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by sayum
17 November 2026 9:07 PM
"An objection relating to the mode or method of proof, must be taken, when the electronic record is tendered and cannot ordinarily be raised for the first time in appeal... The objection based solely upon the absence of a certificate under Section 65-B is, therefore, belated and cannot be sustained." Emphasizing that procedural objections regarding the mode of proof of electronic evidence must be voiced contemporaneously during the trial to afford the prosecution an opportunity to rectify any curable defect, the Delhi High Court, through a single-judge bench of Justice Madhu Jain on October 29, 2026, dismissed an appeal against conviction under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The Court ruled that where an accused permitted a secondary audio recording cassette to be exhibited and cross-examined witnesses on its contents without challenging the lack of a certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, such a challenge cannot be entertained for the first time at the appellate stage.
The appellant, working as a Section Supervisor in the Employees' Provident Fund Organisation, was convicted by the Special CBI Court for demanding and accepting an illegal gratification of ₹500 from a complainant seeking the release of his sanctioned provident fund and pension arrears. The trap laid by the CBI resulted in the recovery of phenolphthalein-treated currency notes from the appellant's left shirt pocket, along with positive chemical washes of both his hands and pocket, leading to sentences of up to three years of rigorous imprisonment. Challenging his conviction, the appellant argued before the High Court that no official work remained pending at his desk, the money was forcibly thrust into his pocket, and the recorded conversation was inadmissible for want of a Section 65-B Evidence Act certificate.
Whether an objection concerning the non-production of a certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act can be validly raised for the first time in an appeal against conviction when the secondary electronic record was admitted in evidence without demur before the trial court?
Whether a public servant can be held liable under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act when the specific processing required at his immediate desk had been completed, but the file remained pending within the administrative section under his overall supervisory charge?
Whether the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act stands rebutted by a defence plea of forcible insertion of tainted currency notes when chemical washes of both hands of the accused test positive for phenolphthalein?
Mode of proof objections under Section 65-B cannot be raised for the first time in appeal
Addressing the admissibility of the secondary audio cassette transferred from a digital voice recorder, the Court observed that although a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act is ordinarily a condition precedent under the dictum of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, procedural objections pertaining to the mode and method of proof must be strictly taken when the document is tendered in evidence.
The Court highlighted that the trial had concluded in 2006, well prior to the landmark ruling in Anvar P.V., and that the appellant had allowed the tape and transcript to be exhibited without demurring. Applying the principles enunciated in Sonu v. State of Haryana and reiterated in Sundar v. State, the Court observed that failing to object during trial deprived the prosecution of the opportunity to cure the technical defect, thereby rendering the appellate objection impermissible.
Section 7 PC Act does not necessitate exclusive authority over every stage of official work
Turning to the defence contention that the appellant had cleared the provident fund claim on his desk on January 2, 2003, and therefore had no official favour left to perform, the Court ruled that administrative pendency within a section under the accused's direct supervision is sufficient to establish official nexus under anti-corruption laws.
The Bench reiterated that Section 7 of the PC Act does not require the concerned public servant to possess exclusive authority over every stage of the official process. It is sufficient that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward for an official act connected with his official functions, particularly when the file had not yet been transmitted to the Cash Section for disbursement.
Positive hand washes negate defence of money being thrust into pocket
Scrutinizing the appellant's explanation under Section 313 CrPC that the currency notes were forcibly thrust into his shirt pocket, the Court held that while Section 313 statements cannot fill prosecution lacunae, they can be tested against the probabilities of proved facts.
The Court held that the explanation of forcible insertion was fundamentally incompatible with the scientific evidence on record. Had the currency notes merely been thrust into the pocket without conscious handling, the presence of phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate in the washes of both hands would remain entirely unexplained, thereby dismantling the defence theory.
Presumption under Section 20 remains unrebutted once conscious acceptance is proved
Reiterating the Constitution Bench ruling in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court observed that direct oral evidence from the complainant and the shadow witness conclusively proved prior demand as well as demand at the spot through spoken words and gestures.
The Court held that once the foundational facts of demand and voluntary receipt are established by direct evidence, Section 20 of the PC Act mandates a statutory presumption that gratification was accepted as a motive or reward. Since the appellant failed to displace this presumption on a preponderance of probabilities, and the prosecution independently proved obtainment under Section 13(1)(d), the conviction was unassailable.
Upholding the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the Special Judge, CBI, the High Court dismissed the appeal and directed the appellant to surrender before the trial court within four weeks to serve out the remainder of his sentence, granting the benefit of set-off under Section 428 CrPC.
Date of Decision: October 29, 2026