may lead the Court to view what he has said in court with caution, or to reject his testimony altogether. It does not, however, make his previous statement evidence of the facts narrated therein. In other words, a proved contradiction may show that the witness is unreliable, but it cannot show that what he told the police is true," Supreme Court.
NEW DELHI: Observing that the statutory prohibition in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is absolute, the Supreme Court on November 16, 2026 held that statements recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC cannot be treated as substantive evidence to establish guilt or motive when witnesses turn hostile at trial. A Bench comprising Justice Satish Chandra Sharma and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh ruled that confronting a hostile witness with their police statement under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 can at best impeach their creditworthiness under Section 155(3) of the Evidence Act, but can never convert the police statement into substantive proof of the facts stated therein.
The prosecution alleged that on the night of April 17, 2011, the appellant, along with a co-accused, murdered two widows in village Ranila, Haryana, over suspicion of immoral character, initially using dandas and subsequently a gandasi. The Trial Court convicted both accused under Sections 302, 449, 297, and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and awarded the death penalty. On reference and appeal, the Punjab and Haryana High Court acquitted the co-accused, commuted the appellant's sentence to life imprisonment, and sustained his conviction primarily because his name figured in the FIR and previous police statements of witnesses.
Whether statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC and an FIR based on hearsay can be treated as substantive evidence of complicity and motive when every private witness resiled from their version in court?
Whether disclosure statements and recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act stand legally established when the investigating officers fail to depose to the exact words uttered by the accused?
Whether an accused can be convicted on evidence of the identical quality and nature that was discarded by the High Court to acquit a co-accused?
Section 162 CrPC enacts a blanket prohibition against substantive use of police statements
The Supreme Court observed that Section 162(1) CrPC is couched in the widest negative terms, barring the use of any statement made to a police officer during investigation for any purpose other than the limited exception of contradicting a prosecution witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. and the three-judge bench ruling in V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, the Bench underscored that statements under Section 161 CrPC are wholly devoid of the procedural safeguards attending judicial testimony.
The Court held that the Trial Court and High Court committed a fundamental illegality by relying on Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of Delhi) to treat Section 161 CrPC statements of hostile witnesses as substantive evidence. The Bench clarified that Bhagwan Dass cannot be read as laying down that a resiled police statement becomes substantive evidence of its contents, noting that the Constitution Bench judgment in Tahsildar Singh was not brought to the notice of the Court in that matter.
Proved contradictions only impeach credit and cannot establish the truth of police records
The Court highlighted that even if a contradiction is proved through the examining police officer under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, its legal effect is strictly confined by Section 155(3) of the Evidence Act to discrediting the witness. Such impeachment may warrant rejecting the sworn deposition, but it cannot reverse the evidentiary standard to treat the unsworn police record as truth.
The Bench further found that the prosecution did not even prove the contradictions in accordance with law, as the investigating officers were never called upon to prove the specific portions denied by the witnesses, and simply deposed that they had recorded the statements.
An FIR naming an accused based on hearsay remains inadmissible to prove complicity
Addressing the High Court's finding that the FIR became a binding document because the informant admitted his signature, the Supreme Court held that Section 154 CrPC merely mandates the informant to sign the record, which only proves that the statement was made. Where the informant admittedly did not witness the crime and failed to disclose the source of their knowledge, the FIR constitutes pure hearsay.
The Court strongly disapproved of the High Court's reasoning of accepting the resiled police statement of a child witness against the appellant merely because his name was in the FIR, while rejecting the exact same statement against the co-accused whose name was absent from the FIR. The Bench held that an inadmissible statement cannot become substantive evidence against one accused while remaining non-evidence against another.
Section 27 Evidence Act requires IO to depose exact words uttered by accused
Evaluating the recoveries, the Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position in Ramanand alias Nandlal Bharti v. State of U.P., ruling that to prove a discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the investigating officer is obliged in law to depose to the exact words uttered by the accused, rather than merely exhibiting the recovery memo. Because the investigating officers failed to narrate the actual information furnished, the disclosures remained unproved.
The Court also observed that the prosecution drastically shifted its case regarding the weapon of offence after the post-mortem revealed incised wounds. While the FIR and initial disclosures alleged the use of a blunt danda, a second disclosure was recorded days later introducing a gandasi. The Bench noted that the High Court had rightly discarded the parallel recovery of an axe from the co-accused on this very ground, and could not have applied a contradictory standard to accept the gandasi recovery against the appellant.
Inconclusive serological analysis and non-examination under Section 313 CrPC vitiate reliance on recoveries
The Bench pointed out that the forensic analysis revealed the blood group on the appellant’s clothes to be inconclusive, while the blood on the gandasi had completely disintegrated, failing even to confirm human origin. Relying on Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, the Court held that in the absence of a reliable recovery and an unblemished investigation, inconclusive blood grouping cannot bridge the missing links in a circumstantial case.
The Court also observed that vital circumstances, including the forensic reports and the motive attributed to the appellant, were never put to him during his examination under Section 313 CrPC, causing serious prejudice and requiring such material to be eschewed from consideration as held in Raj Kumar alias Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi).
Principle of parity mandates identical treatment where evidence against co-accused is of same quality
Applying the panchsheel principles of circumstantial evidence laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, the Bench held that the prosecution failed to complete the chain of circumstances pointing exclusively to the appellant's guilt. The Court underscored that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Invoking the principle of parity reiterated in Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court concluded that once the inadmissible Section 161 CrPC statements and hearsay FIR are excluded, the case against the appellant stood on identical footing with that of the acquitted co-accused, and convicting one while acquitting the other amounted to impermissible discrimination.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court, and acquitted the appellant of all charges under Sections 302, 449, 297, and 201 IPC, directing his immediate release. The Court also set aside the order of compensation under Section 357 CrPC, while recommending that the District Legal Services Authority, Bhiwani, consider granting compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased victims under the applicable Victim Compensation Scheme pursuant to Section 357A(3) CrPC.
Date of Decision: November 16, 2026